The book consists of a series of chapters on Carnap's ideal of explication as an alternative to the naturalistic conceptions of science, setting it in its historical context, discussing specific cases of explications, and enriching the on-going debate on conceptual engineering and naturalism in analytic philosophy.

Working from Within examines the nature and development of W. V. Quine's naturalism, the view that philosophy ought to be continuous with science. Sander Verhaegh's reconstruction is based on a comprehensive study of Quine's personal and academic archives. Transcriptions of five unpublished papers, letters, and notes are included in the appendix.

Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970) is widely regarded as one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. Born in Germany and later a US citizen, he was a founder of the philosophical movement known as Logical Empiricism. He was strongly influenced by a number of different philosophical traditions (including the legacies of both Kant and Husserl), and also by the German Youth Movement, the First World War (in which he was wounded and decorated), and radical socialism. This book places his central ideas in a broad cultural, political and intellectual context, showing how he synthesised many different currents of thought to achieve a philosophical perspective that remains strikingly relevant in the twenty-first century. Its rich account of a philosopher's response to his times will appeal to all who are interested in the development of philosophy in the twentieth century.

This text provides an extensive exploration of the relationship between the thought of Otto Neurath and Rudolf Carnap, providing a new argument for the complementarity of their mature philosophies as part of a collaborative metatheory of science. In arguing that both Neurath and Carnap must be interpreted as proponents of epistemological naturalism, and that their naturalisms rest on shared philosophical ground, it is also demonstrated that the boundaries and possibilities for epistemological naturalism are not as restrictive as Quinean orthodoxy has previously suggested. Both building on and challenging the scholarship of the past four decades, this naturalist reading of Carnap also provides a new interpretation of Carnap’s conception of analyticity, allowing for a refutation of the Quinean argument for the incompatibility of naturalism and the analytic/synthetic distinction. In doing so, the relevance and potential importance of their scientific meta-theory for contemporary questions in the philosophy of science is demonstrated. This text appeals to students and researchers working on Logical Empiricism, Quine, the history of analytic philosophy and the history of philosophy of science, as well as proponents of naturalized epistemology.

Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970), one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century, helped found logical positivism, was one of the originators of the field of philosophy of science, and was a leading contributor to semantics and inductive logic. This volume of new essays, written by leading international experts, places Carnap in his philosophical context and studies his topics, his interests, and the major stages of his thought. The essays reassess Carnap's place in the history of analytic philosophy through his approach to metaphysics, values, politics, epistemology and philosophy of science. They delve into important topics of Carnap's mature thought, namely explication, naturalism, and his defence of analyticity; and they recover the logical and the linguistic components of philosophy and how they unfolded in the syntax-semantics relation, induction, and language-planning. The resulting interpretation of Carnap will be illuminating for both current and future research.

This book reassesses Carnap and Quine by presenting them as sharing philosophical motivations despite their notable differences.

This volume contains Carnap's Studies in Semantics, a series of three interlocking books: Introduction to Semantics (1942), Formalization of Logic (1942), and Meaning and Necessity (1947). They were extremely influential in their time, especially the third, and shaped the direction of analytic philosophy during the 1950s and 1960s. They constitute the background to a number of celebrated controversies of that period, especially those between Carnap and Quine. Most of the philosophical debates today in philosophical logic and the philosophy of language ultimately had their origins here. This new edition situates these works in their context, both within Carnap's philosophical development and within the philosophical debates they responded to and influenced. The editors' introduction explains how Carnap arrived at the project of semantics in the 1930s and how it developed into these three successive publications, how the three books fit together, and how the project developed and changed in the course of the 1940s. It also describes the reception of the books as they appeared, as well as Carnap's response. The editorial and textual notes give variant readings, Carnap's own marginal notes on these texts in his personal copies, and elucidatory commentary where Carnap's terminology or notation are no longer familiar. This will be an indispensable volume for anyone interested in the origins and preoccupations of present-day analytic philosophy, especially philosophical logic and philosophy of language.