This series of books presents the fundamentals of reasoning well, in a style accessible to both students and scholars. The text of each essay presents a story, the main line of development of the ideas, while the footnotes and appendices place the research within a larger scholarly context. The essays overlap, forming a unified analysis of reasoning, yet each essay is designed so that it may be read independently of the others. The topic of this volume is the evaluation of reasoning about cause and effect, reasoning using conditionals, and reasoning that involves explanations. The essay "Reasoning about Cause and Effect" sets out a way to analyze whether there is cause and effect in terms of whether an inference from a claim describing the purported cause to a claim describing the purported effect satisfies specific conditions. Different notions of cause and effect correspond to placing different conditions on what counts as a good causal inference. An application of that method in "The Directedness of Emotions" leads to a clearer understanding of the issue whether every emotion need be directed at something. In the essay "Conditionals" various ways of analyzing reasoning with claims of the form "if . . . then . . ." are surveyed. Some of those uses are meant to be judged as inferences that are not necessarily valid, and conditions are given for when we can consider such inferences to be good. In "Explanations" verbal answers to a question why a claim is true are evaluated in terms of conditions placed on inferences from the explaining claims to the claim being explained. Recognizing that the direction of inference of such an explanation is the reverse of that for an argument with the very same claims is crucial in their evaluation. Explanations in terms of functions and goals are also investigated.

This series of books presents the fundamentals of logic in a style accessible to both students and scholars. The text of each essay presents a story, the main line of development of the ideas, while the notes and appendices place the research within a larger scholarly context. The essays overlap, forming a unified analysis of logic as the art of reasoning well, yet each essay is designed so that it may be read independently. The question addressed in this volume is how we can justify our beliefs through reasoning. The first essay, "Arguments," investigates what it is that we call true or false and how we reason toward truths through arguments. A general theory of argument analysis is set out on the basis of what we can assume about those with whom we reason. The next essay, "Fallacies," explains how the classification of an argument as a fallacy can be used within that general approach. In contrast, there is no agreement on what the terms "induction" and "deduction" mean, and they are not useful in evaluating arguments, as shown in "Induction and Deduction." In reasoning to truths, in the end we must take some claims as basic, not requiring any justification for accepting them. How we choose those claims and how they affect our reasoning is examined in "Base Claims." The essay "Analogies" considers how comparisons can be used as the basis of arguments, arguing from similar situations to similar conclusions. An important use of analogies is in reasoning about the mental life of other people and things, which is examined in "Subjective Claims," written with Fred Kroon and William S. Robinson. "Generalizing" examines how to argue from part of a collection or mass to the whole or a larger part. The question there is whether we are ever justified in accepting such an argument as good. "Probabilities" sets out the three main ways probability statements have been interpreted: the logical relation view, the frequency view, and the subjective degree of belief view. Each of those is shown to be inadequate to make precise the scale of plausibility of claims and the scale of the likelihood of a possibility. Many discussions of how to reason well and what counts as good reason are given in terms of who or what is rational. In the final essay, "Rationality," it's shown that what we mean by the idea of someone being rational is of very little use in evaluating reasoning or actions. This volume is meant to give a clearer idea of how to reason well, setting out methods of evaluation that are motivated in terms of our abilities and interests. At the ground of our reasoning, though, are metaphysical assumptions, too basic and too much needed in our reasoning for us to justify them through reasoning. But we can try to uncover those assumptions to see how they are important and what depends on them.

This book presents a new perspective on ways we encounter the world with our languages. There are two kinds of languages. Some direct speakers to encounter the world as made up of things. Others direct speakers to encounter the world as the flow of all with no idea of change, for there is no thing to change, only differing descriptions of the flow. The essays by Richard L. Epstein set out this division of languages and explore its significance for linguistics, metaphysics, thought, meaning, logic, and ethics. The other essays, by Dorothy Lee, Benjamin Lee Whorf, M. Dale Kinkade, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Benson Mates, extend, or contradict, or support those ideas, leading to a large view of how we talk and understand, and how that affects how we live.

This book presents the history, philosophy, and mathematics of the major systems of propositional logic. Classical logic, modal logics, many-valued logics, intuitionism, paraconsistent logics, and dependent implication are examined in separate chapters. Each begins with a motivation in the originators' own terms, followed by the standard formal semantics, syntax, and completeness theorem. The chapters on the various logics are largely self-contained so that the book can be used as a reference. An appendix summarizes the formal semantics and axiomatizations of the logics. The view that unifies the exposition is that propositional logics comprise a spectrum: as the aspect of propositions under consideration varies, the logic varies. Each logic is shown to fall naturally within a general framework for semantics. A theory of translations between logics is presented that allows for further comparisons, and necessary conditions are given for a translation to preserve meaning. For this third edition the material has been re-organized to make the text easier to study, and a new section on paraconsistent logics with simple semantics has been added which challenges standard views on the nature of consequence relations. The text includes worked examples and hundreds of exercises, from routine to open problems, making the book with its clear and careful exposition ideal for courses or individual study.

First comes clear thinking, then comes clear writing. *** The Pocket Guide to Critical Thinking teaches very clearly the essential skills to reason better--for classwork, for writing, and in everyday life. Hundreds of pertinent, analyzed, and engaging examples from the Internet, magazines, newspapers, radio, as well as dialogues of cartoon characters illustrate how to analyze arguments and make better decisions. The Pocket Guide is both the perfect supplement for any course that requires critical thinking and a practical aid for self-study. This fifth edition has new chapters on reasoning in the sciences that provide the basics for any student to begin the study of any science: explanations, experiments, the scientific methods, and models and theories.

From the very beginning of their investigation of human reasoning, philosophers have identified two other forms of reasoning, besides deduction, which we now call abduction and induction. Deduction is now fairly well understood, but abduction and induction have eluded a similar level of understanding. The papers collected here address the relationship between abduction and induction and their possible integration. The approach is sometimes philosophical, sometimes that of pure logic, and some papers adopt the more task-oriented approach of AI. The book will command the attention of philosophers, logicians, AI researchers and computer scientists in general.

Is the appropriate form of human action explanation causal or rather teleological? While this is a central question in analytic philosophy of action, it also has implications for questions about the differences between methods of explanation in the sciences on the one hand and in the humanities and the social sciences on the other. Additionally, this question bears on the problem of the appropriate form of explanations of past human actions, and therefore it is prominently discussed by analytic philosophers of historiography. This volume brings together causalists and anti-causalists to address enduring philosophical questions at the heart of this debate, as well as their implications for the practice of historiography. Part I considers the quarrel between causalism and anti-causalism in recent developments in the philosophy of action. Part II presents papers by causalists and anti-causalists that are more narrowly focused on the philosophy of historiography.