Each of the 40 extraordinary hand-crocheted afghans displayed here in magnificent photos is a blue-ribbon winner, and you can recreate these wonderful items at home, thanks to the patterns, detail shots, and instructions provided in "Blue Ribbon Afghans from America's State Fairs." Scattered throughout the text are fun facts about the fairs, along with new and vintage photos

Two hot trends combine in one classic collection: the popular poncho and the hip craft of crochet. And these 33 designs take the versatile wardrobe staple to new heights of sophistication: they feature a range of neckline and hem variations, and come in a variety of yarns, including novelty types like ribbon, faux suede, and fur. Some are long, others short; some are dressy, others just made for a fancy night on the town. And the majority are one size fits all. With the help of a well-illustrated basics section, brand-new or out-of-practice crocheters can confidently pick up their needles and create an open-weave poncho with sleeves and cuffs, a wrap-up for winter, a shimmering gold lacy poncho, and other showstoppers.

Create beautiful, award-winning afghans with HERRSCHNER`S BLUE RIBBON AFGHANS. Both crocheted and knitted afghans from Herrschner`s national afghan competition are presented here. The best afghans from all over the nation will suit a wide variety of tastes and styles as well as skill levels. Great designs with clear instructions and photographs will aid readers in creating over 40 projects.

The defense debate tends to treat Afghanistan as either a revolution or a fluke: either the "Afghan Model" of special operations forces (SOF) plus precision munitions plus an indigenous ally is a widely applicable template for American defense planning, or it is a nonreplicable product of local idiosyncrasies. In fact, it is neither. The Afghan campaign of last fall and winter was actually much closer to a typical 20th century mid-intensity conflict, albeit one with unusually heavy fire support for one side. And this view has very different implications than either proponents or skeptics of the Afghan Model now claim. Afghan Model skeptics often point to Afghanistan's unusual culture of defection or the Taliban's poor skill or motivation as grounds for doubting the war's relevance to the future. Afghanistan's culture is certainly unusual, and there were many defections. The great bulk, however, occurred after the military tide had turned not before-hand. They were effects, not causes. The Afghan Taliban were surely unskilled and ill-motivated. The non-Afghan al Qaeda, however, have proven resolute and capable fighters. Their host's collapse was not attributable to any al Qaeda shortage of commitment or training. Afghan Model proponents, by contrast, credit precision weapons with annihilating enemies at a distance before they could close with our commandos or indigenous allies. Hence the model's broad utility: with SOF-directed bombs doing the real killing, even ragtag local militias will suffice as allies. All they need do is screen U.S. commandos from the occasional hostile survivor and occupy the abandoned ground thereafter. Yet the actual fighting in Afghanistan involved substantial close combat. Al Qaeda counterattackers closed, unseen, to pointblank range of friendly forces in battles at Highway 4 and Sayed Slim Kalay.

The author of Imperial Life in the Emerald City (winner of the 2007 Samuel Johnson Prize) now gives us the startling, behind-the-scenes story of the struggle between President Obama and the US military to remake Afghanistan.

The Council on Foreign Relations sponsors Independent Task Forces to assess issues of current and critical importance to U.S. foreign policy and provide policymakers with concrete judgments and recommendations. Diverse in backgrounds and perspectives, Task Force members aim to reach a meaningful consensus on policy through private and non-partisan deliberations. Once launched, Task Forces are independent of CFR and solely responsible for the content of their reports. Task Force members are asked to join a consensus signifying that they endorse "the general policy thrust and judgments reached by the group, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation." Each Task Force member also has the option of putting forward an additional or a dissenting view. Members' affiliations are listed for identification purposes only and do not imply institutional endorsement. Task Force observers participate in discussions, but are not asked to join the consensus. --Book Jacket.