Within China, the discipline of American Studies spans a wide variety of concerns and preoccupations, reflecting its practical diversity in a transnational setting. Essays in this volume by close to forty scholars, the majority most of them based in mainland China, reflect on the past history and current teaching of American Studies within China, placing these in comparative perspectives. The nature of globalization, the transmission of ideas and practices across cultural boundaries, the formulation and meaning of identity in cross-national communications, constitute major themes in contemporary American Studies in China. For officials and commentators alike, the past, present, and future state of Sino-American relations are also an overriding preoccupation of China’s America-watchers. Overall, this collection allows the reader to sample and appreciate the state of the field of American Studies in today’s China.

Can China and the United States bridge their political differences? Are those differences as large as conventional wisdom suggests? Thirty years after formal U.S.-Chinese diplomatic relations were established, A Bridge Too Far? addresses these essential questions by bridging the academic divide separating scholars who study these countries from Chinese and Western political science perspectives. Rather than bringing together China specialists exclusively, then, this book allows a broad range of scholars using Western analytical tools to examine Chinese politics and political theory in relation to the United States. It also allows Chinese scholars to examine specific policy areas related to countries and thereby confirm or contest the broader analysis offered by their outsider counterparts. Some of the contributors are Chinese specialists, a number having played key roles as advisors to the central government, others students of American politics, and stilll others political economists or political theorists who are not involved directly in area studies. Finally, some are academically trained but work in China in the area of environmental regulation or are legal advisors for state-owned businesses. In all, the contributors bring extensive experience with China, and all see commonalities beneath the obvious and deep differences between the two nations. Emerging from an ongoing face-to-face dialog, the book unites this unusual group to uncover genuine areas of overlap between the politics of the two nations without diminishing the very real distance separating them. The essays included discuss topics such as China's democratic prospects and the rise of local village elections, the role of interest groups, Chinese political and legal reforms and developments regarding intellectual property rights and environmental regulation, Western and Chinese political philosophy, and Sino-American foreign policy interactions.

For more than a century, no US adversary or coalition of adversaries - not Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, or the Soviet Union - has ever reached sixty percent of US GDP. China is the sole exception, and it is fast emerging into a global superpower that could rival, if not eclipse, the United States. What does China want, does it have a grand strategy to achieve it, and what should the United States do about it? In The Long Game, Rush Doshi draws from a rich base of Chinese primary sources, including decades worth of party documents, leaked materials, memoirs by party leaders, and a careful analysis of China's conduct to provide a history of China's grand strategy since the end of the Cold War. Taking readers behind the Party's closed doors, he uncovers Beijing's long, methodical game to displace America from its hegemonic position in both the East Asia regional and global orders through three sequential "strategies of displacement." Beginning in the 1980s, China focused for two decades on "hiding capabilities and biding time." After the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, it became more assertive regionally, following a policy of "actively accomplishing something." Finally, in the aftermath populist elections of 2016, China shifted to an even more aggressive strategy for undermining US hegemony, adopting the phrase "great changes unseen in century." After charting how China's long game has evolved, Doshi offers a comprehensive yet asymmetric plan for an effective US response. Ironically, his proposed approach takes a page from Beijing's own strategic playbook to undermine China's ambitions and strengthen American order without competing dollar-for-dollar, ship-for-ship, or loan-for-loan.

The second half of the 20th century featured a strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. That competition avoided World War III in part because during the 1950s, scholars like Henry Kissinger, Thomas Schelling, Herman Kahn, and Albert Wohlstetter analyzed the fundamental nature of nuclear deterrence. Decades of arms control negotiations reinforced these early notions of stability and created a mutual understanding that allowed U.S.-Soviet competition to proceed without armed conflict. The first half of the 21st century will be dominated by the relationship between the United States and China. That relationship is likely to contain elements of both cooperation and competition. Territorial disputes such as those over Taiwan and the South China Sea will be an important feature of this competition, but both are traditional disputes, and traditional solutions suggest themselves. A more difficult set of issues relates to U.S.-Chinese competition and cooperation in three domains in which real strategic harm can be inflicted in the current era: nuclear, space, and cyber. Just as a clearer understanding of the fundamental principles of nuclear deterrence maintained adequate stability during the Cold War, a clearer understanding of the characteristics of these three domains can provide the underpinnings of strategic stability between the United States and China in the decades ahead. That is what this book is about.

To explore what extended competition between the United States and China might entail out to 2050, the authors of this report identified and characterized China’s grand strategy, analyzed its component national strategies (diplomacy, economics, science and technology, and military affairs), and assessed how successful China might be at implementing these over the next three decades.

While Americans are generally aware of China's ambitions as a global economic and military superpower, few understand just how deeply and assertively that country has already sought to influence American society. As the authors of this volume write, it is time for a wake-up call. In documenting the extent of Beijing's expanding influence operations inside the United States, they aim to raise awareness of China's efforts to penetrate and sway a range of American institutions: state and local governments, academic institutions, think tanks, media, and businesses. And they highlight other aspects of the propagandistic “discourse war” waged by the Chinese government and Communist Party leaders that are less expected and more alarming, such as their view of Chinese Americans as members of a worldwide Chinese diaspora that owes undefined allegiance to the so-called Motherland.Featuring ideas and policy proposals from leading China specialists, China's Influence and American Interests argues that a successful future relationship requires a rebalancing toward greater transparency, reciprocity, and fairness. Throughout, the authors also strongly state the importance of avoiding casting aspersions on Chinese and on Chinese Americans, who constitute a vital portion of American society. But if the United States is to fare well in this increasingly adversarial relationship with China, Americans must have a far better sense of that country's ambitions and methods than they do now.

Looking deeply into the matter of strategic vulnerability, the authors address questions that this vulnerability poses: Do conditions exist for Sino-U.S. mutual deterrence in these realms? Might the two states agree on reciprocal restraint? What practical measures might build confidence in restraint? How would strategic restraint affect Sino-U.S. relations as well as security in and beyond East Asia?