"Beck, Cull, and Jerome assess the effect of privatization on performance in a panel of Nigerian banks for the period 1990--2001. They find evidence of performance improvement in nine banks that were privatized, which is remarkable given the inhospitable environment for true financial intermediation. Their results also suggest negative effects of the continuing minority government ownership on the performance of many Nigerian banks. The authors' results complement aggregate indications of decreasing financial intermediation over the 1990s. Banks that focused on investment in government bonds and non-lending activities enjoyed a relatively higher performance. This paper--a product of the Finance Team, Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the group to study the effects of bank privatization in developing countries"--World Bank web site.

The authors assess the effect of privatization on performance in a panel of Nigerian banks for the period 1990-2001. They find evidence of performance improvement in nine banks that were privatized, which is remarkable given the inhospitable environment for true financial intermediation. Their results also suggest negative effects of the continuing minority government ownership on the performance of many Nigerian banks. The authors' results complement aggregate indications of decreasing financial intermediation over the 1990s. Banks that focused on investment in government bonds and non-lending activities enjoyed a relatively higher performance.

Abstract: "The authors jointly analyze the static, selection, and dynamic effects of domestic, foreign, and state ownership on bank performance. They argue that it is important to include indicators of all the relevant governance effects in the same model. "Nonrobustness" checks (which purposely exclude some indicators) support this argument. Using data from Argentina in the 1990s, their strongest and most robust results concern state ownership. State-owned banks have poor long-term performance (static effect), those undergoing privatization had particularly poor performance beforehand (selection effect), and these banks dramatically improved following privatization (dynamic effect. However, much of the measured improvement is likely due to placing nonperforming loans into residual entities, leaving "good" privatized banks."--World Bank web site.

Abstract: Previous empirical analyses have found that bank privatizations are more successful when the government fully relinquishes control, when the bank is privatized to a strategic investor, and when foreign-owned banks are allowed to participate in the bidding. The privatization of Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB) to the South African bank Stanbic met all these criteria, suggesting that it is a likely candidate for success. But other features suggest reasons for caution: UCB dominated the Ugandan banking sector prior to privatization and the institutional environment in Uganda was less favorable than in many of the middle-income countries looked at in earlier empirical studies. Despite these concerns, the privatization appears to have been relatively successful. The portfolio of the privatized bank, which was cleaned prior to sale, remains relatively strong and profitability and credit growth are now on par with other Ugandan banks. Though market segmentation remains a concern since Stanbic faces little or no direct competition in many remote areas, some early results suggest that access to credit has improved for some hard-to-serve groups.

We empirically investigate the role of country governance in the privatization of 113 government-owned banks from 1996 to 2007 across 39 countries. First, privatized banks tend to outperform non-privatized banks after the privatization, which is called the privatization effect. Second, we find that the privatization effect is much larger in developing countries compared to those in developed countries, suggesting that the privatization effect is systematically related to a country's level of economic development. Third, we discover that country governance enhances the privatization effect in developing countries, which is consistent with the hypothesis that countries with good-governance can minimize the likelihood of political intervention via residual ownership. Conversely, we also find that country governance reduces the privatization effect in developed countries due to smaller spaces for improvement.

"This paper takes stock of recent privatization trends, examines the extent to which government ownership is still prevalent in developing countries, and summarizes emerging issues for state enterprise reform going forward. Between 1990 and 2003, 120 developing countries carried out nearly 8,000 privatization transactions and raised $410 billion in privatization revenues. Privatization activity peaked in 1997 and dropped off in the late 1990s and, while still at overall low levels, is slowly creeping back. While there are a large number of studies assessing the impact of privatization on enterprise performance and overall welfare, there are no systematic data on the extent to which privatization has changed the role of state enterprises in the economy. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the state's role has been substantially reduced in Eastern and Central Europe and in certain countries in Latin America. But available evidence also suggests that, despite a long track record of privatization, government ownership in state enterprises is still widely prevalent in some regions and countries, and in certain sectors in virtually all regions. The paper shows that the costs of not reforming state enterprises are high and that continued efforts need to be made to improve their performance by improving privatization policies and institutions; adopting more of a case-by-case approach for complex sectors and countries; and exposing state enterprises to market discipline through new private entry and exit of unviable firms and improvements in their corporate governance. "--World Bank web site.

Research suggests that if the majority of a country's financial institutions are owned by the state, that country will experience slower financial development, less efficient financial systems, less private sector credit, and slower GDP growth. Yet more than 40 percent of the world's population live in countries in which public sector institutions dominate the banking system. In The Role of State-Owned Financial Institutions: Policy and Practice noted experts discuss the challenges presented by state-owned financial institutions and offer cross-disciplinary solutions for policymakers and banking regulators. The issues include: methods for effectively managing, reforming, and privatizing state-owned banks; the fiscal costs and contingent liabilities of state-owned banks; macroeconomic implications and the impact of state-owned banking on access to credit in an economy; guidance for effective supervision of state-owned banks; managerial perspectives on improving products, human resources, and risk; management case studies of different methods of privatization, such as initial public offerings, employee stock ownership plans, and strategic investors Contributors include David Binns (Beyster Institute), Robert Cull (World Bank), Ron Gilbert (ESOP Services), James A. Hanson (World Bank), Richard Hemming (International Monetary Fund), Fred Huibers (ING Research), Arminio Fraga (formerly Central Bank of Brazil), Nicholas Lardy (Institute for International Economics), David Marston (International Monetary Fund), Moody's Global Investor Service, Herman Mulder (ABN-Amro), William Nichol (Deutsche Bank AG), Urjit Patel (Infrastructure Development Finance Company, India), and P. S. Srinivas (World Bank).