A history of British financial crises since the Napoleonic wars, providing an account of the main crises from 1825 until the credit crunch of 2007-8.

This book exposes, for the first time in modern scholarship, the role that the rise of the Carry Trade played in British financial crises between 1825 and 1866, how in reaction the Bank of England improved its management of monetary policy after 1866 and how those lessons have been forgotten since the 1970s. Britain is one of the few major capitalist economies in the world to have avoided policy-induced systemic financial crises for more than 100 years of its history-between 1866 and 1973. Beforehand, it suffered a series of serious banking panics, in 1825, 1837, 1847, 1857-58 and 1866. Since the 1970s banking instability has returned again, with the global financial crisis of 2007-09 hitting Britain hard. Economists and policymakers have asked what can be learnt from Britain's experience of the disappearance and reappearance of crises to help efforts to prevent future ones. This book answers that question with a major reassessment of Britain's financial history over the past two centuries. It does so by applying the long-neglected ideas of the British Banking School to explain how crises can occur because of the Carry Trade. This book is essential reading for economists and historians of modern Britain, practitioners and policymakers, as well as anyone who is affected by financial crises and their consequences. Charles Read is a British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow in History and an Affiliated Lecturer in Economics and History at the University of Cambridge. He is also a Fellow, Tutor, College Lecturer and Director of Studies at Corpus Christi College and a Research Associate at the Centre for Financial History at Darwin College. His previous research has won the Thirsk-Feinstein PhD Dissertation Prize, the T.S. Ashton Prize, and the New Researcher Prize of the Economic History Society and a prize from the International Economic History Association for the best doctoral dissertation completed in 2015, 2016 or 2017. He has also worked as a writer and editor at The Economist and as a research associate at an investment bank in London.

A full account of the rise and fall of British banking stability which sheds new light on why banking systems crash.

This book provides a history of British financial crises since the Napoleonic wars. Interest in crises lapsed during the generally benign financial conditions which followed the Second Word War, but the study of banking markets and financial crises has returned to centre stage following the credit crunch of 2007-8 and the subsequent Eurozone crisis. The first two chapters provide an overview of British financial crises from the bank failures of 1825 to the credit crunch of 2007-8. The causes and consequences of individual crises are explained and recurrent features are identified. Subsequent chapters provide more detailed accounts of the railway boom-and-bust and the subsequent financial crisis of 1847, the crisis following the collapse of Overend Gurney in 1866, the dislocation of London's money market at the outset of the Great War in 1914 and the crisis in 1931 when sterling left the gold standard. Other chapters consider the role of regulation, banks' capital structures, and the separation of different types of banking activity. The book examines the role of the Bank of England as lender of last resort and the successes and failures of crisis management. The scope for reducing the risk of future systemic crises is assessed. The book will be of interest to students, market practitioners, policymakers and general readers interested in the debate over banking reform.

The Media and Financial Crises provides unique insights into the debate on the role of the media in the global financial crisis. Coverage is inter-disciplinary, with contributions from media studies, political economy and journalists themselves. It features a wide range of countries, including the USA, UK, Ireland, Greece, Spain and Australia, and a completely new history of financial crises in the British press over 150 years. Editors Steve Schifferes and Richard Roberts have assembled an expert set of contributors, including Joseph E Stiglitz and Lionel Barber, editor of the Financial Times. The role of the media has been central in shaping our response to the financial crisis. Examining its performance in comparative and historical perspectives is crucial to ensuring that the media does a better job next time. The book has five distinct parts: The Banking Crisis and the Media The Euro-Crisis and the Media Challenges for the Media The Lessons of History Media Messengers Under Interrogation The Media and Financial Crises offers broad and coherent coverage, making it ideal for both students and scholars of financial journalism, journalism studies, media studies, and media and economic history.

WINNER OF THE LIONEL GELBER PRIZE A NEW YORK TIMES NOTABLE BOOK OF 2018 ONE OF THE ECONOMIST'S BOOKS OF THE YEAR A NEW YORK TIMES CRITICS' TOP BOOK "An intelligent explanation of the mechanisms that produced the crisis and the response to it...One of the great strengths of Tooze's book is to demonstrate the deeply intertwined nature of the European and American financial systems."--The New York Times Book Review From the prizewinning economic historian and author of Shutdown and The Deluge, an eye-opening reinterpretation of the 2008 economic crisis (and its ten-year aftermath) as a global event that directly led to the shockwaves being felt around the world today. We live in a world where dramatic shifts in the domestic and global economy command the headlines, from rollbacks in US banking regulations to tariffs that may ignite international trade wars. But current events have deep roots, and the key to navigating today’s roiling policies lies in the events that started it all—the 2008 economic crisis and its aftermath. Despite initial attempts to downplay the crisis as a local incident, what happened on Wall Street beginning in 2008 was, in fact, a dramatic caesura of global significance that spiraled around the world, from the financial markets of the UK and Europe to the factories and dockyards of Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, forcing a rearrangement of global governance. With a historian’s eye for detail, connection, and consequence, Adam Tooze brings the story right up to today’s negotiations, actions, and threats—a much-needed perspective on a global catastrophe and its long-term consequences.