This book, based on recently declassified documents in Britain and the USA, is the first detailed account of Britain's East of Suez decision, which was taken by the Harold Wilson Government in 1967-68. Contrary to received opinion, the author argues that the decision was not taken hastily as a result of the November 1967 devaluation. Nor is there any hard evidence to support the notion that there existed a 'Pound-Defence' deal with the USA. Despite Washington's pressure to maintain Britain's East of Suez role, the decision was taken by the Labour Government on the basis of a long-term effort to re-examine Britain's world role since 1959, and it marked the end of an era for postwar Britain.

After 1945, Britain maintained a great chain of overseas military outposts stretching from the Suez Canal to Singapore. Commonly termed the `east of Suez' role, this chain had long been thought to be crucial for the country's security and its vitality. Nonetheless, British leaders eventually decided to abandon this network of bases. This study provides the most comprehensive explanation of this pivotal decision to date, while also offering insight into the processes of foreign policy change and the decline of great powers.

In October 1956, Britain, France and Israel launched an attack on Egypt. For each of the contenders there was much more at stake than the future of the Canal. None of the combatants in the Suez campaign emerged in glory which may be why, in recent years, it has been largely relegated to academic studies. But the events surrounding the invasion, while combining the high drama with elements of political farce that make for a compelling story, had a greater impact on world affairs than many more famous conflicts.

This book examines Britain's decision to leave the Gulf and considers the interaction between British decision-making, and local responses and initiatives, in shaping the modern Gulf.

In July 1956 Egyptian President Gamal Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, causing immediate concern to Britain and France. They already opposed Nasser and were worried at the threat to maritime traffic in the Canal. This book traces the course of subsequent events. Together with Israel, Britain and France hatched a plot to occupy the Canal Zone and overthrow Nasser. Israel attacked Sinai, and Britain and France launched offensives throughout Egypt, but strategic failures overshasdowed tactical success. Finally, Britain, France and Israel bowed to international pressure and withdrew, leaving the Suez Canal, and Egypt, firmly in the hands of President Nasser.

Diane Kunz describes here how the United States employed economic diplomacy to affect relations among states during the Suez Crisis of 1956-57. Using political and financial archival material from the United States and Great Britain, and drawing from pers

An original and perceptive study of Britain's withdrawal from her last Arab dependencies - the Sudan, South West Arabia and the Gulf States.