Ongoing operations and emerging mission requirements place a heavy burden on Army resources, resulting in capability gaps that the Army is unable to fill by itself. One solution is to build the appropriate capabilities in allies and partner armies through focused security cooperation. To do this, Army planners need a more comprehensive understanding of the capability gaps and a process for matching those gaps with candidate partner armies.

This monograph outlines an approach to building the capabilities and capacity of partner armies for coalition operations through the effective use of Army security cooperation. It is important to clarify two key terms in this study, specifically, the difference between capability and capacity. Simply put, "capability" is the ability to perform a function, and "capacity" is the extent of a capability present. Ongoing operations and emerging missions create competing demands for the Army's capabilities, resulting in requirement gaps that the Army is unable to fill by itself. Although there are other ways to fill capability gaps (e.g., with other Services, contractors, or increased Army end-strength), national and Department of Defense (DoD) strategic guidance emphasizes the need to leverage the capabilities of allies and partners to fill these gaps. Thus, this monograph is concerned with how the Army should focus its security cooperation activities to build the most appropriate capabilities in partner armies. As a supporting entity, it must use its limited security cooperation resources in a way that effectively builds partner army capabilities that support Joint requirements. To do this, the Army cannot work in isolation. Partnering with DoD and other U.S. government agencies provides the solution and also enables the development of partner capacity. This study is part of a larger RAND Arroyo Center effort to assist the U.S. Army in building partner capabilities through enhanced and focused security cooperation. It argues that U.S. Army planners need a comprehensive understanding of the types of capability gaps that partner armies might fill and provides a process for matching them with potential partner capabilities. The study also provides insights into planning associated with Army security cooperation activities and discusses the importance of developing metrics that would allow the Army to assess its security cooperation investment over time.

Limited resources, access, and incomplete knowledge of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats create a need for working with appropriate partner countries around the world to address these challenging threats. This monograph outlines and then applies a four-step process for developing regional approaches to building partner capacity (BPC) to combat WMD.

It is often challenging to determine whether security cooperation activities conducted by the Defense Department have contributed to U.S. objectives. This monograph, based on themes that emerged from a May 2008 assessment workshop held at RAND, lays out a framework for security program assessment and stresses the need for injecting a greater level of objectivity into the assessment process.

The Air Force faces a challenging environment as it devises an approach to managing security cooperation with partner countries. The important mission of countering terrorist and insurgent groups abroad requires working closely with allies and partner countries to strengthen security. Accordingly, current U.S. defense strategy emphasizes that the U.S. armed forces should do more to work "by, with, and through partners" to accomplish missions.

This book provides suggestions for how the U.S. military can help prepare its personnel to work successfully with interagency (IA), multinational, and coalition partners. The nature of recent challenges and the types of missions the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has undertaken highlight the need for DoD to consider ways to help the military prepare to work with other government agencies, international organizations, private and nongovernmental organizations, and foreign militaries. These challenges require DoD to combine military and nonmilitary means, such as intelligence, diplomacy, and humanitarian assistance, to advance U.S. national-security interests. Moreover, exhibiting cultural awareness and sensitivity vis- -vis non-DoD partners is paramount to successful operational planning and execution.