From the first stock markets of Amsterdam,London, and New York to the billions of electronic commerce transactions today, privately produced and enforced economic regulations are more common, more effective, and more promising than commonly considered. In Private Governance, prominent economist Edward Stringham presents case studies of the various forms of private enforcement, self-governance, or self-regulation among private groups or individuals that fill a void that government enforcement cannot. Through analytical narratives the book provides a close examination of the world's first stock markets, key elements of which were unenforceable by law; the community of Celebration, Florida, and other private communities that show how public goods can be bundled with land and provided more effectively; and the millions of credit-card transactions that occur daily and are regulated by private governance. Private Governance ultimately argues that while potential problems of private governance, such as fraud, are pervasive, so are the solutions it presents, and that much of what is orderly in the economy can be attributed to private groups and individuals. With meticulous research, Stringham demonstrates that private governance is a far more common source of order than most people realize, and that private parties have incentives to devise different mechanisms for eliminating unwanted behavior. Private Governance documents numerous examples of private order throughout history to illustrate how private governance is more resilient to internal and external pressure than is commonly believed. Stringham discusses why private governance has economic and social advantages over relying on government regulations and laws, and explores the different mechanisms that enable private governance, including sorting, reputation, assurance, and other bonding mechanisms. Challenging and rigorously-written, Private Governance will make a compelling read for those with an interest in economics, political philosophy, and the history of current Wall Street regulations.

Purpose - The study extends the debate on finance versus institutions in the promotion of investment documented by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Ali (2013) and Asongu (2014). We assess the effects of various components of governance on private investment, notably: political, economic and institutional governances. Financial indicators of depth, allocation efficiency, activity and size are used.Design/methodology/approach - An endogeneity robust dynamic system GMM estimation technique is employed. Principal component analysis is also employed to reduce the dimensions of governance variables. The empirical evidence is based on 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010. Findings - The findings provide support for the quality of governance as a better determinant of private investment than financial intermediary development. Moreover, the evidence of finance and governance as substitutes in their impact on investment implies that good governance fuels private investment and this positive impact is stronger in nations with less developed financial systems. This finding is consistent with Ali (2013) and contrary to the results of Asongu (2014c).Practical implication - Policy measures for fighting involuntary and voluntary surplus liquidities are discussed. The paper provides additional support for the need of strengthening governance institutions to promote investment on the one hand and fighting financial allocation inefficiency by mitigating surplus liquidity issues on the other hand. Originality/value - The paper extends the debate on the substitution of finance and institutions in the promotion of private investment.

In managerial literature the challenges of ramping-up, growing and enhancing a (Finance) Shared Services Organization are regularly neglected. Therefore, the compilation will address two objectives: First, based on a generic phase model of an SSO’s development, frequently arising questions related to the management of SSOs shall be systematically discussed and practicable solutions derived. Secondly, a picture of the future of SSOs shall be elaborated, resulting in new future management implications.

Panarchy is a normative political meta-theory that advocates non-territorial states founded on actual social contracts that are explicitly negotiated and signed between states and their prospective citizens. The explicit social contract, or a constitution, sets the terms under which a state may use coercion against its citizens and the conditions under which the contract may be annulled, revised, rescinded, or otherwise exited from. Panarchy does not advocate any particular model of the state or social justice, but intends to encourage political variety, innovation, experimentation, and choice. With its emphasis on explicit social contracts, Panarchy offers an interesting variation on traditional social contract theories. Today, Panarchist political thought is particularly relevant and interesting in the context of globalization, increased international migration, the weakening of national sovereignty, the rise of the internet "cloud" as a non-territorial locus of political and protopolitical social networks that are not geographic, the invention of cryptocurrencies that may replace national currencies, and the rise of urban centers where people of many different political identities live and work together. This is the first volume to bring together key philosophically and politically interesting yet often overlooked Panarchist texts. From the first published translation of de Puydt seminal 1860 article to contemporary Silicon Valley political theory, the volume includes Panarchist texts from different eras, cultures and geographical regions. The amassed wealth of theoretical insight enables readers to compare different texts in this tradition of political thought and distinguish different streams and varieties within this political tradition, in comparison with Cosmopolitanism, Contractarianism, and Anarchism.

Scientific knowledge and practical advice are combined in this book. Leading scientists present their latest research results in the area of product and price bundling, with respect to optimization as well as to behavioral bundling approaches. In addition the reader will learn how to implement bundling strategies and how to set up a bundling concept. He will find a thorough explanation of the value that bundling has for improving a company`s profit and sales.

"An organization "bundles" the services that it purchases when it consolidates activities previously provided by separate sources and purchases the services through a single contract from a single provider. The Department of Defense is giving increasing attention to this practice because commercial firms report that bundling offers the potential for significant performance and cost benefits. However, the goals of the federal government differ from those of commercial firms in that federal regulations commit the Air Force and other federal organizations to place "a fair proportion" of purchases and contracts with small business enterprises and to maintain free and open competition among prospective providers of services to the federal government. Small businesses typically do not have the scale of operation or scope of expertise to provide bundles of services as prime contractors. The authors of this report discuss recent legislation designed to protect small businesses by ensuring that bundling occurs only when it is likely to generate "measurably substantial" increases in performance or reductions in cost to the federal buyer. After reviewing potential sources of such benefits, the authors propose a methodology that buying agencies could use to gather information on when and how to bundle the services they buy and justify those decisions in a way that satisfies the legislative requirements."--Rand abstracts.