This paper provides a brief historical journey of central banking in Latin America to shed light on the debate about monetary policy in the post-global financial crisis period. The paper distinguishes three periods in Latin America’s central bank history: the early years, when central banks endorsed the gold standard and coped with the collapse of this monetary system; a second period, in which central banks turned into development banks under the aegis of governments at the expense of increasing inflation; and the “golden years,” when central banks succeeded in preserving price stability in an environment of political independence. The paper concludes by cautioning against overburdening central banks in Latin America with multiple mandates as this could end up undermining their hard-won monetary policy credibility.

The paper documents the use of foreign exchange intervention (FXI) across countries and monetary regimes, with special attention to its use under inflation targeting (IT). We find significant differences between advanced and emerging market economies, with the former group conducting FXI limitedly and broadly symmetrically, while the use of this policy instrument in emerging market countries is pervasive and mostly asymmetric (biased towards purchasing foreign currency, even after taking into account precautionary motives). Within emerging markets, the use of FXI is common both under IT and non-IT regimes. We find no evidence of FXI being used in response to inflation developments, while there is strong evidence that FXI responds to exchange rates, indicating that IT central banks in EMDEs have dual inflation/exchange rate objectives. We also find a higher propensity to overshoot inflation targets in emerging market economies where FXI is more pervasive.

A major, new, and comprehensive look at six decades of macroeconomic policies across the region What went wrong with the economic development of Latin America over the past half-century? Along with periods of poor economic performance, the region’s countries have been plagued by a wide variety of economic crises. This major new work brings together dozens of leading economists to explore the economic performance of the ten largest countries in South America and of Mexico. Together they advance the fundamental hypothesis that, despite different manifestations, these crises all have been the result of poorly designed or poorly implemented fiscal and monetary policies. Each country is treated in its own section of the book, with a lead chapter presenting a comprehensive database of the country’s fiscal, monetary, and economic data from 1960 to 2017. The chapters are drawn from one-day academic conferences—hosted in all but one case, in the focus country—with participants including noted economists and former leading policy makers. Cowritten with Nobel Prize winner Thomas J. Sargent, the editors’ introduction provides a conceptual framework for analyzing fiscal and monetary policy in countries around the world, particularly those less developed. A final chapter draws conclusions and suggests directions for further research. A vital resource for advanced undergraduate and graduate students of economics and for economic researchers and policy makers, A Monetary and Fiscal History of Latin America, 1960–2017 goes further than any book in stressing both the singularities and the similarities of the economic histories of Latin America’s largest countries. Contributors: Mark Aguiar, Princeton U; Fernando Alvarez, U of Chicago; Manuel Amador, U of Minnesota; Joao Ayres, Inter-American Development Bank; Saki Bigio, UCLA; Luigi Bocola, Stanford U; Francisco J. Buera, Washington U, St. Louis; Guillermo Calvo, Columbia U; Rodrigo Caputo, U of Santiago; Roberto Chang, Rutgers U; Carlos Javier Charotti, Central Bank of Paraguay; Simón Cueva, TNK Economics; Julián P. Díaz, Loyola U Chicago; Sebastian Edwards, UCLA; Carlos Esquivel, Rutgers U; Eduardo Fernández Arias, Peking U; Carlos Fernández Valdovinos (former Central Bank of Paraguay); Arturo José Galindo, Banco de la República, Colombia; Márcio Garcia, PUC-Rio; Felipe González Soley, U of Southampton; Diogo Guillen, PUC-Rio; Lars Peter Hansen, U of Chicago; Patrick Kehoe, Stanford U; Carlos Gustavo Machicado Salas, Bolivian Catholic U; Joaquín Marandino, U Torcuato Di Tella; Alberto Martin, U Pompeu Fabra; Cesar Martinelli, George Mason U; Felipe Meza, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México; Pablo Andrés Neumeyer, U Torcuato Di Tella; Gabriel Oddone, U de la República; Daniel Osorio, Banco de la República; José Peres Cajías, U of Barcelona; David Perez-Reyna, U de los Andes; Fabrizio Perri, Minneapolis Fed; Andrew Powell, Inter-American Development Bank; Diego Restuccia, U of Toronto; Diego Saravia, U de los Andes; Thomas J. Sargent, New York U; José A. Scheinkman, Columbia U; Teresa Ter-Minassian (formerly IMF); Marco Vega, Pontificia U Católica del Perú; Carlos Végh, Johns Hopkins U; François R. Velde, Chicago Fed; Alejandro Werner, IMF.

Central banks have become the go-to institution of modern economies. In the wake of the 2007 financial crisis, they injected trillions of dollars of liquidity – through a process known as quantitative easing – first to prevent financial meltdown and later to stimulate the economy. The untold story behind these measures, and behind the changing roles of central banks generally, is that they have come at a considerable cost. Central banks argue we had no choice. This book offers a powerfully original examination of why this claim is false. Using examples from Europe and the US, the authors present and analyse three specific concerns about the way central banks in developed economies operate today. Firstly, they show how unconventional monetary policies have created significant unintended negative consequences in terms of inequalities in income and wealth. They go on to argue that central banks may have become independent of governments, but have instead become worryingly dependent on financial markets. They then proceed to analyse how central bankers, despite being the undisputed experts on monetary policy, can still err and suffer from multiple forms of bias. This book is a sobering and urgent wake-up call for policy-makers and anyone interested in how our monetary and financial system really works.

This book examines the current state of central banking in 44 developing countries. The authors analyse the banks' achievement in their primary objective of price stability and discuss the reasons behind the general lack of success. The book covers: * government financing * foreign exchange systems * domestic banking systems. Rich in data, the book contains original financial information from Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean. The lay-out is user-friendly and generously illustrated with tables, figures, boxed material and useful appendices. The book is published in association with the Bank of England and presents the definitive account of the role of central banks in developing countries.

In the wake of the 2008–09 global financial crisis, central banking and monetary policy in many corners of the world came under intense pressure and entered unchartered waters. The breadth and scale of central bank operations have been modified or expanded in unprecedented and even unimaginable ways given the circumstances. Additionally, a fundamental rethinking of central banking and its policy frameworks has been taking place. This volume reflects a multilateral effort to help close the gap in our knowledge in meeting the critical challenges presented by these significant changes, in particular, those confronting central banks in Latin America. The volume’s first section provides a panoramic overview of the policy progress made to date and the challenges that lie ahead. The related issue of spillovers and monetary independence is taken up more fully in the next section. The final section presents chapters that reexamine macroprudential and monetary policies and policy frameworks from the perspective of central bank staff members from the region.

Why has the economy of Latin America responded more positively than Asia, Europe or the United States after being hit by the recent global financial crisis? Three years after the worst of the crisis, Latin America's GDP is 25 percent higher than its precrisis level. José De Gregorio, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile from 2007 to 2011, tells the story of how Latin America has responded to the crisis with a perspective that only an insider can have. De Gregorio focuses on the seven largest economies of the region, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela (90 percent of the region's output). He argues that Latin America was resilient because of good macroeconomic policies, strong financial systems, and "a bit of luck."