Both studies of political power and Europeanization studies have tended to neglect central banks. As the age of the euro reaches its 10th anniversary, it is timely to reflect on what it means for central banks, which have been at the forefront of the establishment of Economic and Monetary Union in the European Union. Central banks have been caught up in a major historic political project. What does it mean for them? What does the age of the euro tell us about the power of central banks, their Europeanization and whether they are coming to resemble each other more closely? This book brings together a range of recognized academic specialists to examine the main political aspects of this question. How, and in what ways, has the euro Europeanized central banks (members and non-members of the Euro Area)? What have been its effects on the power of central banks and their use of power? Has the euro generated convergence or divergence in central banking? The book offers the first, in-depth and systematic political analysis of central banks in the first decade of the euro. It places the euro in its global and European contexts, including the US Fed and the Australasian central banks, patterns of differentiated integration in European central banking, and the European Central Bank. It offers a set of case studies of its effects on a representative sample of EU central banks (euro 'insiders' and 'outsiders') and looks at four main thematic areas (monetary policy, financial market supervision, accountability and transparency, and research). The book contributes to Europeanization studies, comparative political economy, and studies of Economic and Monetary Union. It will be of major interest to students of the European Union and European integration, comparative European politics, and area and 'country' studies. More generally, it will interest all those interested in central banking and their pivotal and problematic position between politics and markets.

Comprehensive 200-page overview of the ECB from its inception in June 1998 until the present day.

Curzio had one of the most fertile and original minds ever to be deployed on questions relating, first, to the interactions between Central Banks, private sector financial intermediaries and the government, and second to the working of the international monetary system in general, and to the role of the IMF specifically within that. His approach has been to apply a theory of history , which provides a beautifully written and illuminating book, much easier and nicer to read and more rounded than the limited mathematical models that have so monopolised academia in recent decades. From the foreword by Charles A.E. Goodhart Curzio Giannini s history of the evolution of central banks illustrates how the most relevant institutional developments have taken place at times of widespread confidence crises and in response to deflationary pressures. The eminent and highly-renowned author provides an analytical perspective to study the evolution of central banking as an endogenous response to crisis and to the ever increasing needs of economic growth. The key argument of the analysis is that crucial innovations in the payment technology (from the invention of coinage to the development of electronic money) could not have taken place without an institution i.e. the central bank - that could preserve confidence in the instruments used as money. According to Curzio Giannini s neo-institutionalist methodological approach, social institutions are, in fact, essential in the coordination of individual decisions as they minimize transaction costs, overcome information asymmetries and deal with incomplete contracts. This enlightening and revealing historical theory perspective on central banking will prove a thought-provoking read for academic and institutional economists, economic historians, and economic policymakers involved in the task of crafting a new institutional arrangement for central banking in the globalized economy.

"The book contains a collection of articles on the European Union and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), the Eurosystem, monetary law, central bank independence and central bank statutes as well as on financial law. The authors are current or former members of the Legal Committee of the ESCB (LEGCO). This book commemorates ten years of work by the Working Group of Legal Experts of the European Monetary Institute and by the LEGCO. It is dedicated to Mr Paolo Zamboni Garavelli, former Head of the Legal Department at the Banca d'Italia and member of LEGCO, who died in 2004."--Editor.

Central banks have become the go-to institution of modern economies. In the wake of the 2007 financial crisis, they injected trillions of dollars of liquidity – through a process known as quantitative easing – first to prevent financial meltdown and later to stimulate the economy. The untold story behind these measures, and behind the changing roles of central banks generally, is that they have come at a considerable cost. Central banks argue we had no choice. This book offers a powerfully original examination of why this claim is false. Using examples from Europe and the US, the authors present and analyse three specific concerns about the way central banks in developed economies operate today. Firstly, they show how unconventional monetary policies have created significant unintended negative consequences in terms of inequalities in income and wealth. They go on to argue that central banks may have become independent of governments, but have instead become worryingly dependent on financial markets. They then proceed to analyse how central bankers, despite being the undisputed experts on monetary policy, can still err and suffer from multiple forms of bias. This book is a sobering and urgent wake-up call for policy-makers and anyone interested in how our monetary and financial system really works.

Both studies of political power and Europeanization studies have tended to neglect central banks. As the age of the euro reaches its 10th anniversary, it is timely to reflect on what it means for central banks, which have been at the forefront of the establishment of Economic and Monetary Union in the European Union. Central banks have been caught up in a major historic political project. What does it mean for them? What does the age of the euro tell us about the power of centralbanks, their Europeanization and whether they are coming to resemble each other more closely? This book brings together a range of recognized academic specialists to examine the main political aspects of this question. How, and in what ways, has the euro Europeanized central banks (members andnon-members of the Euro Area)? What have been its effects on the power of central banks and their use of power? Has the euro generated convergence or divergence in central banking? The book offers the first, in-depth and systematic political analysis of central banks in the first decade of the euro. It places the euro in its global and European contexts, including the US Fed and the Australasian central banks, patterns of differentiated integration in European central banking, and the EuropeanCentral Bank. It offers a set of case studies of its effects on a representative sample of EU central banks (euro 'insiders' and 'outsiders') and looks at four main thematic areas (monetary policy, financial market supervision, accountability and transparency, and research). The book contributes toEuropeanization studies, comparative political economy, and studies of Economic and Monetary Union. It will be of major interest to students of the European Union and European integration, comparative European politics, and area and 'country' studies. More generally, it will interest all those interested in central banking and their pivotal and problematic position between politics and markets.

Not long ago, secrecy was the byword in central banking circles, but now the unmistakable trend is towards greater openness and transparency. This, the third Geneva Report on the World Economy, describes and evaluates some of the changes in how central banks talk to the markets, to the press, and to the public. The report first assesses the case for transparency ? defined as providing sufficient information for the public to understand the policy regime ? and concludes that it is very strong, based on both policy effectiveness and democratic accountability. It then examines what should be the content of communication and argues that central banks ought to spell out their long-run objectives and methods. It then investigates the link between the decision-making process and central bank communication, drawing a distinction between individualistic and collegial committees. The report concludes with a review of the communications strategies of some of the main central banks.