The original article with Lars Calmfors predicted that highly coordinated or centralized bargaining would lead to wage restraint and low unemployment. Despite shortcomings, this prediction has survived scrutiny. Recent work suggests that collective bargaining should be seen as part of broader research on institutions and macroeconomic performance in growth.

The main focus of the “wage bargaining” literature has been on the factors promoting real wage flexibility at the macro level. This paper, in contrast, examines the microeconomic issues of wage bargaining. More specifically, this paper appraises the following questions: (a) what are the conditions under which a firm prefers decentralized to centralized bargaining?, (b) what are the characteristic features of firms which prefer decentralized to centralized bargaining?, and (c) has the proportion of firms which prefer decentralized bargaining increased over time? These questions are examined in an efficiency wage model with insider-outsider features. This paper provides useful theoretical insights for understanding the issues involved in shifting from centralized to decentralized wage bargaining.

Why were European economies able to pursue the simultaneous commitment to full employment and welfare state expansion during the first decades of the postwar period and why did this virtuous relationship break down during recent decades? This book provides an answer to this question, by highlighting the critical importance of a political exchange between unions and governments, premised on wage moderation in exchange for the expansion of social services and transfers. The strategies pursued by these actors in these political exchanges are influenced by existing wage bargaining institutions, the character of monetary policy and by the level and composition of social policy transfers. The book demonstrates that the gradual growth in the fiscal burden has undermined the effectiveness of this political exchange, lowering the ability of unions' wage policies to affect employment outcomes.