This paper estimates a Behavioral New Keynesian model to revisit the evidence that passive US monetary policy in the pre-1979 sample led to indeterminate equilibria and sunspot-driven fluctuations, while active policy after 1982, by satisfying the Taylor principle, was instrumental in restoring macroeconomic stability. The model assumes "cognitive discounting", i.e., consumers and firms pay less attention to variables further into the future. We estimate the model allowing for both determinacy and indeterminacy. The empirical results show that determinacy is preferred both before and after 1979. Even if monetary policy is found to react only mildly to inflation pre-Volcker, the substantial degrees of bounded rationality that we estimate prevent the economy from falling into indeterminacy.

The form of bounded rationality characterizing the representative agent is key in the choice of the optimal monetary policy regime. While inflation targeting prevails for myopia that distorts agents' inflation expectations, price level targeting emerges as the optimal policy under myopia regarding the output gap, revenue, or interest rate. To the extent that bygones are not bygones under price level targeting, rational inflation expectations is a minimal condition for optimality in a behavioral world. Instrument rules implementation of this optimal policy is shown to be infeasible, questioning the ability of simple rules à la Taylor (1993) to assist the conduct of monetary policy. Bounded rationality is not necessarily associated with welfare losses.

6.2 Introducing Asset Prices in the Behavioral Model -- 6.3 Simulating the Model -- 6.4 Should the Central Bank Care about Stock Prices? -- 6.5 Inflation Targeting and Macroeconomic Stability -- 6.6 The Trade-off between Output and Inflation Variability -- 6.7 Conclusion -- 7 Extensions of the Basic Model -- 7.1 Fundamentalists Are Biased -- 7.2 Shocks and Trade-offs -- 7.3 Further Extensions of the Basic Model -- 7.4 Conclusion -- 8 Empirical Issues -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 The Correlation of Output Movements and Animal Spirits -- 8.3 Model Predictions: Higher Moments -- 8.4 Transmission of Monetary Policy Shocks -- 8.5 Conclusion -- References -- Index

A large literature with canonical New Keynesian models has established that the Fed's policy change from a passive to an active response to inflation led to U.S. macro-economic stability after the Great Inflation of the 1970s. We revisit this view by estimating a staggered price model with trend inflation using a Bayesian method that allows for equilibrium indeterminacy and adopts a sequential Monte Carlo algorithm. The model empirically outperforms a canonical New Keynesian model and demonstrates an active response to inflation even in the Great Inflation era, during which the U.S. economy was likely in the indeterminacy region of the model's parameter space. A more active response to inflation alone does not suffice for explaining the shift to determinacy after the Great Inflation, unless it is accompanied by a decline in trend inflation or a change in policy responses to the output gap and output growth.

The question of whether central banks should target stock prices so as to prevent bubbles and crashes from occurring has been hotly debated. This paper analyses this question using a behavioural macroeconomic model. This model generates bubbles and crashes. It analyses how 'leaning against the wind' strategies, which aim to reduce the volatility of stock prices, can help in reducing volatility of output and inflation. We find that such policies can be effective in reducing macroeconomic volatility, thereby improving the trade-off between output and inflation variability. The strength of this result, however, depends on the degree of credibility of the inflation-targeting regime. In the absence of such credibility, policies aiming at stabilising stock prices do not stabilise output and inflation.