Since the advent of reform in 1992, the Russian authorities have made substantial strides toward creating a market economy through privatization. Recently, Russian authorities have established an institutional framework for a 'case-by-case' approach that ensures transparency and competition through the use of independent financial and other advisers. This paper contains the principal presentations made at a World Bank workshop on the lessons of international experience in case-by-case privatization.

Privatizing Russia offers an inside look at one of the most remarkable reforms in recent history. Having started on the back burner of Russian politics in the fall of 1991, mass privatization was completed on July 1, 1994, with two thirds of the Russian industry privately owned, a rapidly rising stock market, and 40 million Russians owning company shares. The authors, all key participants in the reform effort, describe the events and the ideas driving privatization. They argue that successful reformers must recognize privatization as a process of depoliticizing firms in the face of massive opposition: making the firm responsive to market rather than political influences. The authors first review the economic theory of property rights, identifying the political influence on firms as the fundamental failure of property rights under socialism. They detail the process of coalition building and compromise that ultmately shaped privatization. The main elements of the Russian program -- corporatization, voucher use, and voucher auctions -- are described, as is the responsiveness of privatized firms to outside investors. Finally, the market values of privatized assets are assessed for indications of how much progress the country has made toward reforming its economy. In many respects, privatization has been a great success. Market concepts of property ownership and corporate management are shaking up Russian firms at a breathtaking pace, creating powerful economic and political stimuli for continuation of market reforms. At the same time, the authors caution, the political landscape remains treacherous as old-line politicians reluctantly cede their property rights and authority over firms.

IFC Discussion Paper No. 38.QUOTEIt is now universally acknowledged that ownership matters; that private ownership in and of itself is a major determinant of good performance in firms... Decent economic policy and well-functioning legal and administrative institutions... matter greatly as well.QUOTEThis paper looks at what happens when the shift to private ownership gets far out in front of the effort to build the institutional underpinnings of a capitalist economy. The emphasis is on what went wrong and why and what, if anything, can be done to be correct it. Proposals include renationalization and/or postponement of further privatization, both to be accompanied by measures to strengthen the managerial capacities of the state. Neither approach seems likely to produce short-term improvements. The regrettable fact is that governments that botch privatization are equally likely to botch the management of state-owned firms. In a number of Central European transition countries, privatization is living up to expectations; and there is no need for such measures. For institutionally-weak countries, the less dramatic but reasonable short-term course of action is to push ahead more slowly with case- by-case and tender privatization in cooperation with the international assistance community in hopes of producing some success stories that will lead by example.

Few economic events have caused such controversy as the privatization process in Russia. Some see it as the foundation of political and economic freedom. For others it was economics gone wrong, and ended in "Russians stealing money from their own country". As Russia reasserts itself, and its new brand of capitalism, it is ever more important that policy makers and scholars understand the roots of the economic structure and governance of that country; what was decided, who made the decisions and why, what actually transpired, and what implications this has for the future of Russia. This work, written by two senior advisors to the Russian government, has unique access to documentation, tracking the decision making process in the Russian Mass Privatization process. By close reference to events, and supplemented by interviews with many of the key participants, it shows that the policies adopted were often influenced and shaped by different forces than those cited by current popular accounts. The book challenges the interpretation of Russian privatization by some of the West’s most eminent economists. It underlines that economists of all schools, who bring assumptions from the West to the analysis of Russia, may reach false or misleading conclusions. It is an essential guide for anyone interested in Russian economic reform, and anyone who seeks to understand this enigmatic country, and its actions today.

Kremlin Capitalism provides a wealth of data and analyses not previously available. The authors articulate the political and economic goals of Russian privatization, examine the current ownership of the largest enterprises in Russia, and chart the challenges of corporate governance and restructuring in Russia's new corporations.

This evaluation assesses the development effectiveness of the World Bank's lending and non-lending assistance to the Russian Federation since 1991, a 10-year period of tumultuous political, economic, and social change. This report concludes that an assistance strategy, concentrating on analytical and advisory services with limited financial support for Russia, would have been more appropriate than one involving large volumes of adjustment lending.

Latin America and the Caribbean Region Viewpoints Many articles have been written about the causes of financial crises in emerging market... ... Much less attention has been devoted to the effectiveness of alternative policy responses and the ensuing process of recovery of the real economy... This paper analyzes the adjustment process in the aftermath of speculative attacks in six countries: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand. As implied by the title, the main question to be addressed is whether the tales of adjustment in these Latin American and Asian economies were similar. This comparison is interesting for several reasons. The six countries came under the aegis of adjustment programs supported by international financial institutions, and the associated policy prescriptions have been at the center of attention. Of the six cases, one is an example of a successful defense of the currency, while another exemplifies a temporarily successful defense followed by an incomplete adjustment program. The others experienced dramatic currency devaluations. This small sample of episodes of adjustment also offers variety in the magnitude of the ensuing economic decline. While the Mexican and Argentine crises of 1995, and even the Brazilian adjustment after the October 1997 attack against its currency, were certainly costly, the Asian crises have been deeper and the recovery of the real economy has been slower. The paper draws policy implications for reducing the costs of the macroeconomic adjustment after currency crises. Also available: English edition. 1999. 52 pages. Stock no. 14541 (ISBN 0-8213-4541-9).