This work draws on insights from the experimental and theoretical literature on bargaining to provide a much-needed comprehensive treatment of the neglected subject of how wars end. In a study of how states simultaneously wage war and negotiate peace settlements, Paul R. Pillar argues that war termination is best understood as a bargaining process. Originally published in 1983. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Gastrow describes the initiatives and events that led to the signing of the accord, exploring in particular the important roles played by religious groups and the business community.

In the past two decades, peace negotiators around the world have increasingly accepted that granting amnesties for human rights violations is no longer an acceptable bargaining tool or incentive, even when the signing of a peace agreement is at stake. While many states that previously saw sweeping amnesties as integral to their peace processes now avoid amnesties for human rights violations, this anti-amnesty turn has been conspicuously absent in Asia. In Negotiating Peace: Amnesties, Justice and Human Rights Renée Jeffery examines why peace negotiators in Asia have resisted global anti-impunity measures more fervently and successfully than their counterparts around the world. Drawing on a new global dataset of 146 peace agreements (1980–2015) and with in-depth analysis of four key cases - Timor-Leste, Aceh Indonesia, Nepal and the Philippines - Jeffery uncovers the legal, political, economic and cultural reasons for the persistent popularity of amnesties in Asian peace processes.

This book offers a unique approach to reconciliation as a matter for negotiation, bringing together two bodies of theory in order to offer insights into resolving conflicts and achieving lasting peace. It argues that reconciliation should not be simply accepted as an ‘agreed-upon norm’ within peacemaking processes, but should receive serious attention from belligerents and peace-brokers seeking to end violent conflicts through negotiation. The book explores different meanings the term ‘reconciliation’ might hold for parties in conflict - the end of overt hostilities, a transformation in the quality of relations between warring groups, a vehicle of accountability and punishment of human rights abusers or the means through which they might somehow acquire amnesty, and as a means of atonement and to material reparation. It considers what gives energy to the idea of reconciliation in a conflict situation—why do belligerents become interested in settling their differences and changing their attitudes to one another? Using a range of case studies and thematic discussion, chapters in this book seek to tackle these tough questions from a multidisciplinary perspective. Contributions to the book reveal some of the complexities of national and international reconciliation projects, but particularly diverse understandings of reconciliation and how to achieve it. All conflicts reflect unique dynamics, aspirations and power realities. It is precisely because parties in conflict differ in expectations of reconciliation outcomes that its processes should be negotiated. This book is a valuable resource for both scholars and practitioners engaged in resolving conflicts and transforming fragmented relations in conflict and post-conflict situations.

After a war breaks out, what factors influence the warring parties' decisions about whether to talk to their enemy, and when may their position on wartime diplomacy change? How do we get from only fighting to also talking? In The Costs of Conversation, Oriana Skylar Mastro argues that states are primarily concerned with the strategic costs of conversation, and these costs need to be low before combatants are willing to engage in direct talks with their enemy. Specifically, Mastro writes, leaders look to two factors when determining the probable strategic costs of demonstrating a willingness to talk: the likelihood the enemy will interpret openness to diplomacy as a sign of weakness, and how the enemy may change its strategy in response to such an interpretation. Only if a state thinks it has demonstrated adequate strength and resiliency to avoid the inference of weakness, and believes that its enemy has limited capacity to escalate or intensify the war, will it be open to talking with the enemy. Through four primary case studies—North Vietnamese diplomatic decisions during the Vietnam War, those of China in the Korean War and Sino-Indian War, and Indian diplomatic decision making in the latter conflict—The Costs of Conversation demonstrates that the costly conversations thesis best explains the timing and nature of countries' approach to wartime talks, and therefore when peace talks begin. As a result, Mastro's findings have significant theoretical and practical implications for war duration and termination, as well as for military strategy, diplomacy, and mediation.

The authors focus on the multidimensionality of gender in conflict, yet they also prioritise the experience of women given both the changing nature of war and the historical de-emphasis on women's experiences.

Refreshing and revealing in equal measure, this innovative volume conducts a critical/self--critical exploration of the impact of culture on the ill-fated Oslo peace process. The authors negotiators and scholars alike demolish stereotypes as they construct an unusually subtle and sophisticated understanding of how culture influences negotiating styles. Culture, they argue, did not cause the Oslo breakdown but it did play an influential, intervening role at several levels: coloring the thinking of political leaders, shaping domestic politics on both sides, and affecting each side s evaluation of the other s beliefs and intentions.After an overview by William Quandt of the history of the Oslo process and the impact of international factors such as U.S. mediation, the volume presents a detailed analysis of first Palestinian, and then Israeli negotiating styles between 1993 and 2001. Omar Dajani, a former legal advisor to the Palestinian team, explains how elements of Palestinian identity and national development have hobbled the Palestinians ability to negotiate effectively. Aharon Klieman, a distinguished Israeli analyst, traces a long-standing clash between diplomatic and security subcultures within the Israeli political elite and reveals how Israeli identity has helped create a negotiating style that opts for short-term gains while undermining the prospects for a lasting agreement. Drawing on these insights, Tamara Wittes concludes the volume by offering not only a fresh appreciation of culture s influence on interethnic negotiations but also lessons for future negotiators in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.Read the review from Foreign Affairs."