"This paper examines the new trends in research on capital flows fueled by the 2007-2009 Global Crisis. Previous studies on capital flows focused on current-account imbalances and net capital flows. The Global Crisis changed that. The onset of this crisis was preceded by a dramatic increase in gross financial flows while net capital flows remained mostly subdued. The attention in academia zoomed in on gross inflows and outflows with special attention to cross border banking flows before the crisis erupted and the shift towards corporate bond issuance in its aftermath. The boom and bust in capital flows around the Global Crisis also stimulated a new area of research: capturing the “global factor.” This research adopts two different approaches. The traditional literature on the push-pull factors, which before the crisis was mostly focused on monetary policy in the financial center as the “push factor,” started to explore what other factors contribute to the comovement of capital flows as well as to amplify the role of monetary policy in the financial center on capital flows to the periphery. This new research focuses on global banks’ leverage, risk appetite, and global uncertainty. Since the “global factor” is not known, a second branch of the literature has captured this factor indirectly using dynamic common factors extracted from actual capital flows or movements in asset prices."--Abstract.

This article documents evidence of business cycle synchronization in selected Asia Pacific countries since the 1990s. We explain business cycle synchronization by the channel of international capital flows and boom-bust cycles. Using the vector auto-regression method, we find that most Asian countries experience boom-bust cycles following capital inflows, where the boom in output is mostly driven by consumption and investment. Empirical evidence also shows that capital flow shocks are positively correlated in the region, which supports the conclusion that capital market liberalization has contributed to business cycle synchronization.

The volatility of capital flows to emerging markets continues to pose challenges to policymakers. In this paper, we propose a new framework to answer critical policy questions: What policies and policy frameworks are most effective in dampening sharp capital flow movements in response to global shocks? What are the near- versus medium-term trade-offs of different policies? We tackle these questions using a quantile regression framework to predict the entire future probability distribution of capital flows to emerging markets, based on current domestic structural characteristics, policies, and global financial conditions. This new approach allows policymakers to quantify capital flows risks and evaluate policy tools to mitigate them, thus building the foundation of a risk management framework for capital flows.

Capital flows to the developing economies have long displayed a boom-and-bust pattern. Rarely has the cycle turned as abruptly as it did in the 1990s, however: surges in lending were followed by the Mexican peso crisis of 1994-95 and the sudden collapse of currencies in Asia in 1997. This volume maps a new and uncertain financial landscape, one in which volatile private capital flows and fragile banking systems produce sudden reversals of fortune for governments and economies. This environment creates dilemmas for both national policymakers who confront the "mixed blessing" of capital inflows and the international institutions that manage the recurrent crises.The authors—leading economists and political scientists—examine private capital flows and their consequences in Latin America, Pacific Asia, and East Europe, placing current cycles of lending in historical perspective. National governments have used a variety of strategies to deal with capital-account instability. The authors evaluate those responses, prescribe new alternatives, and consider whether the new circumstances require novel international policies.

A common belief in both academic and policy circles is that capital flows to the emerging periphery are excessive and ending in crises. One of the most frequently mentioned culprits is the cycles of monetary easing and tightening in the financial centers. Also, many focus on the role of crises in the financial center, pointing to excess international borrowing predating crises in the financial center and global retrenchment in capital flows in its aftermath. I re-examine these views using a newly-constructed database on capital flows spanning 200 hundred years. Extending the study of capital flows to the first episode of financial globalization has two major advantages: During this episode, monetary policy in the financial center is constrained by the adherence to the Gold Standard, thus providing a benchmark for capital flow cycles in the absence of an active role of central banks in the financial centers. Second, panics in the financial center are rare disasters that need to be examined in a longer historical episode. I find that boom-bust capital flow cycles in the periphery are milder in the second episode of financial globalization when the financial center follows a cyclical monetary policy. Also, cyclical monetary policy in the financial center is far more pronounced in times of crises in the financial center, cutting short capital flow bonanzas in the periphery and injecting liquidity in the aftermath of the crisis.