'Beatson, Matthews & Elliot's Administrative Law' combines extracts from key cases, articles and other sources with detailed commentary. Aimed at undergraduates studying administrative law, it provides comprehensive coverage of the subject.

'Beatson, Matthews & Elliot's Administrative Law' combines extracts from key cases, articles and other sources with detailed commentary. Aimed at undergraduates studying administrative law, it provides comprehensive coverage of the subject.

"[This book provides an] account of the principles of judicial review and the administrative arrangements of the United Kingdom."--

Wade and Forsyth's Administrative Law has been a cornerstone text since publication of the first edition in 1961. It provides a comprehensive and perceptive account of the principles of judicial review and the administrative arrangements of the United Kingdom. For over sixty years, this text has been trusted by students and is extensively cited by courts throughout the common law world. The book's clarity of exposition makes it accessible to students approaching the subject for the first time, whilst its breadth of coverage and perceptive insight ensure its value to all interested in the field, academics and practitioners alike.

In the late 1980s, a vigorous debate began about how we may best justify, in constitutional terms, the English courts’ jurisdiction to judicially review the exercise of public power derived from an Act of Parliament. Two rival theories emerged in this debate, the ultra vires theory and the common law theory. The debate between the supporters of these two theories has never satisfactorily been resolved and has been criticised as being futile. Yet, the debate raises some fundamental questions about the constitution of the United Kingdom, particularly: the relationship between Parliament and the courts; the nature of parliamentary supremacy in the contemporary constitution; and the possibility and validity of relying on legislative intent. This book critically analyses the ultra vires and common law theories and argues that neither offers a convincing explanation for the courts’ judicial review jurisdiction. Instead, the author puts forward the theory that parliamentary supremacy – and, in turn, the relationship between Parliament and the courts – is not absolute and does not operate in a hard and fast way but, rather, functions in a more flexible way and that the courts will balance particular Acts of Parliament against competing statutes or principles. McGarry argues that this new conception of parliamentary supremacy leads to an alternative theory of judicial review which significantly differs from both the ultra vires and common law theories. This book will be of great interest to students and scholars of UK public law.

Supreme Court Economic Review is an interdisciplinary journal that seeks to provide a forum for scholarship in law and economics, public choice, and constitutional political economy. Its approach is broad ranging and contributions employ explicit or implicit economic reasoning for the analysis of legal issues, with special attention to Supreme Court decisions, judicial process, and institutional design.

Inspired by the work of Professor Michael Taggart, this collection of essays from across the common law world is concerned with two separate but related themes. First, to what extent and by what means should review on substantive grounds such as unreasonableness be expanded and intensified? Jowell, Elliott and Varuhas all agree with Taggart that proportionality should not 'sweep the rainbow', but propose different schemes for organising and conceptualising substantive review. Groves and Weeks, and Hoexter evaluate the state of substantive review in Australia and South Africa respectively. The second theme concerns the broader (Canadian) sense of substantive review including the illegality grounds, and whether deference should extend to these grounds. Cane and Aronson consider the relevance and impact of different constitutional and doctrinal settings. Wilberg and Daly address questions concerning when and how deference is to operate once it is accepted as appropriate in principle. Rights-based review is discussed in a separate third part because it raises both of the above questions. Geiringer, Sales and Walters examine the choices to be made in settling the approach in this area, each focusing on a different dichotomy. Taggart's work is notable for treating these various aspects of substantive review as parts of a broader whole, and for his search for an appropriate balance between judicial scrutiny and administrative autonomy across this entire area. By bringing together essays on all these topics, this volume seeks to build on that approach.