As early as 1920, US Army General Billy Mitchell began sounding alarm bells about an inevitable Japanese invasion from sea-based aircraft. Through the press and in person he lobbied naval brass about America's woefully unprepared defensive air power but his talk of dogfights over the Pacific with superior planes was laughed at and dismissed by all. Mitchell's vision of a US 'Air Arm' would have meant massive, costly upgrades to the nation's dated flying machines owned by private firms holding patents on aircraft machinery. Old guard soldiers, like John J. Pershing, dismissed as delusional ravings Mitchell's belief that a battleship could be destroyed by a bomber. Mitchell's outspoken press conferences about an airplane trust supported by corrupt government officials led to his court-martial for insubordination in 1925. He died in 1936, a man ahead of his times - and hated for it.

As early as 1920, US Army General Billy Mitchell began sounding alarm bells about an inevitable Japanese invasion from sea-based aircraft. Through the press and in person he lobbied naval brass about America's woefully unprepared defensive air power but his talk of dogfights over the Pacific with superior planes was laughed at and dismissed by all. Mitchell's vision of a US Air Arm would have meant massive, costly upgrades to the nation's dated flying machines owned by private firms holding patents on aircraft machinery. Old guard soldiers, like John J. Pershing, dismissed as delusional ravings Mitchell's belief that a battleship could be destroyed by a bomber. Mitchell's outspoken press conferences about an airplane trust supported by corrupt government officials led to his court-martial for insubordination in 1925. He died in 1936, a man ahead of his times.

As early as 1920, US Army General Billy Mitchell began sounding alarm bells about an inevitable Japanese invasion from sea-based aircraft. Through the press and in person he lobbied naval brass about America's woefully unprepared defensive air power but his talk of dogfights over the Pacific with superior planes was laughed at and dismissed by all. Mitchell's vision of a US 'Air Arm' would have meant massive, costly upgrades to the nation's dated flying machines owned by private firms holding patents on aircraft machinery. Old guard soldiers, like John J. Pershing, dismissed as delusional ravings Mitchell's belief that a battleship could be destroyed by a bomber. Mitchell's outspoken press conferences about an airplane trust supported by corrupt government officials led to his court-martial for insubordination in 1925. He died in 1936, a man ahead of his times - and hated for it.

"This is the best book—the most scholarly, the most judicial, the best written—about the intelligent, attractive, undiplomatic, quixotic Billy Mitchell, the legendary founder of today's United States Air Force." —Robert H. Ferrell, author of Harry S. Truman: A Life Revered by many Americans as a martyr for his cause, Brigadier General William "Billy" Mitchell has been one of the least understood figures of modern military history. His position as the dominant figure in American aviation from 1919 until his court-martial in 1925 has made him the frequent subject of biography, film, and television, but usually these portrayals have overemphasized the sensational elements of his story. For Mitchell, sensationalism was only a means of drawing attention to his farsighted ideas on aviation. In Billy Mitchell, he emerges as a man with a mission and a true pioneer of modern aviation, a man whose ideas about leadership in aerial operations inspire and instruct today's airmen and women. Anyone interested in aviation will delight in this compelling biography.

But his brilliance was often overshadowed by his personal failings.".

When Billy Mitchell returned from WWI, he brought with him the deep-seated belief that air power had made navies obsolete. However, in the years following WWI, the U.S. Congress was far more interested in disarmament and isolationist policies than in funding national defense. For the military services this meant lean budgets and skeleton operating forces. Billy Mitchell’s War with the Navy recounts the intense political struggle between the Army and Navy air arms for the limited resources needed to define and establish the role of aviation within their respective services in the period between the two world wars. After Congress rejected the concept of a unified air service in 1920, Mitchell and his supporters turned on the Navy, seeking to substitute the Air Service as the nation's first line of defense. While Mitchell proved that aircraft could sink a battleship with the bombing of the Ostfriesland in 1921, he was unable to convince the General Staff of the Army, the General Board of the Navy, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or Congress of the need for an independent air force. When Mitchell turned to the pen to discredit the Navy, he was convicted by his own words and actions in a court-martial that captivated the nation, and was forced to resign in 1925. Rather than ending the rivalry for air power, Mitchell’s resignation set the stage for the ongoing dispute between the two services in the years immediately before WWII. After Mitchell’s resignation, the rivalry for air power between the two services resurfaced when the Navy's plans to procure torpedo planes for the defense of Pearl Harbor and Coco Solo were brought to the attention of the Army. The book concludes with a description of the events surrounding the Air Corps' abysmal performance at Pearl Harbor and Midway followed by a critical assessment of how the development of aviation was pursued by the Army and the Navy after WWII.

This part of the book reviews the state of American airpower biography and autobiography. I have set certain parameters to define the boundaries of my discussion. I discuss biographies and autobiographies, anthologies, and oral histories of military officers who served in senior positions. Thus, although the stories of great aviators like Eddie Rickenbacker, Charles Lindbergh, and Chuck Yeager are important, those men did not command large forces either in combat or in peace; they had only a temporary effect on the development of strategy and doctrine. Similarly excluded are civilian political leaders and industrialists like Stuart Symington and Donald Douglas, even though they played key roles In their own spheres. What follows are the stories, some published, some not of America's greatest military airmen-some told by themselves, others by biographers. The order of presentation is roughly chronological, according to the time during which these men served. The fact that a surprising number of air luminaries do not appear here means that much work remains to be done.