An account based on British archival sources of the search for a co-ordinated Anglo-French programme of economic recovery which would define the shape of postwar Europe. The pursuit of this goal is traced against the background of the Cold War, the provision of American economic aid and the revival of German industry. It is demonstrated how the emergence of these factors led France to turn instead to European integration on the model of the Schuman Plan.

With the Allied victory in 1945 came a determination to find a new way of conducting relations between the European states based on trust and cooperation. Two nations in particular had the prestige and moral authority to give a lead which others would follow. Britain and France had kept faith with each other through the dark years of the war. Now they faced together the challenge of building a brighter future. As new governments in both countries embraced the principle of economic planning there were hopes that a united Europe might develop naturally from a co-ordinated Anglo-French programme of post-war recovery. Complications arose as the reviving industrial heartlands of defeated Germany found a key role in the Western half of a world divided by the Cold War. How the paths of Britain and France diverged and a different kind of Europe was born is the subject of this book.

Britain, France and Europe, 1945-1975 takes a fresh look at the international trajectories of Europe's premier democracies. The side-lining of Britain and France in the Cold War era, argues Adamthwaite, was preventable. A Franco-British Europe came within a whisker of realization. Condemning President Charles de Gaulle as an intransigent gatekeeper created a convenient alibi for self-inflicted missteps. UK bids for European Community membership ignored the elephant in the room - the need for partnership in a superpower age. A marriage powering the Community could have repositioned Western Europe as partner, not client of the United States. Although perceived as a failing power, France outperformed Britain - seizing the initiative in European construction, and winning primacy in western Europe. As well as exploring sharply contrasting national experiences in the aftermath of war, the author analyses the reasons for French success. The analysis evaluates key influences: the mental maps of decision makers; leadership styles; the post-1945 international system; policy making machinery; the 'democratic deficit' in British and French politics; and public opinion. Drawing on American, British and French official records, together with private papers and interviews, this enlightening study highlights the importance of contingency and individual actors, and will be of great interest to scholars of modern European history.

Edmund Dell examines the Attlee government's rejection of the Schuman Plan for the establishment of a common market for coal and steel and reassesses Bevan's conduct as foreign secretary. The story is placed in the context of the "big questions" dominating British policy formation: security, the dollar shortage, the American attack on the sterling area, and pressure for European integration.

A critical examination of the labour government and trades Union Congress in the immediate postwar period, this book argues that the Cold War was not just a traditional conflict between states but also an attempt to contain the growth of radical working-class movements at home and abroad. These radical movements, stimulated by the Second World War and its aftermath, seemed to policymakers within the Labour Party and the TUC to threaten British interests. The author contends that the Labour government never seriously considered following a socialist foreign policy, but instead sought to shape political developments throughout the world in ways most conductive to maintaining Britain's traditional economic and imperial interests. The government was able to follow established policies abroad and increasingly at home at least in part because British trade union leaders supported its attempts to prevent radicals and communists from coming to power in trade union movements inside Britain and throughout the world. In so doing, the trade union movement significantly extended its links with the state, in particular by cooperating with it in the sphere of foreign and colonial labour policy.

Looking at decolonization in the conditional tense, this volume teases out the complex and uncertain ends of British and French empire in Africa during the period of ‘late colonial shift’ after 1945. Rather than view decolonization as an inevitable process, the contributors together explore the crucial historical moments in which change was negotiated, compromises were made, and debates were staged. Three core themes guide the analysis: development, contingency and entanglement. The chapters consider the ways in which decolonization was governed and moderated by concerns about development and profit. A complementary focus on contingency allows deeper consideration of how colonial powers planned for ‘colonial futures’, and how divergent voices greeted the end of empire. Thinking about entanglements likewise stresses both the connections that existed between the British and French empires in Africa, and those that endured beyond the formal transfer of power.

During the past fifty years few issues in British politics have generated such heated controversy as Britain's approach to European integration. Why has Europe had such an explosive impact on British politics? What impelled British policymakers to embrace a European destiny and why did they take such a cautious approach? These are some of the key issues addressed inThe Reluctant Europeans. This new study draws upon recently available source material providing a clear chronological account and covering events right up to Blair's first year in office and the launch of the Euro.