By applying Cohen and Gooch’s model to the Battle of Mogadishu, this paper shows that the failure of the TFR mission on 3-4 October 1993 was the result of a system failure. Secretary Aspin received far more blame than he deserved for making the decision. Misperception of the real impact tanks and APCs could have had on the overall mission is the real cause of this disproportionate blame. GEN Hoar and GEN Powell, in addition, bear as much responsibility as Secretary Aspin for the decision. Neither of these generals strongly advocated the deployment to Aspin even though the worsening situation on the ground merited their strong support. Both Hoar and Powell’s approval recommendations can be characterized as lukewarm. Aspin’s real failure was of not being more critical of the conduct of the TFR operations. In light of Secretary Aspin’s acknowledged concern over the number of similar operations conducted by TFR and his knowledge that the Administration was seeking a political solution, he should have notified MG Garrison of the policy shift though the JCS and CINCCENT and provided additional guidance on risk. Had Aspin either reassessed the risk of each TFR operation more thoroughly or done a better job coordinating the policy shift in light of the increased risks, it is likely that the three October raid would not have occurred.

"By applying Cohen and Gooch's model to the Battle of Mogadishu, this paper has shows that the failure of the TFR mission on 3-4 October 1993 was the result of a system failure. Secretary Aspin received far more blame than he deserved for making the decision. Misperception of the real impact tanks and APCs could have had on the overall mission is the real cause of this disproportionate blame. Gen. Hoar and Gen. Powell, in addition, bear as much responsibility as Secretary Aspin for the decision. Neither of these generals strongly advocated the deployment to Aspin even though the worsening situation on the ground merited their strong support. Both Hoar and Powell's approval recommendations can be characterized as lukewarm. Aspin's real failure was of not being more critical of the conduct of the TFR operations. In light of Secretary Aspin's acknowledged concern over the number of similar operations conducted by TFR and his knowledge that the Administration was seeking a political solution, he should have notified MG Garrison of the policy shift though the JCS and CINCCENT and provided additional guidance on risk. Had Aspin either reassessed the risk of each TER operation more thoroughly or done a better job coordinating the policy shift in light of the increased risks, it is likely that the three October raid would not have occurred. While better policy coordination from the Secretary of Defense down to TFR could have prevented the 3 October 1993 raid from occurring, TFR did have all the means in Mogadishu to successfully accomplish the mission. However, overconfidence in TFR's capabilities and underestimation of the enemy's ability to find and attack TFR vulnerabilities were critical failures that led to a series of other failures. First, TFR did not request the AC-130s and extra platoon. Second, TER conducted the 3 October raid without protecting its vulnerable helicopters." -- Abstract.

This book tells the story of Task Force Ranger – a unit of US Rangers and Special Forces – and their attempt to capture the lieutenants of the Somali warlord Muhamed Farrah Aideed, during the 1993 United Nations' humanitarian relief mission. What started as a simple snatch-and-grab mission quickly degenerated into a desperate battle for survival when US Black Hawk helicopters were struck by rocket-propelled grenades and crashed into the streets of Mogadishu. Racing to save the crew, Task Force Ranger was surrounded by mobs of hostile Somali gunmen. The battle in the city raged all night as the better-equipped and better-trained US forces kept the nearly overwhelming numbers of Somalis at bay. Finally, battered, bloodied, and low on ammunition, the Task Force was rescued by a combined UN and US relief force and extracted to safety. Containing detailed maps and declassified information, this is a dramatic retelling of a brutal battle that had a far-reaching impact on US military policy.

A story of equipment failures, bad luck, poor planning and unbelievable courage written 25 years after the battle, this new book by Leigh Neville reveals the hard-hitting truth of what happened minute by minute in the dusty streets of Mogadishu. On October 3, 1993, Task Force Ranger was dispatched to seize two high-profile lieutenants of a Somali warlord. Special Forces troops were transported by ground vehicles and helicopters, and the mission was meant to be over within the hour. They quickly found themselves under heavy fire, and two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down. With a hastily organized relief column many hours away, the American troops faced a desperate battle for survival. Focusing on the stories of the soldiers on the ground, and in the air, Day of the Rangers reveals the experiences and recollections of the Special Forces units, including the Rangers, Delta operators and Nightstalker crews who fought in the battle of Mogadishu. Published to mark the battle's 25th anniversary and using recently declassified documents and new interviews with many of the participants, Day of the Rangers is a fascinating and revealing new history of a battle that would influence American Special Forces for decades to come.

As a scholar of terrorism, John Maszka has examined how politics, the media, and the War on Terror play off one another. His most startling claim is that the War on Terror is a war for natural resources--and that terrorism has little to do with it. Once the military became mechanized, oil quickly became the most sought-after commodity on the planet, and the race for energy was eventually framed as a matter of national security. Ironically, Maszka argues, the true threats to national security are the massive oil conglomerates themselves. Maszka delves into the repercussions of a government that capitalizes on an us versus them mentality, such as the demonizing of an entire religion, sensationalizing "radical" violent attacks, and loosely applying the word "terrorism." Because the United States' current approach to terrorism has led to the politicization and abuse of the term, Maszka suggests a need for a standardized definition of terrorism. Currently, too many acts of violence can be labeled terrorism, resulting in state and nonstate actors labeling their enemies as "terrorists," yet claiming their own acts of violence as legitimate and retributive. Maszka argues that much of the violence labeled as terrorism today is not terrorism at all. In an ambitious attempt to connect seemingly unrelated events in politics and the media, Maszka offers an unflinching portrayal of the hypocrisy underlying our foreign policy.

Civil wars have caused tremendous human suffering in the last century, and the United Nations is often asked to send peacekeepers to stop ongoing violence. Yet despite being the most visible tool of international intervention, policymakers and scholars have little systematic knowledge about how well peacekeeping works. Peacekeeping in the Midst of War offers the most comprehensive analyses of peacekeeping on civil war violence to date. With unique data on different types of violence in civil wars around the world, Peacekeeping in the Midst of War offers a rigorous understanding of UN intervention by analysing both wars with and without UN peacekeeping efforts. It also directly measures the strength of UN missions in personnel capacity and constitution. Using large-n quantitative analyses, the book finds that UN peacekeeping missions with appropriately constituted force capacities mitigate violence in civil wars. The authors conclude by analyzing the broader context of UN intervention effectiveness, and conclude that peacekeeping is a more generally effective way to reduce the human suffering associated with civil war.