Regional integration and the organisation of cross-regional relations have been some of the most prominent features of international relations. By further strengthening the institutions of the European Union, Europe is taking steps to become a capable international actor. Only in few world regions, such as the Middle East, integration has not been a driving force moving political and economic relations. Given these structural imbalances between Europe and the Middle East, but also geographical proximity, economic interdependencies, and shared historical experiences, what interests does Europe pursue in the Middle East? And, if the goal of European policies is to establish stable political, economic and social relations with its neighbouring region, how could inter-regional relations best be organised?

The Middle East is a region of crises, conflicts and wars as much as it is a region of great potential and opportunity. However, the European Union and its member states have not yet found a viable strategic approach to meet both the challenges and opportunities in their immediate neighbourhood. The Europeans have not yet developed sufficient foreign and security policy mechanisms to pursue their interests effectively. How the European Union can support economic and political transformation processes throughout the region and thus contribute to a more stable, more democratic Middle East remains the subject of intense debate. The objective of this book is to provide a platform for this debate about the European Union's future role as a player in the Middle East, at a crucial moment in EU-U.S-Middle East relations. As the European Union re-organizes its Mediterranean policies and the United States vote a new president into office, the authors of this book discuss a wide range of topics related to European foreign policy in the Middle East, the Mediterranean and the Gulf region, Europe's role in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the state of transformation processes in the region. Book jacket.

This book contains essays by A. John Simmons, perhaps the most innovative and creative of today's political philosophers.

Outlining the major competing theories in the history of political and moral philosophy--from Locke and Hume through Hart, Rawls, and Nozick--John Simmons attempts to understand and solve the ancient problem of political obligation. Under what conditions and for what reasons (if any), he asks, are we morally bound to obey the law and support the political institutions of our countries?

In this publication civil society actors in Sierra Leone explore the best ways to ensure disarmament and promote stability in their country. The authors offer their assessment of the problems Sierra Leone faces and consider what is necessary to build sustainable peace in their country.--Publisher's description.

The question, 'Why should I obey the law?' introduces a contemporary puzzle that is as old as philosophy itself. The puzzle is especially troublesome if we think of cases in which breaking the law is not otherwise wrongful, and in which the chances of getting caught are negligible. Philosophers from Socrates to H.L.A. Hart have struggled to give reasoned support to the idea that we do have a general moral duty to obey the law but, more recently, the greater number of learned voices has expressed doubt that there is any such duty, at least as traditionally conceived. The thought that there is no such duty poses a challenge to our ordinary understanding of political authority and its legitimacy. In what sense can political officials have a right to rule us if there is no duty to obey the laws they lay down? Some thinkers, concluding that a general duty to obey the law cannot be defended, have gone so far as to embrace philosophical anarchism, the view that the state is necessarily illegitimate. Others argue that the duty to obey the law can be grounded on the idea of consent, or on fairness, or on other ideas, such as community.

How should we assess the social structures that govern human conduct and settle whether we are bound by their rules? One approach is to ask whether those social arrangements (e.g. our family structures) reflect pre-conventional facts about our nature. If they do, compliance will serve our interests because these rules are not just conventions. Another approach is to ask whether following a convention has desirable consequences. For example, the rule which makes the dollar bill legal tender is a convention and the great usefulness of having a medium of exchange ensures that we should follow that convention by accepting paper money in return for things of real value. This work argues that being bound by a convention can also be valuable for its own sake. People need meaning in their lives and conventions infuse acts and attitudes with normative significance, rendering them right or wrong, appropriate or inappropriate, required or forbidden. Such rules bind us not just in virtue of their usefulness but also because their absence would impoverish our social world. Appreciating this point is essential to a proper understanding of our cultures of neighbourliness and hospitality, family structures, systems of property rights, conventions around speech, the norms governing how we deport ourselves in public, and even the rules of a game.