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This wide-ranging collection of essays contains eighteen original articles by authors representing some of the most important recent work on Wittgenstein. It deals with questions pertaining to both the interpretation and application of Wittgenstein’s thought and the editing of his works. Regarding the latter, it also addresses issues concerning scholarly electronic publishing. The collection is accompanied by a comprehensive introduction which lays out the content and arguments of each contribution. Contributors: Knut Erik Tranøy, Lars Hertzberg, Georg Henrik von Wright, Marie McGinn, Cora Diamond, James Conant, David G. Stern, Eike von Savigny, P.M.S. Hacker, Hans-Johann Glock, Allan Janik, Kristóf Nyíri, Antonia Soulez, Brian McGuinness, Anthony Kenny, Joachim Schulte, Herbert Hrachovec, Cameron McEwen.

Making extensive use of unique archival resources this collection presents, for the first time, an in-depth study of the work and influence of Wittgenstein's original literary heirs, Rush Rhees, Elizabeth Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright as editors of Wittgenstein's posthumous writings. Presenting philosophical portraits of Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright, a team of international contributors provide a history of their collaboration and discuss how the individual philosophical views of the literary heirs shaped what we now know as the works of Wittgenstein. They consider the link between philosophically relevant aspects of their biography, their friendship with Wittgenstein and the development of their philosophical personalities, offering us a new appreciation of the dynamics of their editorial collaboration and how each of the heirs worked individually as an editor to create Wittgenstein's philosophy. Each chapter reveals what the editors did to enrich and shape our understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophical contribution on topics such as rule-following, logical necessity, aesthetics and the methods and aims of philosophy. This thorough critical analysis of the editorial history of Wittgenstein's works allows us to finally appreciate the profound impact the editors have had on our understanding of his philosophy, his views and his cultural significance.

In this illuminating collection, Charles Parsons surveys the contributions of philosophers and mathematicians who shaped the philosophy of mathematics over the course of the past century. Parsons begins with a discussion of the Kantian legacy in the work of L. E. J. Brouwer, David Hilbert, and Paul Bernays, shedding light on how Bernays revised his philosophy after his collaboration with Hilbert. He considers Hermann Weyl’s idea of a “vicious circle” in the foundations of mathematics, a radical claim that elicited many challenges. Turning to Kurt Gödel, whose incompleteness theorem transformed debate on the foundations of mathematics and brought mathematical logic to maturity, Parsons discusses his essay on Bertrand Russell’s mathematical logic—Gödel’s first mature philosophical statement and an avowal of his Platonistic view. Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century insightfully treats the contributions of figures the author knew personally: W. V. Quine, Hilary Putnam, Hao Wang, and William Tait. Quine’s early work on ontology is explored, as is his nominalistic view of predication and his use of the genetic method of explanation in the late work The Roots of Reference. Parsons attempts to tease out Putnam’s views on existence and ontology, especially in relation to logic and mathematics. Wang’s contributions to subjects ranging from the concept of set, minds, and machines to the interpretation of Gödel are examined, as are Tait’s axiomatic conception of mathematics, his minimalist realism, and his thoughts on historical figures.

This important book by a major American philosopher brings together eleven essays treating problems in logic and the philosophy of mathematics. A common point of view, that mathematical thought is central to our thought in general, underlies the essays. In his introduction, Parsons articulates that point of view and relates it to past and recent discussions of the foundations of mathematics. Mathematics in Philosophy is divided into three parts. Ontology—the question of the nature and extent of existence assumptions in mathematics—is the subject of Part One and recurs elsewhere. Part Two consists of essays on two important historical figures, Kant and Frege, and one contemporary, W. V. Quine. Part Three contains essays on the three interrelated notions of set, class, and truth.

For Wittgenstein mathematics is a human activity characterizing ways of seeing conceptual possibilities and empirical situations, proof and logical methods central to its progress. Sentences exhibit differing 'aspects', or dimensions of meaning, projecting mathematical 'realities'. Mathematics is an activity of constructing standpoints on equalities and differences of these. Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy of Mathematics (1934–1951) grew from his Early (1912–1921) and Middle (1929–33) philosophies, a dialectical path reconstructed here partly as a response to the limitative results of Gödel and Turing.