Entering the shady world of what he calls "violent entrepreneurship," Vadim Volkov explores the economic uses of violence and coercion in Russia in the 1990s. Violence has played, he shows, a crucial role in creating the institutions of a new market economy. The core of his work is competition among so-called violence-managing agencies—criminal groups, private security services, private protection companies, and informal protective agencies associated with the state—which multiplied with the liberal reforms of the early 1990s. This competition provides an unusual window on the dynamics of state formation.Violent Entrepreneurs is remarkable for its research. Volkov conducted numerous interviews with members of criminal groups, heads of protection companies, law enforcement employees, and businesspeople. He bases his findings on journalistic and anecdotal evidence as well as on his own personal observation. Volkov investigates the making of violence-prone groups in sports clubs (particularly martial arts clubs), associations for veterans of the Soviet—Afghan war, ethnic gangs, and regionally based social groups, and he traces the changes in their activities across the decade. Some groups wore state uniforms and others did not, but all of their members spoke and acted essentially the same and were engaged in the same activities: intimidation, protection, information gathering, dispute management, contract enforcement, and taxation. Each group controlled the same resource—organized violence.

In 1991, a small group of Russians emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union and enjoyed one of the greatest transfers of wealth ever seen, claiming ownership of some of the most valuable petroleum, natural gas and metal deposits in the world. By 1997, five of those individuals were on Forbes Magazine's list of the world's richest billionaires.

It is a widely held idea that Russia has completed its revolution which brought down the Soviet economy, and that many companies after privatisation work as typical western companies. Another belief is that Russia has adopted a market economy but then reverted to authoritarianism. With these two ideas in mind, this book discusses the suggestion that the key element of post-Soviet economic and political reforms in the last two decades was the redistribution of assets from the state to oligarchs and the new elite. It looks at why most Russian companies could not achieve strong long–run corporate performance by analysing in detail a range of different Russian companies. The book is a useful tool for understanding the future prospects for Russian business.

Prior to 1989, the communist countries of Eastern Europe and the USSR lacked genuine employer and industry associations. After the collapse of communism, industry associations mushroomed throughout the region. Duvanova argues that abusive regulatory regimes discourage the formation of business associations and poor regulatory enforcement tends to encourage associational membership growth. Academic research often treats special interest groups as vehicles of protectionism and non-productive collusion. This book challenges this perspective with evidence of market-friendly activities by industry associations and their benign influence on patterns of public governance. Careful analysis of cross-national quantitative data spanning more than 25 countries, and qualitative examination of business associations in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Croatia, shows that postcommunist business associations function as substitutes for state and private mechanisms of economic governance. These arguments and empirical findings put the long-standing issues of economic regulations, public goods and collective action in a new theoretical perspective.

In the 1990s, as Russia under Yeltsin began the transition to a market economy, most American Russia-watchers saw an optimistic future ahead. In the early twenty-first century, so-called reform economic policies have left some 70 percent of Russians living near the poverty line -- many embittered, deprived of life savings, welfare subsidies, health care, and job security. What has happened in Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union? What led U.S. experts and the media to so seriously misjudge the situation?

A post-communist condition has arisen from the fall of the Berlin Wall and later the Soviet Empire: this book looks at how this condition has manifested itself globally in the production of post-communist film. It argues post-communism is a shared experience on a geopolitical level, unlimited by national state borders, and examines post-communist cross culturalism and global totalitarianism within film. The book examines different national cinemas and dissimilar cinematic modes - from Russian blockbuster cinema to Chinese independent cinema; from Serbian city films to revolutionary films of Mozambique - all formulated as within the postcommunist condition. It considers the postcommunist film in terms of transnational and World cinema. It covers a wide range of films from small and independent filmmaking to mainstream, popular cinema, and explains post-communist signifiers as manifested in visual culture both inside and outside former, and current, communist countries.

Post-Soviet Power tells the story of the Russian electricity system and examines the politics of its transformation from a ministry to a market. Susanne A. Wengle shifts our focus away from what has been at the center of post-Soviet political economy - corruption and the lack of structural reforms - to draw attention to political struggles to establish a state with the ability to govern the economy. She highlights the importance of hands-on economic planning by authorities - post-Soviet developmentalism - and details the market mechanisms that have been created. This book argues that these observations urge us to think of economies and political authority as mutually constitutive, in Russia and beyond. Whereas political science often thinks of market arrangements resulting from political institutions, Russia's marketization demonstrates that political status is also produced by the market arrangements that actors create. Taking this reflexivity seriously suggests a view of economies and markets as constructed and contingent entities.