It is impossible to hold patently contradictory beliefs in mind together at once. Why? Because we know that it is impossible for both to be true. This impossibility is a species of rational necessity, a phenomenon that uniquely characterizes the relation between one person's beliefs. Here, Eric Marcus argues that the unity of the rational mind--what makes it one mind--is what explains why, given what we already believe, we can't believe certain things and must believe certain others in this special sense. What explains this is that beliefs, and the inferences by which we acquire them, are constituted by a particular kind of endorsement of those very states and acts. This, in turn, entails that belief and inference are essentially self-conscious: to hold a belief or to make an inference is at the same time to know that one does. An examination of the nature of belief and inference, in light of the phenomenon of rational necessity, reveals how the unity of the rational mind is a function of our knowledge of ourselves as bound to believe the true. Rational self-consciousness is the form of mental togetherness.

It is impossible to hold patently contradictory beliefs in mind together at once. Why? Because we know that it is impossible for both to be true. This impossibility is a species of rational necessity, a phenomenon that uniquely characterizes the relation between one person's beliefs. Here, Eric Marcus argues that the unity of the rational mind—what makes it one mind—is what explains why, given what we already believe, we can't believe certain things and must believe certain others in this special sense. What explains this is that beliefs, and the inferences by which we acquire them, are constituted by a particular kind of endorsement of those very states and acts. This, in turn, entails that belief and inference are essentially self-conscious: to hold a belief or to make an inference is at the same time to know that one does. An examination of the nature of belief and inference, in light of the phenomenon of rational necessity, reveals how the unity of the rational mind is a function of our knowledge of ourselves as bound to believe the true. Rational self-consciousness is the form of mental togetherness.

Inference has long been a central concern in epistemology, as an essential means by which we extend our knowledge and test our beliefs. Inference is also a key notion in influential psychological accounts of mental capacities, ranging from problem-solving to perception. Consciousness, on the other hand, has arguably been the defining interest of philosophy of mind over recent decades. Comparatively little attention, however, has been devoted to the significance of consciousness for the proper understanding of the nature and role of inference. It is commonly suggested that inference may be either conscious or unconscious. Yet how unified are these various supposed instances of inference? Does either enjoy explanatory priority in relation to the other? In what way, or ways, can an inference be conscious, or fail to be conscious, and how does this matter? This book brings together original essays from established scholars and emerging theorists that showcase how several current debates in epistemology, philosophy of psychology and philosophy of mind can benefit from more reflections on these and related questions about the significance of consciousness for inference.

It is natural to think that self-knowledge is gained through introspection, whereby we somehow peer inward and detect our mental states. However, so-called transparency theories emphasize our capacity to peer outward at the world, hence beyond our minds, in the pursuit of self-knowledge. For all their popularity in recent decades, transparency theories have also met with myriad challenges. This volume presents new perspectives on transparency-theoretic approaches to self-knowledge. It addresses many under-explored dimensions of transparency theories and considers their wider implications for epistemology, philosophy of mind, and psychology. Some chapters in this volume aim to deepen our understanding of key themes at the heart of transparency theories, such as the ways in which transparent self-knowledge is properly "first-personal" or "non-alienated". Other chapters offer arguments for extending transparency accounts of self-knowledge to different kinds of mental states and phenomena, such as memory, actions, social groups, and credences. Finally, there are chapters in the volume which discuss interesting relationships between transparency theories, projection, second-order sincerity, and Moore’s Paradox. This book will appeal to scholars and advanced students working in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and psychology.

G. E. M. Anscombe (1919–2001) is one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. Known primarily for influencing research in action theory and moral philosophy, her work also has relevance in the study of metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, and politics. The Anscombean Mind provides a comprehensive survey of Anscombe’s thought, not only placing it in its historical context but also exploring its enduring significance in contemporary debates. Divided into three clear parts, twenty-three chapters by an international array of contributors address the following themes: ancient philosophy metaphysics mind and language Wittgenstein action and ethics politics religion and faith. The Anscombean Mind is an indispensable resource for anyone studying and researching action theory, ethics, moral philosophy, Wittgenstein, twentieth-century philosophy, and Anscombe herself.

Developing original accounts of the many aspects of belief, On Believing puts the believer at the heart of the story. Hunter argues that to believe something is to be in position to do, think, and feel things in light of a possibility whose obtaining would make one right. The logical aspect is that being right depends only on whether that possibility obtains. The psychological one concerns how that possibility can rationalise what one does, thinks, and feels. But, Hunter argues, beliefs are not causes, capacities, or dispositions. Rather, believing rationalises because possibilities are potential reasons. Hunter also denies that believing is a form of representing. The objects of belief are possibilities, not representations, and belief states are not themselves true or false. Hunter defends this modal view against familiar objections and explores how objective and subjective limits to belief generate credal illusions and ground credal necessities. Developing a novel account of the normativity of belief, he argues that voluntary acts of inference make us responsible for our beliefs. While denying that believing is intrinsically normative, Hunter grounds the ethics of belief in attributive goodness. Believing something is to our credit when it shows us to be good in some way, and what we ought to believe depends on what we ought to know, and not on the evidence we have. The ethics of belief, Hunter argues, concern how a believer ought to be positioned in a world of possibilities.

Expression is typically construed as a relation between two ontologically distinct items—namely, a vehicle and a content—but it is better construed non-relationally, since the content is an intrinsic aspect or quality of the expressive vehicle. Upon this basis, The Expressive Self: The First Person in Speech and Thought argues that the distinctive nature of the first-person perspective must be accounted for in expressive, rather than epistemic, terms. For though others can report on what one expresses, one alone is able to non-relationally express oneself; one alone is able to produce vehicles that are episodes of one’s self-consciousness. According to Ángel García Rodríguez, the ensuing expressive model of the self provides clarity on some prominent contemporary puzzles, notably Moore’s paradox, self-deception, and McKinsey’s paradox, given the duality of non-relationally expressive and reporting uses of the underlying first-person claims. Moreover, the phenomena of self-reference and first-person authority, both psychological and bodily, pose no objection to the model. Throughout, the author engages critically with alternative conceptions of the self, delivering a novel account that helps advance the debate about the nature of the self and of the first person.