Unlike the relative uniformity of conventional warfare, the peculiarities of small wars prevent a clear definition of rules and roles for military forces to follow. During the small wars era, aviation was still in its infancy, and the US military had only recently begun battling in the skies. The US Marine Corps recognized that flexibility and ingenuity would be critical to the successful conduct of small wars and thus employed the new technology of aviation. In Biplanes at War: US Marine Corps Aviation in the Small Wars Era, 1915–1934, author Wray R. Johnson provides a riveting history of the marines' use of aviation between the world wars, a time in which young soldiers were volunteering to fly in combat when flying itself was a dangerous feat. Starting with Haiti in 1915, Biplanes at War follows the marines' aviation experiences in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, China, and Nicaragua, chronicling how marines used aircraft to provide supporting fires (e.g., dive-bombing) to ground troops in close contact with irregular opponents, evacuate the sick and wounded, transport people and cargo (e.g., to assist humanitarian operations), and even support elections in furtherance of democracy. After years of expanding the capabilities of airplanes far beyond what was deemed possible, the small wars era ended, and the US Marines Corps transitioned into an amphibious assault force. The legacy of the marines' ability to adapt and innovate during the small wars era endures and provides a useful case study. Biplanes at War sheds light on how the marines pioneered roles and missions that have become commonplace for air forces today, an accomplishment that has largely gone unrecognized in mainstream histories of aviation and air power.

The era of the combat biplane is usually thought to have been between 1914 and 1938. By the outbreak of World War II, most of the advanced air forces of the world had moved on to monoplane aircraft for their front-line battle forces, both in bomber and fighter capacities. Yet despite this, many biplanes did still survive, both in front-line service and in numerous subsidiary roles, and not just as training machines but as fully operational warplanes. Thus in 1939 the majority of major European powers still retained some, albeit few, biplane aircraft. Sadly, and as an indictment of failed British Government defence policies, it was Great Britain who still had the bulk of such obsolescent combat aircraft, machines like the Gladiator, Swordfish, Walrus, Vildebeeste and Audax for example, while the inferior Albacore, meant to replace the Swordfish, was still yet to enter service!Germany had relegated most of her biplane designs to secondary roles, but they still managed to conduct missions in which biplanes like the He.50, He.51 and Hs.120 excelled. Both France and Italy had biplanes in active service, Mussolini's Regia Aeronautica attaching great importance to the type as a fighter aircraft as late as 1941, while the Soviet Union also retained some machines like the Po-2 in front-line service right through the war and beyond. In addition, a whole range of smaller nations utilised biplanes built for larger combatants in their own air forces. By the time Japan and the United States entered the war two years later, they had mainly rid themselves of biplanes but, even here, a few specialised types lingered on. This book describes a selection of these gallant old warriors of all nations. They represent the author's own personal selection from a surprisingly large range of aircraft that, despite all predictions, fought hard and well in World War II.

Colonel Williams presents a comprehensive study of British bombing efforts in the Great War. He contends that the official version of costs and results underplays the costs while overplaying the results. Supported by postwar findings of both US and British evaluation teams, he argues that British bombing efforts were significantly less effective than heretofore believed.Colonel Williams also presents a strong argument that German air defenses caused considerably less damage to British forces than pilot error, malfunctioning aircraft, and bad weather. That we believed otherwise supports the notion that British bombing raids had forced Germany to transfer significant air assets to defend against them. Williams, however, found no evidence that any such transfer occurred. Actual results, Colonel Williams argues, stand in strong contrast to claimed results.

