To Hell in a Handbasket is a chilling account of how Jimmy Carter s abandonment of a longtime U.S. ally in favor of a murderous mullah thirty years ago enabled the Islamization of Iran and how Barack Obama s current oblivion to and appeasement of the radical Muslim world are helping to Islamize the rest of the Middle East. ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Ruthie Blum, who immigrated to Israel from the United States in 1977, was a columnist, interviewer, and senior editor at The Jerusalem Post for two decades. She blogs for Israel Hayom. PRAISE: Whether Barack Obama is another Jimmy Carter is unfortunately not just academic speculation. Carter was bad enough, especially in the Middle East, but Obama is close on his heels. A second Obama term could well bring a nuclear Iran, a militantly anti-Israeli Egypt, and the overthrow of the pro-American Arab monarchies. The United States needs to wake up to what is happening, and Ruthie Blum s book is just the ticket. Let s hope she doesn t have to write a sequel. John Bolton Former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations The esteemed writer and commentator Ruthie Blum has produced a timely and essential account of President Obama s betrayal of a longtime U.S. ally, former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and its consequences for America s vital national-security interests. Just as important, by placing Obama s mishandling of the current pan-Arab populist wave against the backdrop of then-president Jimmy Carter s betrayal of longtime U.S. ally the shah of Iran, Blum demonstrates the timeless truth of George Santayana s lament that those who fail to learn from the mistakes of their predecessors are destined to repeat them. Caroline B. Glick Senior contributing editor, The Jerusalem Post, and senior Middle East fellow, Center for Security Policy

A hard-hitting assessment of Obama's current foreign policy and a sweeping look at the future of the Middle East The 2011 Arab Spring upended the status quo in the Middle East and poses new challenges for the United States. Here, Fawaz Gerges, one of the world's top Middle East scholars, delivers a full picture of US relations with the region. He reaches back to the post-World War II era to explain the issues that have challenged the Obama administration and examines the president's responses, from his negotiations with Israel and Palestine to his drawdown from Afghanistan and withdrawal from Iraq. Evaluating the president's engagement with the Arab Spring, his decision to order the death of Osama bin Laden, his intervention in Libya, his relations with Iran, and other key policy matters, Gerges highlights what must change in order to improve US outcomes in the region. Gerges' conclusion is sobering: the United States is near the end of its moment in the Middle East. The cynically realist policy it has employed since World War II-continued by the Obama administration--is at the root of current bitterness and mistrust, and it is time to remake American foreign policy.

In Barack Obama and the Arab Spring: A Successful Balancing Act of Foreign Policy and Diplomacy, Ahmed Zohny develops a well-blended marriage of history and political theories of U.S. foreign policy, diplomacy, public diplomacy, and national security. In this interdisciplinary research, he uses data and findings from both the Arabic and English languages by genealogically examining President Obama's foreign policy and diplomacy in response to the chronology of the unfolding events of the 2011 Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen. President Obama and his top diplomats' performances in response to each country's events are assessed, critically analyzed, and compared to one another in terms of the U.S. bilateral relations with each country, U.S. national interests, and her strategic goals in the Middle East region. The findings of this research indicate that President Obama's foreign policy and public diplomacy toward the Arab Spring proved to be a successful balancing act, prudent and in the best national interests of the United States in the Middle East.

Less than twenty-four months after the hope-filled Arab uprising, the popular movement had morphed into a dystopia of resurgent dictators, failed states, and civil wars. Egypt's epochal transition to democracy ended in a violent military coup. Yemen and Libya collapsed into civil war, while Bahrain erupted in smothering sectarian repression. Syria proved the greatest victim of all, ripped apart by internationally fueled insurgencies and an externally supported, bloody-minded regime. Amidst the chaos, a virulently militant group declared an Islamic State, seizing vast territories and inspiring terrorism across the globe. What happened? The New Arab Wars is a profound illumination of the causes of this nightmare. It details the costs of the poor choices made by regional actors, delivers a scathing analysis of Western misreadings of the conflict, and condemns international interference that has stoked the violence. Informed by commentators and analysts from the Arab world, Marc Lynch's narrative of a vital region's collapse is both wildly dramatic and likely to prove definitive. Most important, he shows that the region's upheavals have only just begun -- and that the hopes of Arab regimes and Western policy makers to retreat to old habits of authoritarian stability are doomed to fail.

The Arab Spring promised to end dictatorship and bring self-government to people across the Middle East. Yet everywhere except Tunisia it led to either renewed dictatorship, civil war, extremist terror, or all three. In The Arab Winter, Noah Feldman argues that the Arab Spring was nevertheless not an unmitigated failure, much less an inevitable one. Rather, it was a noble, tragic series of events in which, for the first time in recent Middle Eastern history, Arabic-speaking peoples took free, collective political action as they sought to achieve self-determination.

In Barack Obama and the Arab Spring: A Successful Balancing Act of Foreign Policy and Diplomacy, Ahmed Zohny develops a well-blended marriage of history and political theories of U.S. foreign policy, diplomacy, public diplomacy, and national security. In this interdisciplinary research, he uses data and findings from both the Arabic and English languages by genealogically examining President Obama’s foreign policy and diplomacy in response to the chronology of the unfolding events of the 2011 Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen. President Obama and his top diplomats’ performances in response to each country’s events are assessed, critically analyzed, and compared to one another in terms of the U.S. bilateral relations with each country, U.S. national interests, and her strategic goals in the Middle East region. The findings of this research indicate that President Obama’s foreign policy and public diplomacy toward the Arab Spring proved to be a successful balancing act, prudent and in the best national interests of the United States in the Middle East.

By the time of Barack Obama's inauguration as the 44th president of the United States, he had already developed an ambitious foreign policy vision. By his own account, he sought to bend the arc of history toward greater justice, freedom, and peace; within a year he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, largely for that promise. In Bending History, Martin Indyk, Kenneth Lieberthal, and Michael O’Hanlon measure Obama not only against the record of his predecessors and the immediate challenges of the day, but also against his own soaring rhetoric and inspiring goals. Bending History assesses the considerable accomplishments as well as the failures and seeks to explain what has happened. Obama's best work has been on major and pressing foreign policy challenges—counterterrorism policy, including the daring raid that eliminated Osama bin Laden; the "reset" with Russia; managing the increasingly significant relationship with China; and handling the rogue states of Iran and North Korea. Policy on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, however, has reflected serious flaws in both strategy and execution. Afghanistan policy has been plagued by inconsistent messaging and teamwork. On important "softer" security issues—from energy and climate policy to problems in Africa and Mexico—the record is mixed. As for his early aspiration to reshape the international order, according greater roles and responsibilities to rising powers, Obama's efforts have been well-conceived but of limited effectiveness. On issues of secondary importance, Obama has been disciplined in avoiding fruitless disputes (as with Chavez in Venezuela and Castro in Cuba) and insisting that others take the lead (as with Qaddafi in Libya). Notwithstanding several missteps, he has generally managed well the complex challenges of the Arab awakenings, striving to strike the right balance between U.S. values and interests. The authors see Obama's foreign policy to date as a triumph of discipline and realism over ideology. He has been neither the transformative beacon his devotees have wanted, nor the weak apologist for America that his critics allege. They conclude that his grand strategy for promoting American interests in a tumultuous world may only now be emerging, and may yet be curtailed by conflict with Iran. Most of all, they argue that he or his successor will have to embrace U.S. economic renewal as the core foreign policy and national security challenge of the future.