The concept of asymmetrical warfare is a popular and much discussed issue in U.S. defense literature these days. Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010),2 the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR),3 and the National Military Strategy (NMS)4 are just a few of the documents that express concern about it. Understandably, the Secretary of Defense has made addressing the phenomenon a central theme of his administration. All of that said, what exactly is meant by asymmetrical warfare? In broad terms it simply means warfare that seeks to avoid an opponent's strengths; it is an approach that tries to focus whatever may be one side's comparative advantages against its enemy's relative weaknesses.5 In a way, seeking asymmetries is fundamental to all warfighting. But in the modern context, asymmetrical warfare emphasizes what are popularly perceived as unconventional or nontraditional methodologies. For most potential adversaries, attacking the United States asymmetrically is the only warfighting strategy they might reasonably consider for the foreseeable future. The Gulf War was an object lesson to military planners around the globe of the futility of attempting to confront the United States symmetrically, that is, with like forces and orthodox tactics. In this essay I briefly examine how the West's cultural disposition and mindset affect its concept of asymmetrical warfare. I contend that the West's current focus may leave it vulnerable to asymmetrical challenges that arise from opponents whose cultural perspective differs significantly from that of the West.

In war, there are always differences between the opponents. At times these are insignificant, passing disparities with no bearing on the outcome. At other times, the differences between opponents are important, placing one in a position of advantage, the other at a disadvantage. This is a very simple observation, but from it flows one of the pressing issues faced by the United States today: strategic asymmetry. Strategic asymmetry is the use of some sort of difference to gain an advantage over an adversary. It is an idea as old as warfare itself, appearing under a number of guises. Among strategic theorists, Sun Tzu placed great stock in psychological and informational asymmetry, writing that: All warfare is based on deception. When confronted with an enemy one should offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him. When he concentrates, prepare against him; where he is strong. avoid him.

The author offers a detailed comparison between the character of irregular warfare, insurgency in particular, and the principal enduring features of "the American way." He concludes that there is a serious mismatch between that "way" and the kind of behavior that is most effective in countering irregular foes. The author poses the question, Can the American way of war adapt to a strategic threat context dominated by irregular enemies? He suggests that the answer is "perhaps, but only with difficulty."

The U.S. National Security Strategy is the basis of a preventive solution through global engagement, which fosters international interoperability and cooperation to defeat complex asymmetric threats. The study examined how U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) can advance this interoperability and cooperation, and identified three evolving roles; Strike Force, Warrior Diplomats, and Global Scouts. As they transition into the 21st century, the central research question is: will U.S. Army Special Forces need to redefine themselves in terms of mission, doctrine, training, or organization as a result of their evolving roles conditioned by an asymmetric threat environment? The study examined the relevance of core, collateral, and emerging missions. It concluded that basic SF doctrine remains sound, but the changing environment and evolving roles of SF will call for a certain amount of refinement. Tactics, techniques, and procedures will change as new technologies are introduced into SF organizations, but emphasis on the human element remains essential, and SF core competencies and warrior skills must be preserved. The study concluded with recommendations to preserve the relevance and efficiency of SF as the premier mechanism for extending U.S. influence in a world of increased global interaction, required to meet security needs.

This study analyzes the feasibility of guerrilla warfare as the basis for a strategy of airpower employment for a weak air force confronting an opponent with a stronger air force. The analysis begins with a distillation of the theory of guerrilla warfare into five elements essential to its success: superior intelligence, security, mobility advantage, surprise, and sustainment. The author then compares the ground combat environment of the traditional guerrilla with the airpower environment of the potential air guerrilla and concludes that these five elements can be met in the airpower environment provided the weak force has sufficient ingenuity and the necessary resources. An investigation of recent trends in technology and the prevailing strategic environment indicates that it increasingly possible for a weak force to obtain these resources. The author assesses that air guerrilla warfare is a viable warfighting strategy, but points out that the likelihood of a weak force actually adopting air guerrilla warfare will depend on its regional security needs and its resolve to protract a conflict. The study concludes that air guerrilla warfare is a credible threat to a stronger opponent. To meet this threat, the author recommends that the United States re-examine its intervention strategy, reinforce its policy of strategic engagement, and research both airpower and non-airpower means to neutralize an elusive guerrilla air force.