This collection gathers many of the best-known names in the field of Anglo-French relations and provides an authoritative survey of the field. Starting with the crucial period of the First World War and ending with the equally complex question of the second Iraq War, the study has an emphasis on British perceptions of the Entente.

In The Shadow of the Past, Gregory D. Miller examines the role that reputation plays in international politics, emphasizing the importance of reliability-confidence that, based on past political actions, a country will make good on its promises-in the formation of military alliances. Challenging recent scholarship that focuses on the importance of credibility-a state's reputation for following through on its threats-Miller finds that reliable states have much greater freedom in forming alliances than those that invest resources in building military force but then use it inconsistently. To explore the formation and maintenance of alliances based on reputation, Miller draws on insights from both political science and business theory to track the evolution of great power relations before the First World War. He starts with the British decision to abandon "splendid isolation" in 1900 and examines three crises--the First Moroccan Crisis (1905-6), the Bosnia-Herzegovina Crisis (1908-9), and the Agadir Crisis (1911)-leading up to the war. He determines that states with a reputation for being a reliable ally have an easier time finding other reliable allies, and have greater autonomy within their alliances, than do states with a reputation for unreliability. Further, a history of reliability carries long-term benefits, as states tend not to lose allies even when their reputation declines.

Britain and France have rarely been great friends, and towards the end of Queen Victoria's reign relations were exceptionally poor. Yet only three years after her death the situation was completely reversed. On 8 April 1904 the Entente Cordiale was signed between the two countries, a bond that would prove of increasing importance as the world moved towards its first great war. The detailed negotiation of the Entente was the work of two Foreign Secretaries, the Marquess of Lansdowne and Théophile Delcassé, and their task was not easy - but it could scarcely have been contemplated without the extraordinary influence and tireless efforts of Edward VII. Edward, on becoming king, had set about winning over public opinion in France through a combination of personal charm and royal eminence. History has judged Edward a lightweight ruler - fond of women, racing and cigars yet not over fond of hard work - but a very different king emerges from Ian Dunlop's remarkable portrait, supported by quotes from those who knew him best and were closest to events. Edward was fascinated by diplomacy and would stay up far into the night studying the red boxes that held important news and reports. He was also captivated by France, spoke superb French and longed to repair the breach that had yawned between the two countries on his accession. Dunlop reviews earlier attempts at entente and follows the ups and downs of relations with France against the background of the European situation. He describes the chief actors in this drama - the brilliant oratory of Lord Salisbury and the Duke of Devonshire, the character of Lansdowne ('the most courteous of listeners and the most intelligent of critics'), the single-minded devotion to country of Delcassé, the curiously fragmented personality of the German Kaiser and the political ineptitude of the Tsar as well as the key role of lesser characters such as Thomas Barclay and Wickham Steed. Edward's restricted life as Prince of Wales combined with his interpretation of the role of a constitutional monarch is particularly fascinating in the context of today's royal family. With engaging personal touches and a real feeling for the high diplomacy of the period, Dunlop's lively account offers both enjoyment and insight.

Were World Wars I and II inevitable? Were they necessary wars? Or were they products of calamitous failures of judgment? In this monumental and provocative history, Patrick Buchanan makes the case that, if not for the blunders of British statesmen– Winston Churchill first among them–the horrors of two world wars and the Holocaust might have been avoided and the British Empire might never have collapsed into ruins. Half a century of murderous oppression of scores of millions under the iron boot of Communist tyranny might never have happened, and Europe’s central role in world affairs might have been sustained for many generations. Among the British and Churchillian errors were: • The secret decision of a tiny cabal in the inner Cabinet in 1906 to take Britain straight to war against Germany, should she invade France • The vengeful Treaty of Versailles that mutilated Germany, leaving her bitter, betrayed, and receptive to the appeal of Adolf Hitler • Britain’s capitulation, at Churchill’s urging, to American pressure to sever the Anglo-Japanese alliance, insulting and isolating Japan, pushing her onto the path of militarism and conquest • The greatest mistake in British history: the unsolicited war guarantee to Poland of March 1939, ensuring the Second World War Certain to create controversy and spirited argument, Churchill, Hitler, and “the Unnecessary War” is a grand and bold insight into the historic failures of judgment that ended centuries of European rule and guaranteed a future no one who lived in that vanished world could ever have envisioned.

This Very Short Introduction provides a concise and insightful history of the Great War--from the state of Europe in 1914, to the role of the US, the collapse of Russia, and the eventual surrender of the Central Powers. Examining how and why the war was fought, as well as the historical controversies that still surround the war, Michael Howard also looks at how peace was ultimately made, and describes the potent legacy of resentment left to Germany.

Britain, France and Europe, 1945-1975 takes a fresh look at the international trajectories of Europe's premier democracies. The side-lining of Britain and France in the Cold War era, argues Adamthwaite, was preventable. A Franco-British Europe came within a whisker of realization. Condemning President Charles de Gaulle as an intransigent gatekeeper created a convenient alibi for self-inflicted missteps. UK bids for European Community membership ignored the elephant in the room - the need for partnership in a superpower age. A marriage powering the Community could have repositioned Western Europe as partner, not client of the United States. Although perceived as a failing power, France outperformed Britain - seizing the initiative in European construction, and winning primacy in western Europe. As well as exploring sharply contrasting national experiences in the aftermath of war, the author analyses the reasons for French success. The analysis evaluates key influences: the mental maps of decision makers; leadership styles; the post-1945 international system; policy making machinery; the 'democratic deficit' in British and French politics; and public opinion. Drawing on American, British and French official records, together with private papers and interviews, this enlightening study highlights the importance of contingency and individual actors, and will be of great interest to scholars of modern European history.