This paper examines the current Building Partner Capacity and Security Force Assistance capabilities and capacities within the United States Army as well as Department of Defense. The current operational environment calls for us to look at history, policy, doctrine and other academic proposals to identify capability and capacity gaps. As the General Purpose Force looks forward to expanding roles in Irregular Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense and Security Assistance, does the U.S. Army have the proper force structure and minimal capability to fight and win the counterinsurgency of the future? This paper analyzes this construct and provides a framework for identifying proponency, institutionalizing lessons learned from OIF and OEF as well as providing military, police and governance structure as a tool for global engagement. This new structural paradigm will help the United States gain access, influence and build capacity throughout this new world order.

The Civil Response Corps (CRC) would function much like our military reserve. It would ease the burden on the Armed Forces by allowing the hiring of civilians with critical skills to serve on missions abroad when America needs them. The CRC is a product of the efforts of State Department's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The core mission of S/CRS is to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, good governance, and a market economy. As the General Purpose Force looks forward to expanding roles in Irregular Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, Security Assistance and Stability Operations, does the U.S. Army or the Department of Defense have the proper force structure and minimal capability to fight and win through all phases of conflict?

On July 16, 2008 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice launched the Civil Response Corps (CRC) which would function much like our military reserve. It would ease the burden on the Armed Forces by allowing the hiring of civilians with critical skills to serve on missions abroad when America needs them. The CRC is a product of the efforts of State Department's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The core mission of S/ CRS is to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, good governance, and a market economy. This Letort Paper examines the current Building Partner Capacity and Stability Operations capabilities and capacities within the Army and how they relate and complement the efforts of the CRC. Does the U.S. Army or the Department of Defense have the proper force structure and minimal capability to fight and win through all phases of conflict? This paper provides a framework for identifying proponency, institutionalizing lessons learned, and providing a military, police, and governance structure as a tool for global engagement. This new structural paradigm complements S/CRS's efforts to provide the United States with the ability to access, influence, and build capacity throughout this new world order.

Current operations, demands of persistent conflict, and enduring U.S. national security interests underscore the immediate and continuing need to improve U.S. Security Force Assistance (SFA) efforts. The frequency and importance of such activities throughout U.S. history demonstrate that the current requirements are not anomalies. Since September 11, 2001, the United States has been challenged to accomplish key national security goals due to a lack of capability and capacity to effectively advise, utilize, and partner with foreign security forces. To meet this challenge, this paper offers recommendations that build upon recent initiatives within the Department of Defense (DoD) to create a comprehensive approach to improve U.S. SFA. At the heart of the recommendations is a DoD-level organizational approach to institutionalize SFA activities effectively and to facilitate interagency and multinational unity of effort. We intend to adapt current DoD processes that encourage the ad hoc approach and implement a single DoD-level integrating organization.

How do US special operations forces maximize their role in the foreign policy of "building partner capacity" (BPC) to support the objectives of national security strategy? Most analytical writing about partner force development focuses on the wartime advise-and-assist experience of both conventional forces (CF) and special operations forces (SOF). Few scholars have written about the nature of warfare in phase 0 or the strategic utility of special operations campaigns to develop capable and competent forces for partner nations. Fewer still have studied the comprehensive integration of SOF and CF to achieve the policy goals associated with building partner capacity. This monograph identifies gaps in the progression of history, theory, and doctrine for partner force advising and for phase 0 operations in general that contribute to differing cultural attitudes towards these mission and environments between SOF and CF. SOF are proven highly effective in building partner capacity with minimal CF integration, but only when certain criteria are present. When environments are suboptimal, there is insufficient evidence to suggest how these forces might campaign together to complement each other's capabilities and build partner capacity more effectively. US national security policy states that countering the global terrorist network which threatens US and allied interests requires support via an indirect approach through and with the military capacity of our partner nations. Threat groups based in weak and failed states uniformly exploit the undergoverned spaces where US partner nations lack the capacity to deny those spaces to the terrorist or insurgent. US security policy ends therefore include both defeating the terrorist network and supporting partner nation stability. The policy of building partner capacity is the way to achieve those ends, through whole-of-government actions to improve the security, development, and governance abilities of the partner nation. All services of the US military are tasked with preparing for and conducting stability operations, including the partner force development aspects of BPC. Special operations forces will find themselves involved in or leading nearly all these efforts, and must integrate with all capable and potential partners to most effectively support US strategic and policy goals.