In this volume, Carolina Sartorio makes the case for big-picture causalism: a naturalistic conception of agency and free agency that unifies the two phenomena under a common thesis. This is the thesis that actions/free actions are behaviors that have the right kinds of causes or explanations. The book discusses how a causalist view of action and free action fit together—the latter as a natural extension of the former—and how they are motivated by similar considerations having to do with causal control. The result is a compelling "package deal" view of our practical agency, one that is put forth as the default view (the view that deserves to be regarded as the starting point of our theorizing). Sartorio examines both the skeleton of the causalist view as well as potential enrichments that result from exploiting the grounds of the relevant causal facts. The discussion is enriched by an account of the role played in causalism by key metaphysical notions such as causation, grounding, absences, and powers.

The book illustrates the concept of action in three different contexts - the justification of actions, people's life history, and pragmatism. The special feature of this book is that a comprehensive view of this kind marks a departure from the atomistic approach of action theory, which in itself raises a number of questions. If actions are not justified by mental states, how can persons then act for reasons? How can persons' actions over time be described, and what is the connection with the question of personal identity? If there is to be a unified understanding of the person, does the practical have to take precedence over the theoretical, and what does this mean for epistemology, for example? The ten contributors to this volume engage in an instructive manner with these and similar questions in the three sections of the book.

Are the reasons for which we act the causes of our actions? In the nine essays collected here (including a major historical overview by the editors), experts in the field re-evaluate the history and current state of the reasons/causes debate.

In Reality: Fundamental Topics in Metaphysics, Peter Loptson argues for a conception of metaphysics as the most general or comprehensive method of inquiry. Working from a broadly analytic and naturalist perspective, he confronts positions that claim metaphysics to be impossible, as advanced in ancient, Kantian, post-Kantian, and contemporary philosophy, showing them to be unsuccessful. He draws the topics of his selective investigation of metaphysics partly from the work of Kant, whom he conceives as a primary guide to what metaphysical enquiry seeks to know. Loptson provides accounts of basic categories of what is real and outlines major historical metaphysical systems. He then goes on to explore aspects of existence, essence, substance, universals, space, time, causality, mind, freedom, and other topics. This important contribution to metaphysics offers both sustained arguments on all aspects of the subject and important insights into the major metaphysical systems from the history of philosophy.

In this wide-ranging philosophical work, Koons takes on two powerful dogmas--anti-realism and materialism. In doing so, Koons develops an elegant metaphysical system that accounts for such phenomena as information, mental representation, our knowledge of logic, mathematics and science, the structure of spacetime, the identity of physical objects, and the objectivity of values and moral norms.

This book is concerned with the appropriate form of explanations in historiography and the social sciences. It combines action theory and philosophy of historiography and develops a theory of teleological explanations of human actions based on late-Wittgensteinian and Ordinary Language Philosophy insights. In philosophy of action, many philosophers favor causal theories of human action. Additionally, in current philosophy of historiography the majority view is that historians should explain historical phenomena by their causes. This book pushes back against these mainstream views by reviving an anti-causal view of explanation of current and past human actions. The author argues that disciplines that deal with human actions require a certain form of explanation, namely a teleological or intentional explanation. This means that past human actions and their results will have to be explained by reasons of agents, not by causes. Therefore, historiography employs a method of explanation which is in stark contrast to the sciences. The author thus proposes a Verstehen (understanding) approach in historiography and the social sciences. Historical Explanation will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of action, philosophy of history, and philosophy of the social sciences.

What is it for you to be conscious? There is no consensus in philosophy or science: it has remained a mystery. Ted Honderich develops a brand new theory of consciousness, according to which perceptual consciousness is external to the perceiver. It exists in a subjective physical world dependent on both you and the objective physical world.