This work is a quality analysis of the problems posed by Political Action Committees in American life. As the author notes in his new introduction: "Political corruption, as measured by campaign contributions of special interests to elected officials, increased significantly in the few years since the first publication of Capital Corruption. The number of PACs rose from 2,551 in 1980 to 4,175 by 1986. The percentage of PAC contribution of total campaign costs increased from 31.4 percent in 1980 to 41.9 percent (House) and 24.5 percent to 27.0 percent (Senate) in 1986." Such data only begin to tell the story of a book which has grown in stature during the decade. Etzioni characterizes Washington as a marketplace where deals are struck, where a special interest group can buy single pieces of legislation or long-run commitments or a whole slew of legislation. Because such purchases are not direct, but elliptical, they fall within the legal system, but for Etzioni, they are beyond the pale of moral or political worthiness. The book provides policy answers to vexing political dilemmas of mass politics today. The volume has been described as "a devastating indictment of our present system of financing elections" (John Anderson); Etzioni has been called "arguably the best political sociologist writing today" (Warren Bennis); and the founder of Common Cause has termed this "a powerful and important book. If it is widely read and understood the nation will benefit" (John Gardner).

In this book, Sten Widmalm adopts comparative and empirical approaches to examine how decentralization is connected to social capital and corruption. Using evidence from in-depth field studies in Madhya Pradesh and Kerala, and analyzing it against historical cases from around the world, he presents theoretical perspectives and policy suggestions. Widmalm’s journey takes him to ancient Rome, Greece and India, as well as to the West, China, Latin America, and Russia of more recent times.

Criminal Capital explores the relationship between neoliberalism, criminality and the reshaping of class in modern India. It discusses how the political vocabularies of urban industrial workers reflect the processes by which power is distributed across the region. Based upon field research among a ‘casualised’ workforce in the industrial city of Jamshedpur, the book examines the links between the decline of employment security, and criminality in trade unions, corporations and the state. The volume compares popular discourses of corruption against the ethnography of local labour politics, business enterprise and debt collection, and shows how corruption and criminality consolidate class power in industrial environments. Using an interdisciplinary ethnographic approach, this study interrogates the relationship between capitalism, corruption, violence and labour politics in contemporary Indian society. An important intervention in the study of Indian political economy, this work will be of interest to scholars and researchers of Indian politics, social anthropology, economics, labour relations and criminology.

Richard Lawless's Capitol Hill's Criminal Underground: The Most Thorough Exploration of Government Corruption Ever Put in Writing is a no-holds-barred tell-all about the bad guys of Capital Hill and Wall Street, including the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission. After Lawless became a victim of these crimes, he used his decades as a senior and executive banker, backed by an MBA with a focus on finance and law, to break down the evidence in Capitol Hill's Criminal Underground. No names have been changed to protect the innocent because there are no innocent-except for the tens of millions of Americans who, like Lawless, had massive amounts of money stolen from them. Capitol Hill's Criminal Underground is a story about one of the longest-running government-protected criminal enterprises in the history of the United States country. This is Lawless's attempt find justice for what happened to him-and to many readers as well.

This book offers a deep dive into the social, political, and economic forces that make white-collar crime and corruption a staple feature of the nightlife economy. The author, a former bouncer-turned-bartender of party bars and nightclubs in a large U.S. city, draws from an auto-ethnographic case study to describe and explain the routine and embedded nature of corruption and deviance among the regulators and the regulated in the nightlife environment. This text offers a contemporary and incisive theoretical framework on the criminogenic features and structural contradictions of capitalism. The author both describes and explains how the dominant political economy is rife with structural contradictions that, in turn, generate various manifestations of white-collar crime, organizational deviance, and public corruption. The author uses the bar and nightlife environment to empirically anchor these claims. Methodologically, the research is innovative in advancing inquiry into ethically and logistically challenging environments. The style of writing and framing of the text is one that punches upward and avoids the voyeuristic and reductionist tropes historically associated with "dangerous fieldwork." Through a range of disciplinary perspectives, Corrupt Capital offers both scholarly rigor and inviting prose to advance our understanding of crimes of the relatively powerful and powerless alike. An accessible and compelling text, this book will appeal to readers in criminology, sociology, law and society, political science, and all those interested in learning about the relationship between power, law, and routinized corruption in the nightlife economy.

Corruption affects the composition of capital inflows in a way that may raise the likelihood of a currency crisis.

Reforming economies have typically placed little attention on the impact of illegal activities on the success of reform/stabilization packages and optimal policy design. This paper aims at developing a framework in which to assess an economy’s response to alternative stabilization/reform packages as a function of the scope of corruption activities. The framework developed herein is a basic one in which only the most fundamental questions (such as the effects of anti-corruption government policies on output and welfare) are examined. The more interesting questions of the optimal design of stabilization and economic reform policies remain to be addressed in future extensions of the model. The framework also accommodates political-economy analysis, and is able to explain why, even when able to eliminate corruption activity altogether, governments may choose not to do so. Our framework differentiates between developing and developed economies according to the income share accruing to capital, as is common in the literature. In equilibrium, the effect of anti-corruption penalties on the economy’s capital stock is greater in developing countries; in particular, we find that the elasticity of the steady state average per capita stock of capital with respect to increases in anti-corruption penalties is increasing in the income share accruing to capital. The model also shows that reductions in public good output, as a fraction of the economy’s total expenditure, lead to larger welfare decreases when in the presence of corruption.