This work represents a documentary sourcebook on British economic development during the postwar years. The author provides a balanced overview of contentious themes relating to the context, dimensions, pace and consequences of Britain's relative economic decline since 1945.

The debate over 'Britain in Decline' is one that still rages in the academic, political and public spheres. In this concise study, B. W. E. Alford takes issue with those economists who have a mechanistic approach to the subject. Instead, he examines Britain's economic development since the Second World War within a wider framework of political, social and cultural factors. He discusses topics such as post-war reconstruction, the theory of 'too few producers', the alleged process of de-industrialisation, the role of sterling, business organisation and management, labour relations and the impact of government policy on Britain's economic development. Professor Alford provides a clear introduction to the subject along with a survey of recent literature, yet shows how complex and deep-rooted are the causes of the 'British Disease'.

This compelling volume re-examines the topic of economic growth in Europe after the Second World War. The contributors approach the subject armed not only with new theoretical ideas, but also with the experience of the 1980s on which to draw. The analysis is based on both applied economics and on economic history. Thus, while the volume is greatly informed by insights from growth theory, emphasis is given to the presentation of chronological and institutional detail. The case study approach and the adoption of a longer-run perspective than is normal for economists allow new insights to be obtained. As well as including chapters that consider the experience of individual European countries, the book explores general European institutional arrangements and historical circumstances. The result is a genuinely comparative picture of post-war growth, with insights that do not emerge from standard cross-section regressions based on the post-1960 period.

Years of Recovery was the first comprehensive study of the transition from war to peace in the British economy under the Labour government of 1945–51. It includes a full account of the successive crises and turning-points in those hectic years – the coal and convertibility crises of 1947, devaluation in 1949 and rearmament in 1951. These episodes, apart from their dramatic interest, light up the dilemmas of policy and the underlying economic trends and pressures in a country delicately poised between economic disaster and full recovery. Many of the debates on economic policy that are still in progress – on incomes policy, demand management, the welfare state and relations with Europe, for example – have their roots in those years. Many of the trends originating then persisted long afterwards. The book also examines the interaction between events and policy and the role in a managed economy of the policy-making machine. Now that the public records are open to 1954, it has been possible to make use of official documents to review the possibilities of action that were canvassed and the thinking and differences of opinion that underlay ministerial decisions. Combining personal involvement with thorough research, this fascinating study will be a major contribution to our understanding of post-war economic policy. Alec Cairncross was Chancellor of the University of Glasgow and a former Master of St Peter’s College, Oxford. He spent the years covered by this volume as a civil servant in London, Berlin and Paris before moving to Glasgow as Professor of Applied Economics. This classic book of some of his most brilliant research was first published in 1985.

This is a thorough and persuasive study, which summarizes existing literature and draws on hitherto unpublished material. It will be invaluable for anyone interested in economics and politics. Paul Mosley shows how the job has been tackled by the governments of Britain and the United States.

Many accounts of British development since 1945 have attempted to discover why Britain experienced slower rates of economic growth than other Western European countries. In many cases, the explanation for this phenomenon has been attributed to the high level of defence spending that successive British post-war governments adhered to. Yet is it fair to assume that Britain's relative economic decline could have been prevented if policy makers had not spent so much on defence? Examining aspects of the political economy and economic impact of British defence expenditure in the period of the first cold war (1945-1955), this book challenges these widespread assumptions, looking in detail at the link between defence spending and economic decline. In contrast to earlier studies, Till Geiger not only analyses the British effort within the framework of Anglo-American relations, but also places it within the wider context of European integration. By reconsidering the previously accepted explanation of the economic impact of the British defence effort during the immediate post-war period, this book convincingly suggests that British foreign policy-makers retained a large defence budget to offset a sense of increased national vulnerability, brought about by a reduction in Britain's economic strength due to her war effort. Furthermore, it is shown that although this level of military spending may have slightly hampered post-war recovery, it was not in itself responsible for the decline of the British economy.