This book examines Britain’s complex relationship with the mine in the years 1900-1915. The development of mine warfare represented a unique mix of challenges and opportunities for Britain in the years before the First World War. The mine represented the antithesis of British maritime culture in material form, and attempts were made to limit its use under international law. At the same time, mine warfare offered the Royal Navy a solution to its most difficult strategic problem. Richard Dunley explores the contested position occupied by the mine in the attitudes of British policy makers, and in doing so sheds new light on the overlapping worlds of culture, strategy and international law.

This is the first comprehensive account of how intelligence influenced and sustained British naval power from the mid nineteenth century, when the Admiralty first created a dedicated intelligence department, through to the end of the Cold War. It brings a critical new dimension to our understanding of British naval history in this period while setting naval intelligence in a wider context and emphasising the many parts of the British state that contributed to naval requirements. It is also a fascinating study of how naval needs and personalities shaped the British intelligence community that exists today and the concepts and values that underpin it. The author explains why and how intelligence was collected and assesses its real impact on policy and operations. It confirms that naval intelligence was critical to Britain’s survival and ultimate victory in the two World Wars but significantly reappraises its role, highlighting the importance of communications intelligence to an effective blockade in the First, and according Ultra less dominance compared to other sources in the Second. It reveals that coverage of Germany before 1914 and of the three Axis powers in the interwar period was more comprehensive and effective than previously suggested; and while British power declined rapidly after 1945, the book shows how intelligence helped the Royal Navy to remain a significant global force for the rest of the twentieth century, and in submarine warfare, especially in the second half of the Cold War, to achieve influence and impact for Britain far exceeding resources expended. This compelling new history will have wide appeal to all readers interested in intelligence and its crucial impact on naval policy and operations.

How a strategist's ideas were catastrophically ignored in 1914—but shaped Britain’s success in the Second World War and beyond Leading historian Andrew Lambert shows how, as a lawyer, civilian, and Liberal, Julian Corbett (1854–1922) brought a new level of logic, advocacy, and intellectual precision to the development of strategy. Corbett skillfully integrated classical strategic theory, British history, and emerging trends in technology, geopolitics, and conflict to prepare the British state for war. He emphasized that strategy is a unique national construct, rather than a set of universal principles, and recognized the importance of domestic social reform and the evolving British Commonwealth. Corbett's concept of a maritime strategy, dominated by the control of global communications and economic war, survived the debacle of 1914–18, when Britain used the German "way of war" at unprecedented cost in lives and resources. It proved critical in the Second World War, shaping Churchill’s conduct of the conflict from the Fall of France to D-Day. And as Lambert shows, Corbett’s ideas continue to influence British thinking.

This wide-ranging military history examines the vital yet overlooked role of logistics through the global evolution of warfare. An army cannot operate without supplies, yet military researchers and historians often overlook the essential aspect of logistics. In this comprehensive study, Jeremy Black provides an informative yet concise world history of military logistics through the ages. With special focus on key conflicts, Black examines such factors as climate, geography, food supplies, welfare of troops, payment, transport, communications, terrain, and distance. He also considers related factors including government policy, stability, and financial conditions. He covers the sweep of history, from ancient and medieval times to modern eras of industrial warfare, highlighting technological advances from oil and steam to cyber warfare and smart weapons.

Genesis of the Grand Fleet: The Admiralty, Germany, and the Home Fleet, 1896-1914 tells the story of the prewar predecessor to the Royal Navy's war-winning Grand Fleet: the Home Fleet. Established in early 1907 by First Sea Lord Sir John Fisher, the Home Fleet combined an active core of powerful armored warships with a unification of the various reserve divisions of warships previously under the control of the three Royal Navy home port commands. Fisher boasted that the new Home Fleet would be able to counter the growing German Hochseeflotte. While these boasts were accurate, they were not the sole motivation behind the Home Fleet's establishment. The Liberal Party's landslide victory in the 1906 General Election made fiscal economy on the part of the Admiralty even more important than before, and this significantly influenced the Home Fleet's creation. Subsequently the Home Fleet suffered a sustained campaign of criticism by the commander-in-chief of the Channel Fleet, Lord Charles Beresford. This campaign ruined many careers including Beresford's and resulted in the assimilation of the Channel Fleet into the Home Fleet in 1909. From 1910 onward the Home Fleet steadily evolved and became the most important single command in the Royal Navy, and the Home Fleet's successive commanders-in-chief had influence on strategic policy rivaled only by the Board of Admiralty. The last prewar commander of the Home Fleet, Admiral Sir George Callaghan achieved this influence by impressing the civilian head of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill. A driven reformer, Churchill's influence was almost as important as Fisher's. Against this backdrop of political drama, Genesis of the Grand Fleet: The Admiralty, Germany, and the Home Fleet, 1896-1914 explains how Britain maintained its maritime preeminence in the early twentieth century. As Christopher Buckey describes, the fleet sustained Britain and her allies' path to victory in World War I.

The Routledge History of the First World War is a work which, in a single volume, covers a range of major themes and issues relating to that conflict. Providing a comprehensive but readily accessible reference work examining the First World War, in accordance with a broad range of themes, this book presents the many ways in which study of the First World War can take place and introduces readers to new areas of research, often untouched in other studies of the war. With a scholarly Introduction and 60 chapters by specialist authors who come from 14 different countries, across four continents, the book is also intended to open lines of further inquiry from its solid base of academic knowledge. The volume demonstrates the war’s global and total nature, examining the conflict in all major theatres and through the lens of the key combatants and neutrals. It also fully engages with issues of race, gender, ideology, and society during the war. This book will appeal to students of all levels, scholars, and general readers alike interested in the First World War from several different perspectives and research areas. The 60 chapters cover topics from numerous angles and provide detailed information about all aspects relating to the First World War.

This book presents a detailed assessment of the role of navies in the Korean War. It highlights that, despite being predominantly a land war, navies played a vital part. Moreover, the naval war was not solely a U.S. operation. Smaller navies from many countries made important contributions both in supporting the United States and carrying out independent and combined naval operations. This subject holds special importance since current Western strategic thinking and capabilities emphasise the necessity of combined naval operations involving multiple navies in any potential future naval conflict. The example set by the Korean War therefore offers valuable insights into the operational and strategic problems, and benefits and opportunities of contemporary and future combined coalition naval operations.