This book covers the remarkable success of a second-generation Polish kid who, at the age of eighteen, enlisted in the United States Air Force during the Korean War. He was one of less than a handful of basic airmen who rose to the rank of four-star general. More importantly, it covers the reincarnation of WW II Air Commandos under the code name of Jungle Jim, as well as US combat air operations from 1961 through 1967 flying obsolete B-26s and the newest jet fighter, the F-4D. Then airman Piotrowski qualified for aviation cadet training and earned his first wings as a navigator and electronic warfare officer (EWO). Following assignments in Korea and Japan, he returned to the United States for pilot training ranking number one in his class and qualifying for jet fighters. He was selected for Project Jungle Jim and became a leading air force expert in conventional weapons and tactics. His flying ability, combat experience, and tactical expertise led to his assignment at the Air Force Top Gun School to instruct air force generals headed for Vietnam on conventional weapons and tactics. Following school and staff assignments, he was selected to command the Fortieth Tactical Group, Aviano, Italy. He led the group for three years, receiving a rating as “Best Wing in the USAF.” Following Aviano, he was a special assistant to, and troubleshooter for, General Jones, air force chief. Shortly thereafter, he was selected to build the 552nd AWAC equipped with the E-3A aircraft and bring it to combat status. For his outstanding leadership of the 552nd AWAC Wing he received the prestigious Secretary of the Air Force Zukert Award.

This book covers the remarkable success of a first-generation Polish kid who, at the age of eighteen, enlisted in the United States Air Force during the Korean War. He was one of less than a handful of basic airmen who rose to the rank of four-star general. More importantly, it covers the reincarnation of WW II Air Commandos under the code name of Jungle Jim, as well as US combat air operations from 1961 through 1967 flying obsolete B-26s and the newest jet fighter, the F-4D. Then airman Piotrowski qualified for aviation cadet training and earned his first wings as a navigator and electronic warfare officer (EWO). Following assignments in Korea and Japan, he returned to the United States for pilot training ranking number one in his class and qualifying for jet fighters. He was selected for Project Jungle Jim and became a leading air force expert in conventional weapons and tactics. His flying ability, combat experience, and tactical expertise led to his assignment at the Air Force Top Gun School to instruct air force generals headed for Vietnam on conventional weapons and tactics. Following school and staff assignments, he was selected to command the Fortieth Tactical Group, Aviano, Italy. He led the group for three years, receiving a rating as "Best Wing in the USAF." Following Aviano, he was a special assistant to, and troubleshooter for, General Jones, air force chief. Shortly thereafter, he was selected to build the 552nd AWAC equipped with the E-3A aircraft and bring it to combat status. Next, he commanded Air Defense TAC, where he was selected to review the Desert One failure with five other officers. He provided inside information on how the rescue attempt in Iran unraveled. On another special assignment, he was sent to Saudi Arabia as a special advisor to the Saudi chief of the defense staff with the mission to improve Saudi Air Defense. Following that, then major general Piotrowski went to Oman with a diplomatic portfolio to forge an agreement with the Omni government on joint military training of US and Omani forces. Subsequently, he was assigned to the Tactical Air Command as the director of operations and vice commander. Here he grappled with a number of aircraft-related problems and brought the stealth fighter into the operational inventory. Next, he commanded Ninth Air Force with twelve subordinate wings with roughly one thousand fighter aircraft assigned, with responsibilities for air warfare in support of ground forces in the Middle East. On one of his many visits to Sudan, he stopped an invasion from Ethiopia in one day. He was promoted to the rank of general to serve as the vice chief of the air force. Here he revealed how the JCS operates, as well as inside information on the capture of the Achille Lauro hijackers and the punitive raid on Libya. His last assignment was commanding the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and the United States Space Command (USSPACECOM), where he had the opportunity to host and brief senior military members of the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China.

The Air Commando secret wars happened mostly during the Vietnam War time frame and was a global effort involving USAF volunteer personnel who were given official military orders that did not necessarily specify the country they served in, and civilian clothes were many times authorized. Later they had great difficulty proving that they served in many of these countries, which affected their future VA care. These operations were used to strengthen normally a poor country with little military resources and training with secret warriors frequently being there doing some of their legwork behind the scenes. All the operations were tight-lipped, frequently forbidden to tell families where you were and what you were doing. As an example; Capt. Bob Simpsons death, the first fighter pilot KIA in Vietnam in August 1962, became a total fabrication of where, why, and how and took a number of years before the government came clean because of my efforts. Secret wars have a long history, and they will continue because of the interest of more-powerful nations with their less fortunate brethren.

