Ongoing operations and emerging mission requirements place a heavy burden on Army resources, resulting in capability gaps that the Army is unable to fill by itself. One solution is to build the appropriate capabilities in allies and partner armies through focused security cooperation. To do this, Army planners need a more comprehensive understanding of the capability gaps and a process for matching those gaps with candidate partner armies.

This monograph outlines an approach to building the capabilities and capacity of partner armies for coalition operations through the effective use of Army security cooperation. It is important to clarify two key terms in this study, specifically, the difference between capability and capacity. Simply put, "capability" is the ability to perform a function, and "capacity" is the extent of a capability present. Ongoing operations and emerging missions create competing demands for the Army's capabilities, resulting in requirement gaps that the Army is unable to fill by itself. Although there are other ways to fill capability gaps (e.g., with other Services, contractors, or increased Army end-strength), national and Department of Defense (DoD) strategic guidance emphasizes the need to leverage the capabilities of allies and partners to fill these gaps. Thus, this monograph is concerned with how the Army should focus its security cooperation activities to build the most appropriate capabilities in partner armies. As a supporting entity, it must use its limited security cooperation resources in a way that effectively builds partner army capabilities that support Joint requirements. To do this, the Army cannot work in isolation. Partnering with DoD and other U.S. government agencies provides the solution and also enables the development of partner capacity. This study is part of a larger RAND Arroyo Center effort to assist the U.S. Army in building partner capabilities through enhanced and focused security cooperation. It argues that U.S. Army planners need a comprehensive understanding of the types of capability gaps that partner armies might fill and provides a process for matching them with potential partner capabilities. The study also provides insights into planning associated with Army security cooperation activities and discusses the importance of developing metrics that would allow the Army to assess its security cooperation investment over time.

This study outlines a planning framework for cultivating multinational force compatibility (MFC) with armies that are not traditional allies. Such coalition partners are increasingly important to the Army in the post-9/11 security environment. Multilateral military operations are often now conducted by coalitions of the willing rather than by alliances, and many of these ad hoc coalitions include key contingents that have no history of sustained peacetime cooperation with the U.S. Army. The Army has only very limited resources available to enhance compatibility with non-allied partner armies, especially compared to the resources devoted to compatibility with traditional allies such as the United Kingdom. The challenge of enhancing compatibility and building partnership capacity with non-core partner armies therefore requires an innovative approach to planning.

[This] book ... provides a detailed analysis of what we need to do to effectively build and sustain enduring partnerships, examines our current state, and provides a roadmap with specific, actionable recommendations to strengthen our processes and employ a holistic joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational approach to partnerships. Two of the insights that I think we often miss are that our partners have a say in the process and that we need to manage the process as an integrated portfolio and make investment/reinvestment decisions based upon capability objectives that we and our partners agree upon. The U.S. military simply cannot engage alone. Partnership must be planned and executed in order to set meaningful objectives as well as to synchronize available resources to achieve them.

US military operations following 11 September 2001 have demonstrated that US military capacity alone is not enough to meet US security objectives. As a result, the US has renewed its commitment to the endeavors of Security Cooperation (SC) and Building Partner Capacity (BPC). Academic and military research, as well as official strategic guidance and military doctrine have provided priorities and resources for SC and BPC. The Combined Ownership-Operations Program (CO-OP) model is a BPC strategy that expands the potential ends, ways, and means of SC. If resourced and utilized, CO-OP structures can build long-term, transparent, self-sustaining capabilities and capacity among foreign partners that are vectored to support US security, priorities, and values. CO-OP efforts can shape the international environment in favor of the US while they can bridge critical capability shortfalls.