Using newly available material from both sides of the Iron Curtain, William Glenn Gray explores West Germany's efforts to prevent international acceptance of East Germany as a legitimate state following World War II. Unwilling to accept the division of their country, West German leaders regarded the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as an illegitimate upstart--a puppet of the occupying Soviet forces. Together with France, Britain, and the United States, West Germany applied political and financial pressure around the globe to ensure that the GDR remain unrecognized by all countries outside the communist camp. Proclamations of ideological solidarity and narrowly targeted bursts of aid gave the GDR momentary leverage in such diverse countries as Egypt, Iraq, Ghana, and Indonesia; yet West Germany's intimidation tactics, coupled with its vastly superior economic resources, blocked any decisive East German breakthrough. Gray argues that Bonn's isolation campaign was dropped not for want of success, but as a result of changes in West German priorities as the struggle against East Germany came to hamper efforts at reconciliation with Israel, Poland, and Yugoslavia--all countries of special relevance to Germany's recent past. Interest in a morally grounded diplomacy, together with the growing conviction that the GDR could no longer be ignored, led to the abandonment of Bonn's effective but outdated efforts to hinder worldwide recognition of the East German regime.

A new interpretation of the British government's policy towards Germany in the years immediately after 1945, and a reassessment of the part this policy played in the development of the Cold War.

For the first time, Britain and the United States in Greece provides an in-depth analysis of Anglo-American diplomacy in Greece from 1946 to 1950. After Word War II, as Europe floundered economically, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee looked to disengage Britain from some of its broad international obligations and increase American support for its new foreign agenda. One place he sought to do so was in Greece. Spero Simeon Z. Paravantes reveals how the relationship between Britain and the US developed in this formative period, arguing that Britain used the fast-escalating tensions of the Cold War to direct US policy in Greece and encourage the Americans to take a more active role – effectively taking Britain's place – in the region. In the process, Paravantes sheds new light on how the American experience in Greece contributed to the formulation of the Truman Doctrine and the containment of communism, the structure of Greek institutions, and ultimately, the birth of the Cold War. Drawing on a wide range of sources from Britain, the US, Greece and the Balkans, this book is essential reading for all scholars looking to gain fresh insight into the complex origins of the Cold War, 20th-century Anglo-American relations, and the history of modern Greece.

This book details the Soviet Military Liaison Mission (SMLM) in West Germany and the U.S. Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) in East Germany as microcosms of the Cold War strategic intelligence and counterintelligence landscape. Thirty years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Soviet and U.S. Military Liaison Missions are all but forgotten. Their operation was established by a post-WWII Allied occupation forces' agreement, and missions had relative freedom to travel and collect intelligence throughout East and West Germany from 1947 until 1990. This book addresses Cold War intelligence and counterintelligence in a manner that provides a broad historical perspective and then brings the reader to a never-before documented artifact of Cold War history. The book details the intelligence/counterintelligence dynamic that was among the most emblematic of the Cold War. Ultimately, the book addresses a saga that remains one of the true Cold War enigmas.

The only first-hand account of BRIXMIS, the British Army's most secret unit of the Cold War

This book focuses on helping readers to fill the gap of the little known history between Western Europe and its most important trading partner: the People’s Republic of China. Inspired by the economic and political signifance of Sino-European relations, this book shows how the China policies of the three biggest states of Western Europe – Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany – helped China reintegrate into the international community in the 1970s. Against the background of the Cold War, the end of Maoism, and the emergence of globalization, the governments in Bonn, Paris and London had to find ways of dealing with Europe’s declining influence and promote their own national interests in Asia. Based on newly declassified government files, readers will find such sources invaluable in understanding the argument that, despite pursuing very different policies, the three governments supported a rapid expansion of peaceful exchange between the People’s Republic and Europe and substantially contributed to the success of Beijing's reform policy.