THE CONCEPTION OF THIS VOLUME This volume, Cardinalism, has been initiated by Ole Hagen, and is now published due to his perseverance and to Kluwer Academic Publishers. Because of various activities and duties, my contribution to the general conception of this volume has only been formal, and all the credit for it is due to Ole Hagen. I should also emphasize that the responsibility for the year's delay in the publishing of this volume is entirely mine, for two reasons. First of all, I have been involved in many works in very different fields. Second, the English translation of my 1943 contribution to the concept of cardinal utility took some time. The points of view the reader will find in this volume are often different and sometimes contradictory, but this can only increase the interest of its reading. In any case, this is not the editors' part to side with or against. Thus contributions to this volume are presented as they have been submit ted to the editors. Of course, this does not mean that they entirely agree with the analyses presented. MAURICE ALLAIS M. Allais and O. Hagen (eds.), Cardinalism, vii INTRODUCTION Everyone's conscious choices are assumed to reflect their preferences in different situations. For some purposes it serves the theorist's preference for simplicity to assume that a person's life style can be described by the values of some concrete variables, such as quantities of goods available.

The Mind under the Axioms reviews two basic ingredients of our understanding of human decisions – conative aspects (preferences) and cognitive aspects (beliefs). These ingredients are axiomatized in modern decision theory in the view to obtain a formally and empirically tractable representation of the decision-maker. The main issue developed in this book is the connection between realistic and testable psychological features and the descriptive component of abstract axioms of rationality. It addresses three main topics for which the interaction between axiomatization and psychology leads to potential new developments in experimental decision-theory and puts strictures on the standard revealed preference methodology prevailing in that field. The possibility of a cardinal representation of preferences is discussed. Different ways of accounting for incomplete preferences, and in which sense, are analysed. Finally, the conditions of separability between preferences and beliefs, such as prescribed by axioms of state-independence, are submitted to actual and potential tests. The book offers a bridge between the disciplines of decision-theory, psychology, and neuroeconomics. It is thus relevant for those, in psychology and cognitive sciences, who are sometimes put off by the high degree of formalism and abstraction in decision-theory, that seems to lie beyond the reach of psychological realism. It also aims to convince those in decision-theory for whom psychological realism and empirical testability should not constrain the modelling enterprise that conceptual clarification can come from attempted experimentation. Addresses open and evolving theoretical issues in decision-theory, especially from experimental perspectives Helps researchers understand the psychological and neuroscientific mechanisms for decision-making Considers how preferences shape beliefs and how beliefs shape preferences Uncovers the very formal and abstract psychological and behavioral implications that are actually made in contemporary decision-theory

1. PROGRESS IN UTILITY AND RISK THEORY At the First International Congress of Utility and Risk Theory in Oslo 1982 (FUR-82) it appeared to be a widespread feeling among the participants that the conference signalled something like a paradigm shift in the field. This does not necessarily mean that old truths were discarded and replaced by new ones, but rather that new theories and new empirical evidence were brought forth, compelling old theories to be critically analyzed from new angels. Some of the papers presented at FUR-82 have been published by Reidel in 1983 in a volume edited by Stigum and Wenst0p. The present volume contains com mentaries on a number of the papers presented at the conference together with broader outlines of current views on the theory. The observation that utility and risk theory now appears to be in a state of rapid change has prompted us to choose the title PROGRESS IN UTILITY AND RISK THEORY for the book, in the belief that science always moves from poorer to more advanced paradigms or from weaker to more forceful theories. In other words, change is usually progress, even though intermediate stages in a para digm shift may be bewildering, to say the least.

Decision Theory has considerably developed in the late 1970's and the 1980's. The evolution has been so fast and far-r2aching that it has become increasingly difficult to keep track of the new state of the art. After a decade of new contributions, there was a need for an overview' of the field. This book is intended to fill the gap. The reader will find here thirty~nine selected papers which were given at FUR-III, the third international confe rence on the Foundations and applications of Utility, Risk and decision theories, held in Aix-en-Provence in June 1986. An introductory chapter will provide an overview of the main questions raised on the subject since the 17th Century and more particularly so in the last thirty years, as well as some elementary information on the experimental and theoretical results obtained. It is thus hoped that any reader with some basic background in either Economics, Hanagement or Operations Research will be able to read profitably the thirty-nine other chapters. Psychologists, Sociologists, Social Philosophers and other specialists of the social sciences will also read this book with interest, as will high-level practitioners of decision~making and advanced students in one of the abovementioned fields. An expository survey of this volume will be found at the end of the introductory chapter, so that any of the seven parts of the book can be put by the reader in due perspective.

For more than two decades, the law and economics movement has been one of the most influential and controversial schools of thought in American jurisprudence. In this authoritative intellectual history, James R. Hackney Jr. situates the modern law and economics movement within the trajectory of American jurisprudence from the early days of the Republic to the present. Hackney is particularly interested in the claims of objectivity or empiricism asserted by proponents of law and economics. He argues that the incorporation of economic analysis into legal decision making is not an inherently objective enterprise. Rather, law and economics often cloaks ideological determinations—particularly regarding the distribution of wealth—under the cover of science. Hackney demonstrates how legal-economic thought has been affected by the prevailing philosophical ideas about objectivity, which have in turn evolved in response to groundbreaking scientific discoveries. Thus Hackney’s narrative is a history not only of law and economics but also of select strands of philosophy and science. He traces forward from the seventeenth-century the interaction of legal thinking and economic analysis with ideas about the attainability of certitude. The principal legal-economic theories Hackney examines are those that emerged from classical legal thought, legal realism, law and neoclassical economics, and critical legal studies. He links these theories respectively to formalism, pragmatism, the analytic turn, and neopragmatism/postmodernism, and he explains how each of these schools of philosophical thought was influenced by specific scientific discoveries: Newtonian physics, Darwin’s theory of evolution, Einstein’s theories of relativity, and quantum mechanics. Under Cover of Science challenges claims that the contemporary law and economics movement is an objective endeavor by historicizing ideas about certitude and empiricism and their relation to legal-economic thought.