Using a new conceptual framework, this study documents and analyses the underlying convictions of influential Canadians, explains why there were such varied degrees of support for NATO, and shows why different leaders either supported or rejected nuclear weapons and the stationing of the Canadian Forces in Europe. Examples taken from previously classified documents illustrate how the underlying convictions of leaders such as Prime Minister John Diefenbaker and Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau significantly shaped defence policy. Behind-the-scenes maneuvering and competing beliefs about nuclear weapons, deterrence strategy, and possible entrapment in a nuclear war led some to defend and others to criticize Canada's approach to both NATO and the bomb. Despite the technological ability and resources to develop its own nuclear weapons - or to acquire them from the United States - Canada ultimately chose not to become a nuclear power. Why did some Canadian leaders defend the nuclear option and urge the deployment of the Canadian Forces in Europe? Why did others condemn the country's nuclear commitments and call for an end to the arms race? Simpson shows that some leaders rejected prevailing American defence strategy and weapons systems to pursue alternative approaches to managing Canada's complex bilateral and multilateral defence relationships.

In Learning to Love the Bomb, Sean M. Maloney explores the controversial subject of Canada's acquisition of nuclear weapons during the Cold War. Based on newly declassified Canadian and U.S. documents, it examines policy, strategy, operational, and technical matters and weaves these seemingly disparate elements into a compelling story that finally unlocks several Cold War mysteries. For example, while U.S. military forces during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis were focused on the Caribbean Sea and the southeastern United States, Canadian forces assumed responsibility for defending the northern United States, with aircraft armed with nuclear depth charges flying patrols and guarding against missile attack by Soviet submarines. This defensive strategy was a closely guarded secret because it conflicted with Canada's image as a peacekeeper and therefore a more passive member of NATO than its ally to the south. It is revealed here for the first time. The place of nuclear weapons in Canadian history has, until now, been a highly secret and misunderstood field subject to rumor, rhetoric, half-truths, and propaganda. Learning to Love the Bomb reveals the truth about Canada's role as a nuclear power.

In 1988, as the Berlin Wall began to quake and the United States and the Soviet Union prepared to slash their nuclear arsenals, Canada's government remained firmly tied to a Cold War vision of the world. In this book, Regehr and Rosenblum assessed the international strategic situation at the very moment that the superpowers' nuclear standoff began to melt away. Against the backdrop of significant undertakings to halt the drift towards annihilation, the authors' find much to criticize in Canadian defence policy: complicity in reckless American war-fighting strategies; undue adherence to organizations such as NATO and NORAD whose justifications were fast disappearing; a retrograde approach to defending Arctic sovereignty. The Road to Peace is a compelling document that vividly conveys the heady atmosphere of the Cold War's apogee.

The story of Canada in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is one of consistent support and involvement but of varying levels of military and diplomatic engagement. Canada in NATO, 1949–2019 provides the first analysis of Canada’s involvement in the Atlantic Alliance – from the negotiations leading to the alliance’s charter in 1949 to NATO’s seventieth anniversary – exploring how the country’s role in NATO has evolved over the years. As one of NATO’s early, foremost participants, Canada was a major force contributor in the 1950s. Briefly deploying more modern fighter aircrafts in Europe than the United States had, as well as a naval commitment that would have been responsible for 10 per cent of ship escorts across the North Atlantic, Canada became the “odd man out” of the western alliance as the Cold War wore on due to its spotty military contributions. Yet Canada eventually re-emerged as a significant member through its contributions to NATO peace enforcement operations in the Balkans in the 1990s and its heavy contributions to operations in Afghanistan in the early twenty-first century, finding itself in the unfamiliar position of criticizing many of the allies by which it had for so long been criticized. As the lead nation for the alliance’s “enhanced forward presence” in Latvia, Canada still plays an important and highly visible role in NATO’s efforts in Eastern Europe today. Canada in NATO, 1949–2019 sheds light on how NATO profoundly shaped Canadian defence and foreign policy, while also serving vital Canadian security and diplomatic interests.

Annotation Employing previously classified Cabinet minutes, memoranda, letters, diaries, drafts of speeches, and other documents, Simpson (political science, U. of Western Ontario) analyzes the underlying beliefs and assumptions of high-level policymakers responsible for shaping Canada's approach to NATO in the cold war years. For over 30 years, two conflicting belief systems--the "defenders" and the "critics"--Significantly influenced Canada's shifting defense policy, particularly in the areas of nuclear weapons acquisitions and Canadian troop contributions to Europe. Simpson's analysis helps explain contemporary defense decisions and Canada's fluctuating attitudes toward NATO, which have puzzled Americans and Europeans. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com).