A comprehensive, multi-faceted volume on the men, the machines, and the missions that shaped the Air Cavalry Troops who served in Vietnam.

Air Cav: History of the 1st Cavalry Division in Vietnam 1965-1969 is the story of the small, close world of fighting men in action. This volume can be many things to many people a book of memories, a souvenir, a pictorial essay on airmobility, or simply a story of gallant men at war. It can be many things, but one thing it is not, nor does it pretend to be a complete history of the 1st Air Cavalry Division in Vietnam. The task and burden of history must lie with the objectivity of future generations, far removed from current pressures and restraints. It is true, of course, that much research for this book has been done from available official records, the ultimate source of written history. But even more has been drawn from the vivid recollections of the Cavalrymen who fought, tasted the brassy bile of fear, shared the fierce exultation of victory, or were drenched in the dark despair of death. This volume contains the memoirs of a fighting team the FIRST TEAM. It is a memory ""

On 1 July 1965 the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was officially activated and was ordered to Vietnam beginning 28 July 1965. In a matter of three and half weeks the newly formed division, with 16,000 men and 434 helicopters--Chinooks (CH-47s), Flying Cranes (CH-54s), Mohawks (OV-1s), UH-1s and OH-13s--was prepared to enter combat. Within 90 days of becoming the Army's first airmobile division, the 'First Team' was in combat as the first fully committed division of the Vietnam War. On 10 October 1965, in Operation 'Shiny Bayonet', the First Team initiated its first brigade-size airmobile action against the enemy. The division would go on to take part in many more air assaults and play a leading role in defence against the Tet offensive, driving out the NVA and Viet Cong invaders from Hue and, in Operation 'Pegasus', relieving the 3,500 U.S. Marines and 2,100 ARVN soldiers besieged by nearly 20,000 enemy at Khe Sanh. On 1 May 1970, the 'First Team' was 'First into Cambodia' hitting what was previously a Communist sanctuary but the campaign had severe political repercussions for the Nixon Administration. Pressure was mounting to withdraw US forces from the war. Although there would be further assault operations, the war was beginning to wind down and 26 March 1971 officially marked the end of duties in Vietnam for the 1st Cavalry Division, although it was only on 5 May 1971 that the colours moved from Vietnam to Fort Hood, Texas.

This military history chronicles the combat operations of the Blackhorse Regiment, which paved the way for armored cavalry tactics in the Vietnam War. South Vietnam, September 1966. When the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment came ashore at Vung Tau, it faced a number of challenges. In addition to the threat of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army, the terrain and weather posed their own dangers, adversely affecting the use of bulletproof vehicles and helicopters. The dearth of doctrine and tactics for the employment of armored cavalry in a counterinsurgency was equally challenging—especially during pre-deployment training and initial combat operations. But despite all this, the leaders of Blackhorse Regiment found a way to accomplish their mission. Within a year of their arrival in Vietnam, Blackhorse troopers overcame ambushes that featured anti-tank weapons, numerous landmines, and coordinated assaults. They not only defeated an enemy division twice their size, but also demonstrated how to succeed while operating on and off the roads, in the jungle, and during both the wet and dry seasons. By the spring of 1967, army leaders were beginning to realize the value of troops stationed in Vietnam. And with the Blackhorse Regiment leading the way, armor came to be considered an essential part of the combat team. Written by a Blackhorse veteran, this regiment history features firsthand accounts from soldiers who served in Vietnam and Cambodia.

At its dawn in the early twentieth century, the new technology of aviation posed a crucial question to American and British cavalry: what do we do with the airplane? Lacking the hindsight of historical perspective, cavalry planners based their decisions on incomplete information. Harnessing the Airplane compares how the American and British armies dealt with this unique challenge. A multilayered look at a critical aspect of modern industrial warfare, this book examines the ramifications of technological innovation and its role in the fraught relationship that developed between traditional ground units and emerging air forces. Cavalry officers pondered the potential military uses of airplanes and other new technologies early on, but preferred to test them before embracing and incorporating them in their operations. Cavalrymen cautiously examined airplane capabilities, developed applications and doctrine for joint operations, and in the United States, even tried to develop their own, specially designed craft. Throughout the interwar period, instead of replacing the cavalry, airplanes were used cooperatively with cavalry forces in reconnaissance, security, communication, protection, and pursuit—a collaboration tested in maneuvers and officially blessed in both British and American doctrine. This interdependent relationship changed drastically, however, during the 1930s as aviation priorities and doctrine shifted from tactical support of ground troops toward independent strategic bombardment. Henning shows that the American and British experiences with military aviation differed. The nascent British aviation service made quicker inroads into reconnaissance and scouting, even though the British cavalry was the older institution with more-established traditions. The American cavalry, despite its youth, contested the control of reconnaissance as late as the 1930s, years after similar arguments ended in Britain. Drawing on contemporary government reports, memoirs and journals of service personnel, books, and professional and trade journals and magazines, Harnessing the Airplane is a nuanced account of the cavalry’s response to aviation over time and presents a new perspective on a significant chapter of twentieth-century military history.

The tactics and technologies of modern air assault – vertical deployment of troops by helicopter or similar means – emerged properly during the 1950s in Korea and Algeria. Yet it was during the Vietnam War that helicopter air assault truly came of age and by 1965 the United States had established fully airmobile battalions, brigades, and divisions, including the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).This division brought to Vietnam a revolutionary new speed and dexterity in battlefield tactics, using massed helicopters to liberate its soldiers from traditional overland methods of combat manoeuvre. However, the communist troops adjusted their own thinking to handle airmobile assaults. Specializing in ambush, harassment, infiltration attacks, and small-scale attrition, the North Vietnamese operated with light logistics and a deep familiarity with the terrain. They optimized their defensive tactics to make landing zones as hostile as possible for assaulting US troops, and from 1966 worked to draw them into 'Hill Traps', extensive kill zones specially prepared for defence-in-depth. By the time the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) withdrew from Vietnam in 1972, it had suffered more casualties than any other US Army division. Featuring specially commissioned artwork, archive photographs, and full-colour battle maps, this study charts the evolution of US airmobile tactics pitted against North Vietnamese countermeasures. The two sides are analysed in detail, including training, logistics, weaponry, and organization.