This book provides a long-term perspective on the opinions of the British public on foreign and defence policy in the post-war era. Thematically wide-ranging, it looks at the broader role of foreign and defence policy in British politics and elections, public opinion towards Britain’s key international relationships and alliances (the United States, NATO, the EU and the Commonwealth), and public opinion towards the projection of ‘soft power’ (overseas aid) and ‘hard power’ (defence spending, nuclear weapons and military intervention). Assessing the main areas of change and continuity in the public’s views, it also pays close attention to the dividing lines in wider society over foreign and defence policy. Analysing an extensive range of surveys and opinion polls, the book situates the analysis in the wider context of Britain’s changing foreign policy role and priorities in the post-war era, as well as linking public opinion with the politics of British external policy – the post-war consensus on Britain’s overseas role, historical and contemporary areas of inter-party debate, and enduring intra-party divides. This text will be of key interest to scholars and students of British politics, European politics, foreign policy analysis, public opinion, defence and security studies and more broadly to comparative politics and international relations.

First Published in 1981. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This new work examines how the European states, the United Kingdom and the United States will approach the defence and Security of Europe in the medium and long-term. It is often assumed that Brexit, the United Kingdom’s departure from the political and commercial European Union, would affect defence and security profoundly, but the basis of that assumption is rarely analysed. Bringing together a panel of specialists from Europe, the UK, the EU, and the United States, this volume evaluates the relative position they play in Europe’s defence in the era of Brexit. It examines the arguments, challenges, and problems in European defence, and tests them against the residual commitment, cohesion, and capabilities of the states concerned, including Anglo-French military co-operation, the silent Anglo-German partnership, the US-UK Special Relationship, and the emergent Northern Group.

This study of British defence policy argues that a "one-off" defence review is not enough but a regular process of defece reviews every five years provide a long-term strategic direction which, the author maintains, is lacking at present.

This study of British defence policy argues that a "one-off" defence review is not enough but a regular process of defece reviews every five years provide a long-term strategic direction which, the author maintains, is lacking at present.

This book explores the process by which defence policy is made in contemporary Britain and the institutions, actors and conflicting interests which interact in its inception and continuous reformulation. Rather than dealing with the substance of defence policy, this study focuses upon the institutional actors involved in this process. This is a subject which has commanded far more interest from public, Parliament, government and the armed forces since the protracted, bloody and ultimately unsuccessful British military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. The work begins with a discussion of two contextual factors shaping policy. The first relates to the impact of Britain’s ‘special relationship’ with the United States over defence and intelligence matters, while the second considers the impact of Britain’s relatively disappointing economic performance upon the funding of British defence since 1945. It then goes on to explore the role and impact of all the key policy actors, from the Prime Minister, Cabinet and core executive, to the Ministry of Defence and its relations with the broader ‘Whitehall village’, and the Foreign Office and Treasury in particular. The work concludes by examining the increasing influence of external policy actors and forces, such as Parliament, the courts, political parties, pressure groups and public opinion. This book will be of much interest to students of British defence policy, security studies, and contemporary military history.

This book argues that postwar Britain's 'imperial over-extension' has been exaggerated. Britain developed and adjusted its defence strategy based upon the perceived Communist threat and available resources. It was especially successful at adapting to meet the strategic and resource challenges from the Far East from 1947-54. There British and Gurkha forces were deployed only in contingencies that threatened vital British interests, while the U.S. and Commonwealth allies were persuaded to accept key wartime missions, thus preserving Britain's ability to fight in Western Europe.