After the end of World War I, international pressures prevented the Allies from implementing direct colonial rule over the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Instead, the Allies created a system of mandates for the governance of the Middle East. France was assigned Lebanon and Syria, and Britain was assigned Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan. First published in 1976, Britain in Iraq has long been recognized as the definitive history of the mandate period, providing a meticulous and engaging account of Britain's political involvement in Iraq as well as rare insights into the motives behind the founding of the Iraqi state. Peter Sluglett presents a historical narrative of the development and implementation of the mandate in the face of considerable opposition in both Iraq and Britain and shows how the British maintained a "reliable" group of Iraqi clients in power to protect imperial interests. Sluglett explores the changing relationship between Britain and Iraq over the eighteen years of occupation and mandate, the interactions between Shi'ite and Sunni populations, the position of the Kurds, the boundary between Turkey and northern Iraq, and policies relating to defense, land tenure and the tribes, and education. A new conclusion attempts to analyze the legacy of the mandate and to offer some explanation for Iraq's continuing weakness as a state and the structural obstacles preventing the emergence of a plural political system.

This book examines the decisions by Tony Blair and John Howard to take their nations into the 2003 Iraq War, and the questions these decisions raise about democratic governance. It also explores the significance of the US alliance in UK and Australian decision-making, and the process for taking a nation to war. Relying on primary government documents and interviews, and bringing together various strands of literature that have so far been discussed in isolation (including historical accounts, party politics, prime ministerial leadership and intelligence studies), the authors provide a comprehensive and original view on the various post-war inquiries conducted in the UK, Australia.

"This book is the first in-depth history of Britain's decision to invade Iraq since the Chilcot Inquiry released its report. The volume controversially argues that it was a blunder, or a careless failure of judgement" (ed.).

An original exploration of the 2003 Iraq war and geopolitics more broadly through the prism of art. Offers a reappraisal of one of the most contentious and consequential events of the early twenty-first century Advances an original perspective on Britain’s role in the 2003 invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq Maps out new ways of thinking about geopolitical events through art Examines the work of artists, curators and activists in light of Britain’s role as a colonial power in Iraq and the importance of oil Reflects on the significance, limits and dilemmas of art as a form of critical intervention Questions the implications of art in colonialism and modernity

This new edition of Frank Ledwidge’s eye-opening analysis of British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan unpicks the causes and enormous costs of military failure. Updated throughout, and with fresh chapters assessing and enumerating the overall military performance since 2011—including Libya, ISIS, and the Chilcot findings—Ledwidge shows how lessons continue to go unlearned. “A brave and important book; essential reading for anyone wanting insights into the dysfunction within the British military today, and the consequences this has on the lives of innocent civilians caught up in war.”—Times Literary Supplement

This thesis examines the British experience in Iraq from 1914-1926. Britain invaded Iraq to secure its oil interests and to protect its lines of communication to India. The British initially defeated Ottoman forces and captured the Basra vilayet (province) in December 1914. Although Basra’s capture accomplished the objectives that Britain had sought to achieve at the outset of the campaign, it was followed by an ill-advised advance to Baghdad that culminated in defeat by the Ottomans at Kut-al-Amara in 1916. The British regrouped, however, and resumed the offensive, capturing Baghdad in 1917 and Mosul in 1918. After the war, Britain managed Iraq as a League of Nations Mandate from 1920-1932. The British installed Iraq’s first ruler, King Feisal I in 1921 and helped demarcate its northern border with Turkey in 1926. This thesis explores the British military campaign in Iraq during World War I and its subsequent civil administration. The thesis will examine the actions Britain took during this time period and determine, what wisdom, if any, that the United States (US) can draw from these experiences in relation to its current efforts in Iraq. This study concludes that, if the US is going to accomplish its objectives in Iraq, it should base its future relationship with Iraq primarily by incentives and not coercion. Furthermore, any attempt by the US to simultaneously develop Iraq into an independent nation-state and maintain dominant, long-term influence will likely result in failure. Overall, if the US wants to accomplish its goals in Iraq, it should treat Iraq like an equal and strive to be the best friend it has never had.

This is a penetrating account of Anglo-Iraqi relations from 1929, when Britain decided to grant independence to Iraq, to 1941, when hostilities between the two nations came to an end. Showing how Britain tried--and failed--to maintain its political influence, economic ascendancy, and strategic position in Iraq after independence, Silverfarb presents a suggestive analysis of the possibilities and limitations of indirect rule by imperial powers in the Third World. The book also tells of the rapid disintegration of Britain's dominance in the Middle East after World War I and portrays the struggle of a recently independent Arab nation to free itself from the lingering grip of a major European power.