Donald Rumsfeld's vision of a transformed United States military has been discussed by many and understood by few. It is no surprise that this lack of understanding has resulted in both significant simplifications and sweeping generalizations. Even the phrase, "Rumsfeld's Transformation," accounts for neither the historical influences that led to his vision, nor the multiple components of this transformational effort. Donald Rumsfeld did not invent Transformation. Nor was he the sole source of goals to build a high-technology, information-enabled joint military. Soviet military theorists have discussed Military-Technical Revolutions since the early 1970s. The conceptual basis for what the Bush Administration hoped to achieve with Transformation is the 1996 publication, "Joint Vision 2010," a Clinton-era document. However, the facts are that Rumsfeld made Transformation a singular priority and that he pursued the effort with noteworthy zeal. But by 2007, defense language shifted from "transforming" to "recapitalizing" the military. Rumsfeld was out of office and the organizations he created to facilitate Transformation were reabsorbed by the larger Pentagon bureaucracy. If Rumsfeld's Transformation is indeed dead, does this mean that Transformation as a greater process is dead as well? Answers to such questions require one to understand first that "Rumsfeld's Transformation Vision is actually the result of multiple influences that predate his time in office. Second, "Rumsfeld's Transformation Vision" is actually an umbrella term for three different things: a new way of war, a process, and a defense strategy. And third, in spite of Rumsfeld's reputation for aggressive leadership, the military services shaped, and at times limited, the effectiveness of his program.

Donald Rumsfeld¿s vision of a transformed U.S. military has been discussed by many and understood by few, and this lack of understanding has resulted in both significant simplifications and sweeping generalizations. If Rumsfeld¿s Transformation is indeed dead, does this mean that Transformation as a greater process is dead as well? This report discusses the answers to this question, which requires one to understand first that ¿Rumsfeld¿s Transformation Vision (RTV)¿ is the result of multiple influences that predate his time in office. Second, RTV is actually an umbrella term for 3 different things: a new way of war, a process, and a defense strategy. And third, the military services shaped, and at times limited, the effectiveness of his program. Illus.

Many saw the United States' decisive victory in Desert Storm (1991) as not only vindication of American defense policy since Vietnam but also confirmation of a revolution in military affairs (RMA). Just as information-age technologies were revolutionizing civilian life, the Gulf War appeared to reflect similarly profound changes in warfare. A debate has raged ever since about a contemporary RMA and its implications for American defense policy. Addressing these issues, The Iraq Wars and America's Military Revolution is a comprehensive study of the Iraq Wars in the context of the RMA debate. Focusing on the creation of a reconnaissance-strike complex and conceptions of parallel or nonlinear warfare, Keith L. Shimko finds a persuasive case for a contemporary RMA while recognizing its limitations as well as promise.

The most comprehensive account to date of the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon and aftermath, this volume includes unprecedented details on the impact on the Pentagon building and personnel and the scope of the rescue, recovery, and caregiving effort. It features 32 pages of photographs and more than a dozen diagrams and illustrations not previously available.

Joint Vision 2020 is the conceptual template for how we will channel the vitality of our people and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting.

This book probes various groups of Americans as they come to grips with the consequences of the Vietnam War. Dr. Mrozek examines several areas of concern facing the United States Air Force, and the other services in varying degrees, in the years after Vietnam.