The military alliance between the United States and Brazil played a critical role in the outcome of World War II, and yet it is largely overlooked in historiography of the war. In this definitive account, Frank McCann investigates Brazilian-American military relations from the 1930s through the years after the alliance ended in 1977. The two countries emerge as imbalanced giants with often divergent objectives and expectations. They nevertheless managed to form the Brazilian Expeditionary Force and a fighter squadron that fought in Italy under American command, making Brazil the only Latin American country to commit troops to the war. With the establishment of the US Air Force base in Natal, Northeast Brazil become a vital staging area for air traffic supplying Allied forces in the Middle East and Asian theaters. McCann deftly analyzes newly opened Brazilian archives and declassified American intelligence files to offer a more nuanced account of how this alliance changed the course of World War II, and how the relationship deteriorated in the aftermath of the war.

For the United States, full involvement in World War II began and ended in the Pacific Ocean. Although the accepted grand strategy of the war was the defeat of Germany first, the sweep of Japanese victory in the weeks and months after Pearl Harbor impelled the United States to move as rapidly as it could to stem the enemy tide of conquest in the Pacific. Shocked as they were by the initial attack, the American people were also united in their determination to defeat Japan, and the Pacific war became peculiarly their own affair. In this great theater it was the United States that ran the war, and had the determining voice in answering questions of strategy and command as they arose. The natural environment made the prosecution of war in the Pacific of necessity an interservice effort, and any real account of it must, as this work does, take into full account the views and actions of the Navy as well as those of the Army and its Air Forces. These are the factors-a predominantly American theater of war covering nearly one-third the globe, and a joint conduct of war by land, sea, and air on the largest scale in American history-that make this volume on the Pacific war of particular significance today. It is the capstone of the eleven volumes published or being published in the Army's World War II series that deal with military operations in the Pacific area, and it is one that should command wide attention from the thoughtful public as well as the military reader in these days of global tension.

Getúlio Dornelles Vargas established his dictatorship in Brazil in 1937, and from 1938 through 1940 American diplomats and military planners were preoccupied with the possibility that Brazil might ally herself with Nazi Germany. Such an alliance would have made fortress America vulnerable and closed the South Atlantic to Allied shipping. Fortunately for America, Brazil eventually joined the Allies and American engineers turned Northeast Brazil into a vast springboard for supplies for the war fronts. Frank D. McCann has used previously inaccessible Brazilian archival material to discuss the events during the Vargas regime which brought about a close alliance between Brazil and the United States and resulted in Brazil's economic, political, and military dependence on her powerful North American ally. He shows that until 1940 the drive for closer union came largely from Brazil, which wanted to offset the shifting alliances of the Spanish-speaking countries and escape from British economic domination. American interest in Brazil increased during the 1930's as the U.S. turned to Latin America to recoup losses in foreign trade and as Washington began to fear that Nazism and Fascism would spread to South America. By 1940 the nature of Brazil's relationship with the United States made it impossible for Brazil to remain neutral. Frank McCann's analysis of Brazil's decision to join the Allies affords a view of the diplomatic uses of economic and military aid, which became a feature of diplomacy in the postwar years. It also provides insights into the military's influence on foreign policy, and into the functioning of Vargas' Estado Nôvo. Originally published in 1974. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

"This book contains authentic photographs and salient facts covering 358 troopships used in World War II. In addition, other vessels of miscellaneous character, including Victory and Liberty type temporary conversions for returning troops, are listed in the appendices ..."--Pref.

Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.

This collection of squadron histories has been prepared by the USAF Historical Division to complement the Division's book, Air Force Combat Units of World War II. The 1,226 units covered by this volume are the combat (tactical) squadrons that were active between 7 December 1941 and 2 September 1945. Each squadron is traced from its beginning through 5 March 1963, the fiftieth anniversary of the organization of the 1st Aero (later Bombardment) Squadron, the first Army unit to be equipped with aircraft for tactical operations. For each squadron there is a statement of the official lineage and data on the unit's assignments, stations, aircraft and missiles, operations, service streamers, campaign participation, decorations, and emblem.