This paper examines the financial strength of central banks in Central America and the Dominican Republic (CADR). Some central banks are working off the effects of intervention in distressed financial institutions during the 1990’s and early 2000’s. Their net income has improved since then owing to lower interest rates, a reduction in interest bearing debt, and recapitalization transfers. Claims on the government have fallen, but remain high and are typically reimbursed at below-market rates, and capital is negative when adjusting for this. Capital is sufficient to back a low inflation target given that the income position is supported by unremunerated reserve requirements. Capital is likely to increase over time, but only gradually, leaving countries vulnerable to macroeconomic risks. The capacity of CADR central banks to engage in macroeconomic stabilization would benefit from increased emphasis on low inflation as the primary objective of monetary policy and a stronger commitment by governments to recapitalization.

This paper provides a brief historical journey of central banking in Latin America to shed light on the debate about monetary policy in the post-global financial crisis period. The paper distinguishes three periods in Latin America’s central bank history: the early years, when central banks endorsed the gold standard and coped with the collapse of this monetary system; a second period, in which central banks turned into development banks under the aegis of governments at the expense of increasing inflation; and the “golden years,” when central banks succeeded in preserving price stability in an environment of political independence. The paper concludes by cautioning against overburdening central banks in Latin America with multiple mandates as this could end up undermining their hard-won monetary policy credibility.

Despite some improvement since 2011, Latin America and the Caribbean continue to lag behind other regions in terms of financial inclusion. There is no clear evidence that fintech developments have supported greater financial inclusion in LAC, contrary to what has been observed elsewhere in the world. Case studies by national policy experts suggest that barriers to entry in the financial sector, along with a constraining regulatory environment, may have hindered a faster adoption of fintech. However, fintech development seems to have accelerated in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and with the support of recent policy initiatives.

Why has the economy of Latin America responded more positively than Asia, Europe or the United States after being hit by the recent global financial crisis? Three years after the worst of the crisis, Latin America's GDP is 25 percent higher than its precrisis level. José De Gregorio, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile from 2007 to 2011, tells the story of how Latin America has responded to the crisis with a perspective that only an insider can have. De Gregorio focuses on the seven largest economies of the region, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela (90 percent of the region's output). He argues that Latin America was resilient because of good macroeconomic policies, strong financial systems, and "a bit of luck."

Most central banks oblige depository institutions to hold minimum reserves against their liabilities, predominantly in the form of balances at the central bank. The role of these reserve requirements has evolved significantly over time. The overlay of changing purposes and practices has the result that it is not always fully clear what the current purpose of reserve requirements is, and this necessarily complicates thinking about how a reserve regime should be structured. This paper describes three main purposes for reserve requirements - prudential, monetary control and liquidity management - and suggests best practice for the structure of a reserves regime. Finally, the paper illustrates current practices using a 2010 IMF survey of 121 central banks.

This paper analyzes the legal foundations of central bank digital currency (CBDC) under central bank and monetary law. Absent strong legal foundations, the issuance of CBDC poses legal, financial and reputational risks for central banks. While the appropriate design of the legal framework will up to a degree depend on the design features of the CBDC, some general conclusions can be made. First, most central bank laws do not currently authorize the issuance of CBDC to the general public. Second, from a monetary law perspective, it is not evident that “currency” status can be attributed to CBDC. While the central bank law issue can be solved through rather straithforward law reform, the monetary law issue poses fundmental legal policy challenges.