Why do we believe in the views of a political party or leader? How can we better understand vaccine hesitancy or denial of climate change science? What drives extremist or conspiracist beliefs? This vital and timely new text provides a compelling survey of the science behind how people form beliefs and evaluate those of others, and why it is that beliefs are often so resistant to change in the face of conflicting evidence. Bringing together theories and empirical evidence from cognitive, developmental, and social psychology, Nancy S. Kim presents an engaging overview of the field and its implications for a wide range of beliefs – from moral, political, religious, and superstitious beliefs to beliefs about ourselves and our own potential. The intriguing studies discussed demonstrate how many psychological factors contribute to belief, including memory, reasoning, judgment, emotion, personality, social cognition, and cognitive development. With thoughtful questions and a range of cross-cultural case studies, this is an ideal overview for students of psychology and all readers interested in the psychology of belief.

Believing the wrong thing can have drastic consequences. The question of when a person is not only ill-guided, but genuinely at fault for holding a particular belief goes to the root of our understanding of such notions as criminal negligence and moral responsibility. This book explores the conditions under which someone may be deemed blameworthy for holding a particular belief, drawing on contemporary epistemology, ethics and legal scholarship.

There have been many books over the past decade, including outstanding collections of essays, on the topic of the ethical virtues and virtue-theoretic approaches in ethics. But the professional journals of philosophy have only recently seen a strong and growing interest in the intellectual virtues and in the development of virtue-theoretic approaches in epistemology. There have been four single-authored book length treatments of issues of virtue epistemology over the last seven years, beginning with Ernest Sosa's Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge, 1991), and extending to Linda Zabzebski's Virtue of the Mind (Cambridge, 1996). Weighing in with Jonathan Kvanvig's The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind (1992), and James Montmarquet's Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility (1993), Rowman & Littlefield has had a particularly strong interest in the direction and growth of the field. To date, there has been no collection of articles directly devoted to the growing debate over the possibility and potential of a virtue epistemology. This volume exists in the belief that there is now a timely opportunity to gather together the best contributions of the influential authors working in this growing area of epistemological research, and to create a collection of essays as a useful course text and research source. Several of the articles included in the volume are previously unpublished. Several essays discuss the range and general approach of virtue theory in comparison with other general accounts. What advantages are supposed to accrue from a virtue-based account in epistemology, in handling well-known problems such as "Gettier," and "Evil-Genie"-type problems? Can reliabilist virtue epistemology handle skeptical challenges more satisfactorily than non-virtue-centered forms of epistemic reliabilism? Others provide a needed discussion of relevant analogies and disanalogies between ethical and epistemic evaluation. The readings all contribute

Tired of beating yourself up for not living what you know to be true? Ready to light your passions and let them fuel your dreams and desires? What if you could reset old thought patterns, "flipping the switch" without thinking about it? What if there was an autopilot option for positive thinking? There is, and you can access it through Belief Re-patterning! Solidly based in cognitive learning theory, educational psychology, and years of observation, this proactive technique developed by author and teacher Suze Casey rebuilds neural pathways and connections, allowing you to think, act, and feel differently. You didn’t arrive with an owner’s manual for your mind; and neither did your parents, friends, or children. Well, Belief Re-patterningcan be just what you’re looking for—full of activities that acknowledge your Inner Critic, strengthen your Inner Coach, and ignite your inner motivation. You’re going to have a conversation with yourself; it might as well be compassionate, encouraging, conscious, supportive, purposeful, and authentic! In this book, you’ll discover guaranteed ways to quickly, and almost effortlessly, get back on track when life’s stressors have pulled you off.

A fundamental question in philosophy of religion is whether religious belief must be based on evidence in order to be properly held. In recent years two prominent positions on this issue have been staked out: evidentialism, which claims that proper religious belief requires evidence; and Reformed epistemology, which claims that it does not. Evidence and Religious Belief contains eleven chapters by prominent philosophers which push the discussion in new directions. Thevolume has three parts. The first part explores the demand for evidence: some chapters object to it while others seek to restate it or find space for compromise between Reformed epistemology and evidentialism. The second part explores ways in which beliefs are related to evidence; that is, ways in which theevidence for or against religious belief that is available to a person can depend on that person's background beliefs and other circumstances. The third part contains chapters that discuss actual evidence for and against religious belief. Evidence for belief in God includes the so-called common consent of the human race and the way that such belief makes sense of the moral life; evidence against it includes profound puzzles about divine freedom which suggest that it is impossible for a beingto be morally perfect.

Research on the topic of parent beliefs, or parent cognition, has increased tremendously since the original publication of this volume in 1985. For this revised second edition, the editors sought to reflect some of the new directions that research on parent cognition has taken. By offering a greater variety of topics, it gives evidence of the intellectual concerns that now engage researchers in the field and testifies to the expanding scope of their interests. Although a unique collection because it reflects the diversity that exists among major researchers in the field, it evinces a common theme -- that the ideas parents have regarding their children and themselves as parents have an impact on their actions. This emphasis on parents' ideas shifts the focus on sources of family influence to ideas or beliefs as determinants of family interactions. The implication of this way of thinking for practitioners is that it suggests the shift to ideas and thoughts from behavior and attitudes.

In this final revision of the classic work, the author has produced the fullest and most sophisticated account of this influential theoretical model. Here, he makes clear that morality is an informal system that does not provide unique answers to every moral question but does always limit the range of morally acceptable options, and so explains why some moral disagreements cannot be resolved. The importance placed on the moral ideals also makes clear that the moral rules are only one part of the moral system. A chapter that is devoted to justifying violations of the rules illustrates how the moral rules are embedded in the system and cannot be adequately understood independently of it. The chapter on reasons includes a new account of what makes one reason better than another and elucidates the complex hybrid nature of rationality.