Drawing on a range of sources, including original interviews with the commanders ordered to fight a land war in Southeast Asia, former U.S. Army infantry officer recounts his experiences in Vietnam as a company commander and as a battalion- and division-level operations officer carrying out those orders. The crucial flaws of the Johnson Administration's strategy of attrition are analyzed--the failure to seal off the theater of battle from Chinese and Soviet resupply, and allowing North Vietnamese forces to maintain sanctuaries in Laos, Cambodia and even North Vietnam.

In 1968, twenty-one-year-old Fred McCarthy transitioned from the monastic life of a seminary student to that of a U.S. Army helicopter gunship commander in Vietnam. Despite preparation from a family tradition of decorated combat service, a strong sense of patriotism, a love for aviation, and a desire for adventure, he got far more than he bargained for. Written after 50 years of reflection, reading, and study, this memoir tells both a universal story about war, adventure, and perseverance and, also shares the intensely personal experience of the Vietnam War and its legacy for those who fought in it. McCarthy describes many of his missions, reflects on the nature of being a combat helicopter pilot, and processes the experience through his poetry, letters home, and reflective analysis.

A fighter pilot who flew 75 combat missions in World War I, George C. Kenney was a charismatic leader who established himself as an innovative advocate of air power. As General MacArthur's air commander in the Southwest Pacific during World War II, Kenney played a pivotal role in the conduct of the war, but until now his performance has remained largely unexplored. Thomas Griffith offers a critical assessment of Kenney's numerous contributions to MacArthur's war efforts. He depicts Kenney as a staunch proponent of airpower's ability to shape the outcome of military engagements and a commander who shared MacArthur's strategic vision. He tells how Kenney played a key role in campaigns from New Guinea to the Philippines; adapted aircraft, pilots, doctrine, and technology to the demands of aerial warfare in the southwest Pacific; and pursued daring strategies that likely would have failed in the European theater. Kenney is shown to have been an operational and organizational innovator who was willing to scrap doctrine when the situation called for ingenuity, such as shifting to low-level attacks for more effective bombing raids. Griffith tells how Kenney established air superiority in every engagement, provided close air support for troops by bombing enemy supply lines, attacked and destroyed Japanese supply ships, and carried out rapid deployment by airlifting troops and supplies. Griffith draws on Kenney's diary and correspondence, the personal papers of other officers, and previously untapped sources to present a comprehensive portrayal of both the officer and the man. He illuminates Kenney's relationship with MacArthur, General "Hap" Arnold, and other field commanders, and closely examines factors in air warfare often neglected in other accounts, such as intelligence, training, and logistical support. MacArthur's Airman is a rich and insightful study that shows how air, ground, and marine efforts were integrated to achieve major strategic objectives. It firmly establishes the importance of MacArthur's campaign in New Guinea and reveals Kenney's instrumental role in turning the tide against the Japanese.

In the pantheon of air power spokesmen, Giulio Douhet holds center stage. His writings, more often cited than perhaps actually read, appear as excerpts and aphorisms in the writings of numerous other air power spokesmen, advocates-and critics. Though a highly controversial figure, the very controversy that surrounds him offers to us a testimonial of the value and depth of his work, and the need for airmen today to become familiar with his thought. The progressive development of air power to the point where, today, it is more correct to refer to aerospace power has not outdated the notions of Douhet in the slightest In fact, in many ways, the kinds of technological capabilities that we enjoy as a global air power provider attest to the breadth of his vision. Douhet, together with Hugh “Boom” Trenchard of Great Britain and William “Billy” Mitchell of the United States, is justly recognized as one of the three great spokesmen of the early air power era. This reprint is offered in the spirit of continuing the dialogue that Douhet himself so perceptively began with the first edition of this book, published in 1921. Readers may well find much that they disagree with in this book, but also much that is of enduring value. The vital necessity of Douhet’s central vision-that command of the air is all important in modern warfare-has been proven throughout the history of wars in this century, from the fighting over the Somme to the air war over Kuwait and Iraq.