If flexible exchange rates are not adopted, central banks should at least avoid the widespread practice of trying to sterilise the monetary effects of capital flows." "The author argues that the implementation of this plan will be a far more effective way of enhancing financial stability than controlling international capital flows, or trying to force private lenders to make new loans to countries that suffer crises."--BOOK JACKET.

This book examines the determinants of real exchange rates (RERs), with an emphasis on the roles of a pegged exchange rate regime and capital account opening in driving the persistent real exchange rates appreciation in the lead-up to the 1997 currency crisis, through an in-depth case study of Thailand. The book aims to inform the debate, rekindled by the recent currency crises in emerging market economies, on exchange rate policy choice and the timing and sequencing of capital account opening.

According to many economists, the increasing mobility of capital across borders has made it more costly to peg exchange rates. This phenomenon has contributed to some of the more famous examples of exchange rate crises in recent times, such as the Mexican peso crisis in 1994 and the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Yet despite the increasing costs of pegging in today's accelerated financial markets, some developing countries try to maintain a peg for as long as they can. This work is the first to theorize the role of bankers as a domestic interest group involved in exchange rate policy. It adds to our understanding of how interest groups affect economic policy in developing countries and explains why some of the largest and fastest growing economies in the developing world were the most prone to crisis. The volume also refines our understanding of the 'hollowing-out thesis', the argument that increasing capital mobility is forcing states to abandon pegging.

An analysis of the connections between capital flows and financial crises as well as between capital flows and economic growth.

Capital flows to the developing economies have long displayed a boom-and-bust pattern. Rarely has the cycle turned as abruptly as it did in the 1990s, however: surges in lending were followed by the Mexican peso crisis of 1994-95 and the sudden collapse of currencies in Asia in 1997. This volume maps a new and uncertain financial landscape, one in which volatile private capital flows and fragile banking systems produce sudden reversals of fortune for governments and economies. This environment creates dilemmas for both national policymakers who confront the "mixed blessing" of capital inflows and the international institutions that manage the recurrent crises.The authors—leading economists and political scientists—examine private capital flows and their consequences in Latin America, Pacific Asia, and East Europe, placing current cycles of lending in historical perspective. National governments have used a variety of strategies to deal with capital-account instability. The authors evaluate those responses, prescribe new alternatives, and consider whether the new circumstances require novel international policies.

The dramatic growth of international capital flow has provided unprecedented opportunities and risks in emerging markets. This book is the result of a conference exploring this phenomenon, sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. The issues explored include direct versus portfolio investment; exchange rates and economic growth; and optimal exchange rate policy for stabilizing inflation in developing countries. It concludes with a panel discussion on central bank coordination in the midst of exchange rate instability.

Breaking from conventional wisdom, this book provides an explanation of exchange rates based on the premise that it is financial capital flows and not international trade that represents the driving force behind currency movements. John T. Harvey combines analyses rooted in the scholarly traditions of John Maynard Keynes and Thorstein Veblen with that of modern psychology to produce a set of new theories to explain international monetary economics, including not only exchange rates but also world financial crises. In the book, the traditional approach is reviewed and critiqued and the alternative is then built by studying the psychology of the market and balance of payments questions. The central model has at its core Keynes’ analysis of the macroeconomy and it assumes neither full employment nor balanced trade over the short or long run. Market participants’ mental model, which they use to forecast future exchange rate movements, is specified and integrated into the explanation. A separate but related discussion of currency crises shows that three distinct tension points emerge in booming economies, any one of which can break and signal the collapse. Each of the models is compared to post-Bretton Woods history and the reader is shown exactly how various shifts and adjustments on the graphs can explain the dollar’s ups and downs and the Mexican (1994) and Asian (1987) crises.