Private firms reluctant to invest in pollution abatement when the penalty for noncompliance falls short of the cost of abatement may be more willing to invest in pollution abatement when enforcement is tougher or when information is released that allows capital markets to react to ranking of firms in terms of their environmental performance.After weighing the costs and benefits of pollution control, profit-maximizing firms sometimes choose not to invest in pollution abatement because the penalty they expect regulators to impose for noncompliance falls short of the cost of abatement. To improve incentives for pollution control, regulators have recently embarked on a strategy to release information to communities and markets (investors and consumers) about firms' environmental performance.Drawing on evidence from American and Canadian studies, Lanoie, Laplante, and Roy report that capital markets do react to the release of such information. The evidence suggests that heavy polluters are affected more significantly than minor polluters. And firms whose market values are hurt most by the release of this information are most likely to invest in pollution abatement.The firms' greater willingness to invest in pollution abatement seems to result from the regulators' willingness to undertake strong enforcement actions combined with the possibility of capital markets reacting to public ranking of firms in terms of their environmental performance. This paper - a product of the Environment, Infrastructure, and Agriculture Division, Policy Research Department - is part of a larger effort in the department's ongoing work on industrial pollution and also to study whether capital markets in developing countries can provide the incentives needed for pollution control. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project Incentives for Pollution Control in Developing Countries: The Role of Capital Markets (RPO 680-76).

"Both regulation and public disclosure belong in the environmental regulators' arsenal. Strong, clear standards combined with a significant, credible penalty system send the right signals to the regulated community, which responds by lowering pollution emissions. The public disclosure of environmental performance also provides strong additional incentives to pollution control"--Cover.

Prices as regulatory instruments; The regulation of aircraft noise; The problem of aicraft noise; Federal noise-control strategies; Noise- control strategies for individual airports; An evaluation of incentive-based strategies; The regulation of airborne benzene.

The first edition of Public Policies for Environmental Protection contributed significantly to the incorporation of economic analysis in the study of environmental policy. Fully revised to account for changes in the institutional, legal, and regulatory framework of environmental policy, the second edition features updated chapters on the EPA and federal regulation, air and water pollution policy, and hazardous and toxic substances. It includes entirely new chapters on market-based environmental policies, global climate change, solid waste, and, for the first time, coverage of the Safe Drinking Water Act. Portney, Stavins, and their contributors provide an invaluable resource for researchers, policymakers, industry professionals, and journalists---anyone who needs up-to-date information on U.S. environmental policy. With their careful explanation of policy alternatives, the authors provide an ideal book for students in courses about environmental economics or environmental politics.