Central banks may operate perfectly well without capital as conventionally defined. A large negative net worth, however, is likely to compromise central bank independence and interfere with its ability to attain policy objectives. If society values an independent central bank capable of effectively implementing monetary policy, recapitalization may become essential. Proper accounting practice in determining central bank profit or loss and rules governing the transfer of the central bank’s operating result to the treasury are also important. A variety of country-specific central bank practices are reviewed to support the argument.

This paper provides a simple, quantitative, net worth-based, approach to assessing the need for central bank capital. It derives a concept of core capital (a function of the central bank's operating expenditures and the carrying cost of its international reserves) as the minimum capital needed by a central bank to ensure the credibility of its inflation target. the approach is illustrated with the published accounts of three loss-making central banks and selected accounting entries for a broader sample of central banks. Policy implications are explored. In particular, the paper argues that central bank capitalizations cannot be automatic and require instead a broad policy debate.

This paper provides a simple, quantitative, net worth-based, approach to assessing the need for central bank capital. It derives a concept of "core capital" (a function of the central bank's operating expenditures and the carrying cost of its international reserves) as the minimum capital needed by a central bank to ensure the credibility of its inflation target. The approach is illustrated with the published accounts of three loss-making central banks and selected accounting entries for a broader sample of central banks. Policy implications are explored. In particular, the paper argues that central bank capitalizations cannot be automatic and require instead a broad policy debate.

An eye-opening analysis of the Federal Reserve's massive and unwarranted power in American life and how it favors the financial sector over everyone else. The Federal Reserve, created more than a century ago, is the most powerful central bank in the world. The Fed's power, which derives from its ability to alter the money supply and move interest rates, weighs heavily not only on the US economy, but on the world economy as well. Lawrence R. Jacobs and Desmond King's Fed Power is the first sustained synthesis of the Fed's political role--especially the way in which it uses its power to benefit some interest groups and not others--since the 2008 financial crisis. In this fully updated and revised second edition, Fed Power addresses new developments during Trump's presidency--particularly the Fed's massive and unprecedented injection of liquidity into the US economy following the COVID epidemic-and offers fresh insights on the Fed's outsized role in picking winners and losers in the American economy. King and Jacobs conclude with bold proposals to reform America's financial management to prevent future crises and to restore democratic accountability. A powerful critique of how the Federal Reserve governs the American economy, Fed Power will be essential reading for anyone interested in the role that the Fed's policies have played in increasing economic and racial inequality across both the Obama and Trump presidencies and the new directions pursued by the Biden administration and progressive activists.

This collection takes the reader through historical, theoretical and factual discussions on why central banks exist and the role – actual and intended – they have in assisting their home nation in achieving monetary and financial stability.

Following the COVID shock, supervisors encouraged banks to use capital buffers to support the recovery. However, banks have been reluctant to do so. Provided the market expects a bank to rebuild its buffers, any draw-down will open up a capital shortfall that will weigh on its share price. Therefore, a bank will only decide to use its buffers if the value creation from a larger loan book offsets the costs associated with a capital shortfall. Using market expectations, we calibrate a framework for assessing the usability of buffers. Our results suggest that the cases in which the use of buffers make economic sense are rare in practice.