Unlike the relative uniformity of conventional warfare, the peculiarities of small wars prevent a clear definition of rules and roles for military forces to follow. During the small wars era, aviation was still in its infancy, and the US military had only recently begun battling in the skies. The US Marine Corps recognized that flexibility and ingenuity would be critical to the successful conduct of small wars and thus employed the new technology of aviation. In Biplanes at War: US Marine Corps Aviation in the Small Wars Era, 1915–1934, author Wray R. Johnson provides a riveting history of the marines' use of aviation between the world wars, a time in which young soldiers were volunteering to fly in combat when flying itself was a dangerous feat. Starting with Haiti in 1915, Biplanes at War follows the marines' aviation experiences in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, China, and Nicaragua, chronicling how marines used aircraft to provide supporting fires (e.g., dive-bombing) to ground troops in close contact with irregular opponents, evacuate the sick and wounded, transport people and cargo (e.g., to assist humanitarian operations), and even support elections in furtherance of democracy. After years of expanding the capabilities of airplanes far beyond what was deemed possible, the small wars era ended, and the US Marines Corps transitioned into an amphibious assault force. The legacy of the marines' ability to adapt and innovate during the small wars era endures and provides a useful case study. Biplanes at War sheds light on how the marines pioneered roles and missions that have become commonplace for air forces today, an accomplishment that has largely gone unrecognized in mainstream histories of aviation and air power.

A tactical and technical history of the development of British, American, and Japanese naval air defense from the 1920s to the 1980s. This is an account of the evolution of naval fighters for fleet air defense and the parallel evolution of the ships operating and controlling them, concentrating on the three main exponents of carrier warfare: the British Royal Navy, the U.S. Navy, and the Imperial Japanese Navy. It describes the earliest efforts from the 1920s, but it was not until radar allowed the direction of fighters that organized air defense became possible. Thus, major naval-air battles of the Second World War like Midway, the Pedestal convoy, the Philippine Sea, and Okinawa are portrayed as tests of the new technology. This was ultimately found wanting by the Kamikaze campaigns, leading to postwar moves towards computer control and new kinds of fighters. After 1945 the threats of nuclear weapons and standoff missiles compounded the difficulties of naval air defense. The second half of the book covers R.N. and U.S.N. attempts to solve these problems, looking at the American experience in Vietnam and British operations in the Falklands War. It concludes with the ultimate U.S. development of techniques and technology to fight the Outer Air Battle in the 1980s, which in turn point to the current state of carrier fighters and the supporting technology. Based largely on documentary sources, some previously unused, this book will appeal to both the naval and aviation communities. “Fighters Over the Fleet provides more information about fleet air defense than any other work currently available. It is recommended for specialist as well aviation-minded readers.” —Naval Historical Foundation

300 biplanes, triplanes and seaplanes featured, each one illustrated by a full-color artwork. Describes the most important and exciting Biplanes, triplanes and seaplanes from around the world. Includes the famous aircraft of World War I, including planes flown by the Red Baron and Eddie Rickenbacker.

The use of airpower in wartime calls to mind the massive bombings of World War II, but airplanes have long been instrumental in small wars as well. Ever since its use by the French to put down rebellious Moroccan tribes in 1913, airpower has been employed to fight in limited but often lengthy small conflicts around the globe. This is the first comprehensive history of airpower in small wars-conflicts pitting states against non-state groups such as insurgents, bandits, factions, and terrorists-tracing it from the early years of the twentieth century to the present day. It examines dozens of conflicts with strikingly different scenarios: the Greek Civil War, the Philippine Anti-Huk campaign, French and British colonial wars, the war in South Vietnam before the American escalation, counterinsurgency in southern Africa, Latin American counterguerrilla operations, and counterinsurgency and counterterrorist campaigns in the Middle East over the last four decades. For each war, the authors describe the strategies employed on both sides of the conflict, the air forces engaged, and the specific airpower tactics employed. They discuss the ground campaigns and provide the political background necessary to understand the air campaigns, and in each case they judge the utility of airpower in its broadest sense. In their historic sweep, they show how forms of airpower evolved from planes to police helicopters, aircraft of the civilian air reserve, and today's unmanned aircraft. They also disclose how small wars after World War II required new strategies, operational solutions, and tactics. By taking this broad view of small-war airpower, the authors are able to make assessments about the most effective and least effective means of employing airpower. They offer specific conclusions ranging from the importance of comprehensive strategy to the need for the United States and its allies to expand small-wars training programs. Airpower in Small Wars will be invaluable for educating military professionals and policy makers in the subject as well as for providing a useful framework for developing more effective doctrine for employing airpower in the conflicts we are most likely to see in the twenty-first century.