Chemical warfare watchers, from scientists to policy advocates, often wonder what went on at the Army Chemical Center during the 1960s. It was a decade in which thousands of Army enlisted men served as volunteers for the secret testing of chemical agents. The actual historical record, however, has until now remained disturbingly incomplete. What chemicals was the Army studying? Why was the program never fully documented in books available to the public? Who planned and carried out the tests, and what was their purpose? How, and by whom, were the volunteers recruited? How adequately were they instructed before giving their informed consent? What long range effects, if any, have been found in follow-up studies? Written by the physician who played a pivotal role in psychoactive drug testing of hundreds of volunteers, the story breaks an official silence that has lasted almost fifty years. Dr. James Ketchum may be the only scientist still equal to the task. His book goes a long way toward revealing the contents of once classified documents that still reside in restricted archives. The author spent most of a decade testing over a dozen potential incapacitating agents including LSD, BZ and marijuana derivatives. His 380-page narrative, loaded with both old and recent photographs, derives from technical reports, memoranda, films, notes and memories. Written primarily for the general reader, but supplemented by a voluminous appendix of graphs and tables for the technically inclined, Dr. Ketchum's book combines a subjective diary with an objective report of the external events that shaped and eventually terminated the program. Informal and autobiographical in style, it includes numerous amusing anecdotes and personality portraits that make it simultaneously intriguing and informative.

This book gives an almost forgotten history concerning civilian university scientists, who carried out research on defense against poison gases in some unusual places during World War II. Most of these were graduate students, working under the direction of professors at the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) and the University of California (Berkeley). The first job on these projects was to make major improvements on gas masks. Later, most activities were done outdoors to assess the effects of terrain and meteorological conditions on the travel and dissipation of toxic gas clouds. Action took place in California, Florida, and the jungles of Panama.On these two parallel projects, one young participant was a big, healthy, athletic extrovert, who was deeply trained in the physical sciences, and by age twenty-nine (in 1943) was world famous in physics and in biology. Another was opposite in many ways: a skinny sickly loner, who was minimally schooled in science and mathematics. From the ten principal people working on these two projects, one was killed by accident while experimenting with a poison gas in the laboratory; another was proud of how he had defeated the draft system in an unusual way.

In the years since the 9/11 attacks—and the subsequent lethal anthrax letters—the United States has spent billions of dollars on measures to defend the population against the threat of biological weapons. But as Lynn C. Klotz and Edward J. Sylvester argue forcefully in Breeding Bio Insecurity, all that money and effort hasn’t made us any safer—in fact, it has made us more vulnerable. Breeding Bio Insecurity reveals the mistakes made to this point and lays out the necessary steps to set us on the path toward true biosecurity. The fundamental problem with the current approach, according to the authors, is the danger caused by the sheer size and secrecy of our biodefense effort. Thousands of scientists spread throughout hundreds of locations are now working with lethal bioweapons agents—but their inability to make their work public causes suspicion among our enemies and allies alike, even as the enormous number of laboratories greatly multiplies the inherent risk of deadly accidents or theft. Meanwhile, vital public health needs go unmet because of this new biodefense focus. True biosecurity, the authors argue, will require a multipronged effort based in an understanding of the complexity of the issue, guided by scientific ethics, and watched over by a vigilant citizenry attentive to the difference between fear mongering and true analysis of risk. An impassioned warning that never loses sight of political and scientific reality, Breeding Bio Insecurity is a crucial first step toward meeting the evolving threats of the twenty-first century.

Handbook of Toxicology of Chemical Warfare Agents, Third Edition, covers every aspect of deadly toxic chemicals used in conflicts, warfare and terrorism. Including findings from experimental as well as clinical studies, this essential reference offers in-depth coverage of individual toxicants, target organ toxicity, major incidents, toxic effects in humans, animals and wildlife, biosensors and biomarkers, on-site and laboratory analytical methods, decontamination and detoxification procedures, and countermeasures. Expanding on the second edition, Handbook of Toxicology of Chemical Warfare Agents has been completely updated, presenting the most recent advances in field. Brand new chapters include a new chapter on emergency preparedness, coverage of the chemical warfare agents used in Syria, the use of the Novichok agent in the UK, and more. Unites world-leading experts to bring you cutting-edge, agent-specific information on Chemical Warfare Agents (CWA) and their adverse effects on human and animal health, and the environment Provides you with all the information you need on CWA modes of action, detection, prevention, therapeutic treatment and countermeasures New to this edition: a full update to reflect the most recent advances in the field and new chapters on emergency preparedness, the chemical warfare agents used in Syria, and the use of the Novichok agent in the UK