A central bank is financially strong if it possesses resources sufficient to attain its fundamental policy objective(s). Once endowed with those resources, relations between government and central bank should be designed so that significant changes in central bank financial strength do not occur unless necessitated by changes in policy objectives. The level of strength required depends on the array of policy objectives (for example, the exchange rate regime) as well as the constraints and risks presented by the operational environment. Attaining credibility is facilitated if the public can easily determine the financial strength of the bank, yet for a variety of reasons this is often difficult. Transparency requires institutional arrangements that ensure the central bank generates profit in most states of the world, is subject to strict ex post independent audit, and transfers regularly all profits, after provisions, to the treasury.

Central bank financial strength is positively associated with good policy performance. Financially weak central banks generate losses which undermine macroeconomic stability and call into question the credibility of their policies. In assessing central bank financial strength a careful examination of the policy regime and the volatility of the economic environment is necessary. Conventional measures of private enterprise financial strength- profitability and capital-can be very misleading when applied to central banks. The way in which a central bank balance sheet is strengthened matters. Providing the central bank with marketable government debt that can be used to develop a money market that in turn may become the locus of central bank monetary operations serves both to directly strengthen the institution and improve the quality of the environment in which it operates, thereby facilitating the attainment of its ultimate performance objectives.

To mitigate the risks of contagion from problems arising in the banking sector, many countries operate some form of banking sector safety net. Such safety nets generally involve a judicious mixture of transparency and ambiguity. This ambiguity may be important to counter moral hazard effects but may lead to excessive forbearance in the face of banking problems. While the scope for ambiguity has been declining, some ambiguity in the handling of individual institutions remains. In any case, ex post transparency is essential for reviewing the propriety of any assistance and preserving the authorities’ future reputation and policy credibility.

CONTENTS: Central Banking Governance -- Insights; Central Bank Independence & Governance: Definitions & Modelling; Central Bank Independence & Policy Results: Theory & Evidence; Communicating a Policy Path: The Next Frontier in Central Bank Transparency?; Governance Structures & Decision -- Making Roles in Inflation Targeting Central Banks; Central Bank Governance: Maintaining Arm's Length from those in Power; Risk Based Supervision: Legal & Supervisory Implications; Central Bank Financial Strength, Transparency, & Policy Credibility; Payment System Governance; Transparency & Communication Policy in Japan; Rising New Governance Regime in Monetary Policy: A Review of ECB & Fed.

Conventional economic policy models focus only on selected elements of the central bank balance sheet, in particular monetary liabilities and sometimes foreign reserves. The canonical model of an "independent" central bank assumes that it chooses money (or an interest rate), unconstrained by a need to generate seignorage for itself or government. While a long line of literature has emphasized the dangers of fiscal dominance influencing the conduct of monetary policy the idea that an independent central bank could be constrained in achieving its policy objectives by its own balance sheet situation is a relatively novel idea considered in this paper. If one accepts this potential constraint as a valid concern, the financial strength of the central bank as a stand alone entity becomes highly relevant for ascertaining monetary policy credibility. We consider several strands of evidence that clearly indicate fiscal backing for central banks cannot be assumed and hence financial independence is relevant to operational independence. First we examine 135 central bank laws to illustrate the variety of legal approaches adopted with respect to central bank financial independence. Second, we examine the same data set with regard to central bank recapitalization provisions to show that even in cases where the treasury is nominally responsible for maintaining the central bank financially strong, it may do so in purely a cosmetic fashion. Third, we show that, in actual practice, treasuries have frequently not provided central banks with genuine financial support on a timely basis leaving them excessively reliant on seignorage to finance their operations and/or forcing them to abandon policy objectives.

This collection takes the reader through historical, theoretical and factual discussions on why central banks exist and the role – actual and intended – they have in assisting their home nation in achieving monetary and financial stability.