In 1999 Gen Eric Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff, initiated the Army Transformation program attempting to both enhance the timeliness of employment for ground forces and to leverage technology to maintain our ground dominance. The first phase of the transformation consists of fielding initial brigade combat teams (IBCTs) at Fort Lewis, Washington. These IBCTs will develop the operational and organizational model for follow-on brigades using readily available equipment. The second phase consists of fielding an interim division (IDIV) using a yet-to-be-determined interim armored vehicle (IAV). The third phase consists of the total transformation to the Objective Force. The Objective Force requirement is to have a combat brigade on the ground within 96 hours after liftoff, a division within 120 hours, and five divisions within 30 days. Sometime around the year 2003, the Army can expect to have a mixture of legacy forces such as the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and interim forces including the IBCT and IDIV. Each of these forces will have unique capabilities and employment requirements to maximize its use. The challenge for the Army will be to develop missions and orders that maximize the combat power of each type of unit. The monograph determines if current U.S. Army planning doctrine develops courses of action that fully utilize the capabilities of Army forces from legacy to interim forces to maximize combat power as outlined in FM 3-0, Operations. The 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and a mechanized brigade from the division are used to represent legacy forces. The IBCT and proposed structure for the IDIV are evaluated to represent interim forces. Each force is analyzed to determine its numerical relative force ratio and its critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities developed using a model put forth by Dr. Joe Strange of the Marine Corps University.

This report explores ways in which the Army might improve its ability to contribute to the prompt, global power-projection capability of the United States. By that the authors mean the strategic responsiveness of early-entry forces in situations where time is critical. Through a case study based upon the Army's new Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), the authors examine two components of early-entry force strategic responsiveness: rapidly tailoring a mission-focused force package and moving the force. The report begins by analyzing options, given existing technology, for improving the deployment time of Army units. Then it examines how the Army might improve its ability to facilitate the rapid-deployment initiation of joint, mission-tailored packages of capabilities. In essence, there are two problems: initiating deployment of the right force capabilities and then getting these capabilities where they need to be as quickly as possible. Specific issues examined in the report include forward basing, new concepts in prepositioning, significant but underappreciated opportunities in process improvement, and speeding the delivery of initial operating capabilities through deployment phasing and improved planning. The research offers an approach for leveraging force modularity concepts to transition to a capabilities-based, rapid mission, force-tailoring construct. (3 tables, 38 figures, 32 refs.).

This publication is about winning in combat. Winning requires many things: excellence in techniques, an appreciation of the enemy, exemplary leadership, battlefield judgment, and focused combat power. Yet these factors by themselves do not ensure success in battle. Many armies, both winners and losers, have possessed many or all of these attributes. When we examine closely the differences between victor and vanquished, we draw one conclusion. Success went to the armies whose leaders, senior and junior, could best focus their efforts-their skills and their resources-toward a decisive end. Their success arose not merely from excellence in techniques, procedures, and material but from their leaders' abilities to uniquely and effectively combine them. Winning in combat depends upon tactical leaders who can think creatively and act decisively.